A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts by Westbrook, Jay Lawrence




A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts
Jay Lawrence Westbrook
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Westbrook, Jay Lawrence, "A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts" (1989). Minnesota Law Review. 1587.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1587





I. The Problem .......................................... 231
A. The Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Contracts .... 231
B. Recent History ................................... 233
1. Context ....................................... 233
2. Traditional Approaches ....................... 234
3. The Material Breach Test .................... 236
C. The Current Difficulties ......................... 239
II. Functional Analysis ................................... 242
A. The Basics ........................................ 247
1. What makes Contracts Unique in
Bankruptcy? ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
2. Nonbankruptcy Law .......................... 249
3. The Limitation of Remedies in Bankruptcy.. 252
B. Specific Performance ............................. 255
C. An Interest in the Thing Itself ................... 257
D. Step-By-Step Analysis ............................ 263
1. Debtor As Buyer .............................. 263
2. Debtor as Seller .............................. 268
E. Impact of the Avoiding Powers .................. 270
F. Discharge ......................................... 275
G. Assumption and Rejection: Deciding to Perform
or Breach ......................................... 280
H. Summary of the Functional Approach ........... 281
III. The Pernicious Effects of Executoriness ............. 282
* Andrews & Kurth Centennial Professor of Law, The University of
Texas at Austin. This article is respectfully dedicated to Professor Vern Coun-
tryman, whose work is the standard for all of us who labor in the vineyards of
commercial law. Development of the concepts in this paper has been greatly
aided by conversations with Elizabeth Warren and Douglas Whaley. I am es-
pecially grateful to my colleague Douglas Laycock for his comments on earlier
drafts. I am also indebted to James M. Bettis for indefatigable help with the
research, as well as to David Hurst for all his assistance in recent months.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A. A Rule Without A Reason ....................... 282
B. Treating State Law Questions as Matters of
Executoriness ..................................... 285
C. Ancillary Obligations ....................... 287
1. Debtor as Buyer .............................. 288
2. Debtor as Seller .............................. 292
D. Executoriness Masking an Avoiding Powers
Problem .......................................... 294
IV. Exemplary Cases ...................................... 295
A . Rovine ............................................ 295
1. The Executoriness Analysis .................. 297
2. A Functional Analysis ........................ 299
3. The Shift in Equities in Chapter 11 .......... 302
B. Richmond ......................................... 305
1. The Executoriness Analysis .................. 307
2. A Functional Analysis ........................ 308
3. The Pseudo Avoiding Power ................. 309
a. Preference Analysis ....................... 311
b. The No-Transfer, Undelivered-Seller
Analysis ................................... 312
c. Fraudulent Conveyance Analysis ......... 313
C. Other Important Recent Cases ................... 315
1. Land-Sale Option Contracts .................. 316
2. Land-Sale Contracts as Mortgages ............ 317
3. "Qui Bono?" Cases ............................ 322
V. The Exclusionary Approach .......................... 323
VI. Precedent ............................................. 332
Conclusion ............................................ 335
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is that volume of the law that might have been
written by Lewis Carroll, every conventional legal principle re-
fracted through the prism of insolvency. In that fact lies much
of its students' joy - and their frustration. In no chapter of
that volume has the law become more psychedelic than in the
one titled "executory contracts." The courts increasingly voice
cries of confusion and frustration over the treatment of con-
tracts in bankruptcy.1 Critics express growing concern about
decisions that are deeply disruptive of commercial expectations,
concerns awkwardly and inadequately addressed by recent con-
1. E.g., In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 54-57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); see infra
note 446.
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gressional patchwork.2
Resolution of these difficulties has recently grown more
pressing as more bankruptcy cases are filed with rejection of
executory contracts as a primary motive.3 Although these in-
clude large and visible proceedings like the Continental Air-
lines case,4 the greater social and commercial problem lies in
thousands of medium sized cases, from the soap opera actress
who wants to jump to another network5 to the Burger King
franchisee who wants to shuck its anti-competition covenant.6
If people continue to view bankruptcy as a device for painlessly
voiding commercial contracts, then it will be transformed from
a hospital for treating troubled companies into a morgue for
commercial expectations. On the other hand, judicial and polit-
ical over-reaction to these cases may lead to rules that cripple
bankruptcy's legitimate functions, especially the reorganization
of financially troubled companies. If we are to avoid these dan-
gers, we must completely reconstruct the fundamentals of
bankruptcy contract law. My purpose in this Article is to begin
that task by proposing a new and relatively simple conceptual
framework to replace the bemusing complexity of current case
law.
For more than a century, federal courts sitting in bank-
ruptcy have assumed that a pre-bankruptcy contract must be
"executory" in order to be assumed or rejected by a trustee in
2. See Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 100-506,
102 Stat. 2538 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 365) (West Supp. 1989). See infra
notes 434, 447 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 397.
4. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 Bankr. 67, 71-72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1984) (rejecting collective bargaining agreement not the primary motive for fil-
ing), later proceeding, 50 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 57
Bankr. 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 57 Bankr. 839 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex.), later proceeding, 60 Bankr. 459 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 57
Bankr. 842 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 57 Bankr. 845 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1985), later proceeding, 60 Bankr. 466 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceed-
ing, 60 Bankr. 472 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 60 Bankr. 484 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 60 Bankr. 903 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceed-
ing, 64 Bankr. 858 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 64 Bankr. 862 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 64 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceed-
ing, 64 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.), later proceeding, 64 Bankr. 882 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 790 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1986).
5. See In re Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156, 160 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (finding
that debtor cannot reject personal services contract where major motivation is
a more lucrative agreement); infra note 398.
6. See Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 6 Bankr.
661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (Rovine II) (holding noncompete clause of
franchise agreement rejectable as part of executory contract).
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bankruptcy. Because assumption and rejection are merely
bankruptcy terms for performance or breach by the trustee,
one can say that the courts have required a finding of "ex-
ecutoriness" in a contract before the trustee is permitted to per-
form or breach it. In the mid-1970s, in two articles in the
Minnesota Law Review,7 Professor Countryman took a great
muddle of confused and often wrong decisions and made them
coherent by developing his famous "material breach" test for
determining if a contract satisfied the courts' requirement of
executoriness.8 This test has greatly improved the results in
the courts.9 Yet severe problems remain and their number is
increasing.
I believe we are now ready to build upon Professor Coun-
tryman's brilliant accomplishment and to take the necessary
further step: abolishing the requirement of executoriness alto-
gether. That is, I suggest that no such threshold finding should
be necessary to assume or reject a bankruptcy contract. In-
stead, I will argue that the estate, as successor to the debtor's
pre-bankruptcy contracts, is in exactly the same position as any
other. contract party under nonbankruptcy law, with just three
exceptions: a) pro rata payment of a usually small percentage
of the breach of contract claims against the debtor;' 0 b) denial
of specific performance against the estate of purely contractual
covenants;" and c) the effect of the avoiding powers.12 Al-
though the demonstration requires some extensive analysis, the
result will greatly simplify the problem.
I call my approach "functional," because it proceeds by
working through the problem from first principles.13 This re-
7. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (pts. 1 & 2), 57
MI-N. L. REv. 439 (1973), 58 MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Country-
man (pt. 1), Countryman (pt. 2)].
8. Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 460, quoted infra text accompany-
ing note 46.
9. See infra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
13. Several cases purport to follow a "functional" approach after In re
Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.), cert denied sub nom Still v. Chattanooga
Memorial Park, 439 U.S. 929 (1978). See In re Sentle Trucking Corp., 93
Bankr. 551, 557 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86
Bankr. 922, 928 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Fox, 83 Bankr. 290, 299 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988). These cases, however, turn on examining "executoriness" first,
then looking further to see if the estate benefits, an approach likely to lead to
somewhat extreme results, as in In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982). See infra text accompanying notes 387-91. Although I think these
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form, which is well within the competence of the courts to
adopt under the present Code, will not change existing bank-
ruptcy policies with respect to contracts. On the contrary, it
will help ensure that they are better understood and more con-
sistently applied.
I. THE PROBLEM
[Definitions like the material breach test] are helpful, but do not
resolve this problem. The key, it seems, to deciphering the meaning
of the executory contract rejection provisions, is to work backward,
proceeding from an examination of the purposes rejection is expected
to accomplish.14
A. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTS
The question addressed in the bankruptcy courts under the
rubric "executory contracts" is the treatment of contracts to
which the debtor was a party prior to bankruptcy. Each pre-
bankruptcy contract represents a bundle of rights belonging to
the estate (the obligations of the other party to the contract)
and potential claims against the estate (the obligations of the
debtor under the contract). The trustee has the choice of "as-
suming" a pre-bankruptcy contract or "rejecting" it. These are
merely bankruptcy terms for performance or breach.1 5 If the
trustee assumes a contract, the estate is bound to perform it
and the other party to the contract (Other Party)16 is required
to perform as well.'1 If the trustee rejects the contract, the es-
tate has breached and is liable for a damage claim by the Other
Party, while the Other Party ordinarily is excused from further
performance under normal contract principles.' 8 The trustee is
given broad discretion to assume or reject, whichever course
will maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate and minimize
courts have the right instinct, the functional analysis suggested here com-
pletely abandons executoriness.
14. In re Jolly, 574 F.2d at 351.
15. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 365(g); 5 02(g) (1988). But see Andrew, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REv.
845, 883-84 (1988) (finding labelling of rejection as "breach" unfortunate).
Strictly speaking, assumption and rejection represent the decision to perform
or breach. See infra Section II. G.
16. Henceforth, for ease of reference, the nonbankrupt party to a pre-
bankruptcy contract shall be referred to as the "Other Party."
17. 2 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 365.01[2] n.18, 365.08[1] n.5
(15th ed. 1988) [hereinafter COLLIER 15th].
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 243, 245 (1979).
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claims against it. 19
If the trustee rejects the contract, the damage claim is cal-
culated under state contract law, but is treated as a pre-petition
debt, just like the debtor's pre-petition rent or printing bill,
even though the actual breach caused by rejection necessarily
takes place after the bankruptcy petition is filed and the
trustee appointed.20 By contrast, when a contract is assumed,
the estate's obligations are treated as post-petition administra-
tion claims, just like the trustee's fees or amounts owed post-
petition providers of insurance and storage for the estate's
property.21 Because administration claims are paid first, they
usually are paid in full.
2 2
This apparently simple problem has given rise to one of the
most confused and difficult areas of modem bankruptcy law,
especially in Chapter 11 reorganizations. The reason is that the
trustee's decision to assume or reject can have some fairly re-
markable consequences. For example, the trustee can specu-
late on the rise or fall of a market and assume or reject a pre-
existing contract for the purchase or sale of goods depending on
the way the market has gone since the contract was made. The
trustee as seller in a fluctuating market will assume the con-
tract if the market falls (forcing the Other Party to buy at a
price over market) or reject the contract if the market rises
(selling to some other buyer at a market price higher than the
contract price).3 Where else in the law do we permit a seller
with a firm contract of sale to speculate at the buyer's expense,
often to the seller's great profit? These results suggest that the
trustee somehow is not bound to the contract, yet can bind the
Other Party, a consequence that seems almost magical to the
legal mind. Such magic irresistibly suggests some congressional
grant of a special bankruptcy "power" to ignore the normal
rules of commerce for the benefit of the estate. Because these
19. COLLIER 15th, supra note 17, 365.03 (discussing trustee's discretion
under the "business judgment" rule).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1988).
21. 1 §§ 365(g)(2)(A), 503(b), 507(a)(1).
22. See, e.g., In re Pearson, 90 Bankr. 638, 642 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988) (giv-
ing priority to balance of defaulted car loan as administrative expense). There
are exceptions, for example, in cases involving super-priorities, but they do not
affect the validity of the proposition in most cases. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(b), 364(c)
(1988).
23. See generally E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDIToRS 492-93 (1986) (describing typical problems concerning assump-
tion and rejection).
[Vol. 74:227232
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 233
effects have not been analyzed or understood in a systematic
way, they have remained apparently magical.
B. RECENT HISTORY
1. Context
A systematic explanation of the treatment of bankruptcy
contracts requires an understanding of the operation of the ma-
terial breach test. The operation of the test is better under-
stood in the context of the recent intellectual history of
bankruptcy law.24
Bankruptcy is relatively young law. Our legal ancestors
achieved a workable bankruptcy statute less than a century
ago, after a hundred years of struggle to comply with the Con-
stitution's mandate. 2s The statute that emerged in 1898 was it-
self short and undetailed.26 The most dramatic advances in
American bankruptcy law since then, the codification of the
"chapter" or "payout" proceedings,2 7 were enacted under the
pressures of the Great Depression. They were pragmatically
brilliant, making ours the most sophisticated bankruptcy laws
in the world, but they were accomplished with little theoretical
understanding of reorganization and little appreciation of how
the new types of proceedings related to the liquidation proce-
dures we had developed from the British precedents and
statutes.
28
24. For two views of the long-term development of executory contract
law, see Andrew, supra note 15, at 856-81; Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at
440-50.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook,
Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An Analysis of the Creditors' Data,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 1091, 1098-1100. Although the Constitution.does not require
Congress to adopt national bankruptcy laws, Congress in the 19th century
clearly considered the authority to do so as creating a duty. See C. WARRMN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8 (1935).
26. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
27. Chandler Act of July 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883, repealed by Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682
codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74, 1201-31, 1301-30 (1988).
28. Some modern theorists are just beginning to grapple with building a
conceptual foundation for reorganization policies. See Jackson & Scott, On
The Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Credi-
tors'Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 158-78 (1989). Of course, even the statute of
1898 contained American innovations, especially the New World version of the
discharge, a fundamentally new creation in its breadth and moral concept.
See, e.g., 1 J. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY § 1.07(11], at 2-132.2 to .4 (1986).
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As a consequence, by the 1960s bankruptcy law consisted of
a thin statutory skeleton surrounded by an enormous corpus of
caselaw.29 Even though bankruptcy was in theory a statutory
subject, it had by then arrived at a position not unlike contract
law in the late nineteenth century, largely governed by a mass
of confusing and often incoherent precedent.3 0 Fortunately, a
group of scholars arose in the 1960s who played a role analo-
gous to the great compilers of the common law like Williston
and Corbin. The most notable were Professors Kennedy and
Countryman. These scholars organized and rationalized the
mass of cases into coherent doctrine,31 and made possible the
remarkable development represented by the Bankruptcy
Rules3 2 and ultimately the 1978 Bankruptcy Code3 3 (Code or
Bankruptcy Code).
In this heroic age of bankruptcy scholarship, Professor
Countryman's Minnesota Law Review articles4 were represen-
tative of the best of this work. The precedents governing bank-
ruptcy contracts had become a nightmare of confusion and
inconsistency by the mid-1970s.35 Professor Countryman took
this doctrine as he found it in the cases and made sense of it.
The material breach test that he developed in those articles had
the effect of correctly resolving a large number of the cases in
which the courts had followed confusion into error.
2. Traditional Approaches
Professor Countryman used a pragmatic approach rather
than the traditional, conceptual approach to bankruptcy con-
tracts. Before and after Countryman, scholars and judges have
proposed various conceptual understandings of the treatment in
29. See, e.g., V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR passim (1964).
30. I&
31. See, e.g., Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pts.
1 & 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407, 631 (1972); Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy, 11 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 177 (1978); Kennedy, Automatic Stays
Under The New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1 (1978).
32. Bankr. R. and Official Bankr. Forms, 411 U.S. 989 (1973); Bankr. R.
and Official Bankr. Forms, 415 U.S. 1003 (1974).
33. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended as The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-15312 (1988)).
34. See supra note 7.
35. There was confusion in the statutory reflections of the case law as
well. See generally Andrew, supra note 15, at 874-75 nn.120-29 (outlining
caselaw background to predecessor of § 365).
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bankruptcy of contracts outstanding on the filing date of the
bankruptcy petition. These efforts have not been satisfactory.
One traditional view derives from the fact that executory
contracts are "property of the estate" under section 541(a) of
the Code. This view treats such contracts just like the two left
shoes the trustee finds in the office cloakroom, to be sold if pos-
sible or abandoned if without value.36 This analysis will not do,
however, because the trustee cannot merely sell or abandon a
contract; the estate must pay for the rights it confers or pay
damages for abandoning it, burdens that do not attach to the
shoes.
3 7
Another view is that the executory contract is automati-
cally breached by bankruptcy, an implied anticipatory repudia-
tion, and that the trustee "cures" by assumption or declines to
cure by rejection. 38 Insofar as this analysis makes the state law
of anticipatory repudiation relevant to the problem, Professor
Countryman demonstrated that it is pernicious.3 9 Treating this
analysis as federal doctrine avoids his criticisms, but suggests
development of some special, post-hoc federal contract law that
is unnecessary and pernicious in its own way.40
Yet a third view is the "new entity" theory. This analysis
posits that the estate is a "new entity" that is not a party to the
pre-petition contract and is therefore free to assume or reject
it.4 1 This approach has a certain conceptual charm, but the
courts often show an instinctive wariness about it, an unarticu-
lated anxiety.42 The judicial instinct is likely correct because
the notion of a "new entity" not bound by the contract conflicts
with the trustee's duty to pay damages for rejecting the con-
tract.43 Because payment of damages for nonperformance of a
36. See COLLIER 15th, supra note 17, % 365.01, at 365-8; E. WARREN & J.
WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 509; Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 440.
37. See COLLIER 15th, supra note 17, % 365.01, at 365-12.
38. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581, 592
(1916) (finding that Other Party could sue for breach when debtor became
bankrupt and trustee had not assumed contract).
39. Countryman, State Law (pt. 1), sup'ra note 31, at 412-26. But see An-
drew, supra note 15, at 872-73.
40. But see E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 509.
41. See, e.g., Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc.,
519 F.2d 698, 704 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding post-bankruptcy debtor is new
entity no longer bound by labor agreement).
42. See In re Unishops, Inc., 543 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1976) (refusing to
apply "new entity" theory beyond labor agreements); see also NLRB v.
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527-29 (1984) (finding debtor in possession not "new en-
tity," but has option to reject labor agreement).
43. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528.
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contract is the very relief a breaching party normally suffers,
an obligation to pay damages is, by definition, proof that the
party is bound by that contract.4 By the same token, the
power to assume the contract, even over the Other Party's ob-
jection, is hardly consistent with the notion of a separate entity
that is not a party to the contract. If the new-entity approach
avoids these shoals by saying the new entity is bound by, and is
the beneficiary of, the contract as a successor, then the estate's
position is indistinguishable from that of the original party, the
debtor, and the analysis explains nothing.
The "material breach" test filled this conceptual void.
With outrd results unexplained, the test served as a talisman.
It also permitted the courts to manipulate a concept essentially
without content in order to produce what seemed to be the cor-
rect result in a particular case. Unfortunately, because bank-
ruptcy policy is so often counter-intuitive, at least to
nonbankruptcy judges, the courts fairly often got these cases
wrong.
3. The Material Breach Test
Professor Countryman took a very nontraditional, prag-
matic approach in the Minnesota Law Review articles.45 He fo-
cused upon the problem as it was actually articulated in the
courts: the existence of a pre-bankruptcy contract that could be
characterized as executory. From this perspective he developed
what has become the standard test for an executory contract:
[A] contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing the performance of the other.4 6
Only a contract that satisfied this test could be assumed by the
estate.47
The material breach analysis properly resolves many cases
and is widely cited in the courts. 48 Although I will not claim to
44. See id. But see Andrew, supra note 15, at 878.
45. Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7; Countryman (pt. 2), supra note 7.
46. Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 460.
47. Id at 461.
48. E.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership), 882
F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (4th Cir.
1985), cert denied sub nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986);
Benevides v. Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Knutson
(Northwest Airlines v. Klinger), 563 F.2d 916, 917 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
In re Stein and Day, Inc., 81 Bankr. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
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have done a before-and-after, case-by-case comparison, it is
clear to me that the test has greatly reduced the number of ju-
dicial errors in treating contracts in bankruptcy and has greatly
clarified everyone's understanding of the issues. This achieve-
ment was recognized when the 1978 Code codified the caselaw
of executory contracts. 49 The legislative history of section 365,
"Executory Contracts," cited the material breach test as an ex-
ample of the general understanding of the concept, although
the drafters stopped short of actually incorporating the test into
the Code.-°
The test was a godsend to judges perplexed by the strange
results they found in bankruptcy contract cases. Rarely in legal
history has a legal test suggested by a scholar been so quickly
and widely adopted by the courts. Several courts of appeal
adopted the test5l and many of the judges using it are expert in
bankruptcy matters. Any theory based on a wholly different
approach than Countryman's had best explain why the material
breach test was so helpful to these courts. By the same token,
an understanding of the reasons for the great success of this
test will enable us to grasp its limitations, the reasons it does
not work in important categories of contemporary cases.
The test has been enormously helpful for three reasons.
First, it prevents assumption of a contract unless the Other
Party owes a material performance. As we will see, it is very
rare that assumption would be desirable for the estate unless
the Other Party owes further performance of a valuable sort.52
Therefore, this test avoids assumption of contracts when as-
sumption would not be beneficial to the estate.53
Second, the "material breach" language focuses the courts'
attention on questions of state law. It is there, in state contract
Learning Publications, Inc., 94 Bankr. 763, 764 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); see also
Counties Contracting and Constr. Co. v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 855 F.2d
1054, 1060 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing whether insurance policies are executory).
49. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (ef-
fective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended as The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1-15132 (1988)).
50. See generally H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347, -eprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6303 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT];
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5844 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 155 n.5 (1973). Section 4-602 of the Bankruptcy Com-
mission's bill, to which note 7 is appended, was the predecessor to the current
section 365. Id. at 152.
51. E.g., Streets, 882 F.2d at 235; Richmond, 756 F.2d at 1045-46.
52. See infra Section H. D.
53. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 892 n.173.
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and remedies law, that the hard issues of bankruptcy contracts
usually are found.1 The material breach test does not work
consistently in this way, but it nonetheless is a great advance
over what went before it, because it often causes the courts to
analyze the state law questions that are at the heart of a bank-
ruptcy contract problem.55
Finally, and most importantly, the material breach test
often serves as a proxy for "finality" in a contractual transac-
tion. The analysis that follows will show that "finality" in this
context often means transfer to the Other Party of what can
loosely be called a "property right" - an interest arising under
nonbankruptcy law that cannot be reclaimed by a bankrupt
debtor unless the transfer of that interest can be avoided under
one of the avoiding powers.56 When the debtor prior to bank-
ruptcy has transferred such an unavoidable interest to the
Other Party, the estate will be unable to undo that transfer and
get back that property. Often that pre-petition transfer by the
debtor will have completed the debtor's material performance.
In that situation, the material performance test can indirectly
identify the existence of an interest in property that the estate
cannot reclaim.5 7
As with every intellectual advance, however, the clarifying
light of Professor Countryman's test revealed a new set of
problems. The very power and utility of the Countryman ap-
proach has prompted its application to more and more
problems where it is unable to give intuitively correct results,
even as the host of errors it prevents have largely disappeared
from the reporters. Many academics, judges, and lawyers are
left, I believe, with the maddening feeling that Countryman has
brought the final answer to the very tips of their tongues, but
no farther.
The consequence is that the Minnesota Law Review arti-
cles both permit and require us to re-examine the threshold re-
quirement that a contract be determined "executory" before it
is subject to "assumption" or "rejection." After more than a
decade of experience in the courts, we can now stand on the
54. E.g., Streets, 882 F.2d at 235.
55. E.g., In re Louisville Motor Exch. Inc., 26 Bankr. 490, 492-93 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1983) (continuing business relationship insufficient to imply execu-
tory agreement under state law).
56. See infra Section II. C.
57. E.g., Roxse Homes, Inc. v. Roxse Homes Ltd. Partnership, 83 Bankr.
185, 187 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re Lewis, 94 Bankr. 789, 794-95 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988).
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shoulders of Countryman and see over the wall of "executori-
ness." When we do so, we can see that the wall should be torn
down.
C. THE CuRRENT DIFFICULTIES
Ironically, the most obvious and striking errors in the re-
cent cases have arisen from the greatest benefit of the material
breach test, the indirect identification of cases in which the
Other Party has acquired a nonrejectable property interest.58 If
the debtor had completely performed, the test made the con-
tract nonexecutory and the transaction therefore irreversible, a
generally correct result. Unfortunately, this effect of the test
leads many courts to infer that executoriness must be found in
a contract or it cannot be rejected.59 The consequence is a con-
tract neither assumable nor rejectable, leaving it in a legal
limbo. The absurdity of that idea has been less damaging, how-
ever, than the next step taken by a number of courts, positing
that obligations owed to the Other Party can be rejected right
out of existence.60 The final, and most serious, complex of er-
rors in this line are the cases that suggest that rejection can
void property interests created pre-petition by state law, even
though they are not avoidable under the statutory avoiding
powers. 61 This last blunder brings the material breach test full
58. See infra Sections I1. C., IV. B.
59. E.g., In re Cutters, Inc., 104 Bankr. 886, 890 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989);
In re Stein and Day, Inc., 81 Bankr. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Wis-
consin Barge Line, Inc., 76 Bankr. 695, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); Carstens
Health Indus. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 47 Bankr. 842, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985); see Andrew, supra note 15, at 887 n.155.
60. E.g., In re KMMCO, 40 Bankr. 976, 977 (E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Gies-
ing, 96 Bankr. 229, 231 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989); see also Andrew, supra note
15, at 886.
61. E.g., Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Rich-
mond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
sub nom Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). This mistake has
been stood on its head by cases suggesting that the trustee is somehow bound
by - that is, bound to perform - contracts because they are nonexecutory.
Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1153
(3d Cir. 1989). This bizarre idea may be a reaction to cases that have tried to
use § 365 as an avoiding power. That is, the court in Hays may simply be try-
ing to say that the trustee cannot undo a contract that is "final" by rejecting it.
Although the intention is good, the effect is the same as coerced assumption
based not on any reliance or other equities, but on the executoriness of the
contract. The result in Hays, enforcement of an arbitration clause in a con-
tract, may well be correct, but the analysis lays up trouble for the future in
the Third Circuit. I made my own suggestions for a correct analysis of bank-
ruptcy treatment of arbitration clauses in an article in this review a few years
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circle, compounding the very error that it at first prevented.
Three examples should suffice to illustrate these problems.
I will describe them briefly here, reserving a full discussion for
the section following the theoretical analysis.62 The first exam-
ple is a leading Fourth Circuit case, In re Richmond Finish-
ers.6 3 The Richmond court permitted a technology licensor to
rescind a license under the guise of rejecting an executory con-
tract.64 This case seems to suggest that inventors might rou-
tinely use Chapter 11 to void licenses whenever a better deal
comes along. The result is so deeply disruptive of commercial
expectations and needs that Congress has adopted an amend-
ment to the Code to limit the applicability of the executory
contract "power" with respect to certain intellectual property
contracts.
6 5
I will attempt to demonstrate that such an over reaction
was not justified, that the case was simply an example of "ex-
ecutoriness" leading a court to a wrong result. More generally,
I hope to bury the use of the Richmond analysis for other sorts
of contracts. Otherwise it will threaten commercial expecta-
tions in many other instances, including trademark contracts,
which are not covered by the new amendment.6
6
A second area of great difficulty involves covenants not to
compete. The leading example is In re Rovine.67 In Rovine,
the court found that a franchise contract with an anti-competi-
tion covenant was executory aid therefore the Chapter 11
debtor could reject it and compete freely with the franchisor
(Burger King).68 Although the case may have been correctly
ago. Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bank-
ruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595, 623-24 (1983).
62. See infra Section IV.
63. Richmond, 756 F.2d at 1043.
64. I& at 1048.
65. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 365 (West Supp. 1989)). The exemp-
tion is only partial, because trademark licenses are excluded.
66. Id.
67. Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 6 Bankr. 661,
666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (Rovine II); accord In re Constant Care Com-
munity Health Center, Inc., 99 Bankr. 697, 702 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989); Silk
Plants, Etc. Franchise Sys., v. Register (In re Register), 95 Bankr. 73, 74
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn.), aff'd, iO0 Bankr. 360 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Silver, 26
Bankr. 526, 530-31 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1983); see also In re Eli Witt Co., 39
Bankr. 984, 988 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (holding as in Rovine but with an op-
posite fact situation: debtor corporation rejected former employees' no-com-
pete contracts based on theory of executory contracts).
68. Rovine II, 6 Bankr. at 666.
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decided, its rationale is consistent with enabling franchisees to
shrug off their franchise obligations as easily as inventors could
revoke licenses under the Richmond decision.69 Other courts
have gotten the result wrong, as well as the analysis.70 Once
again, the "executoriness" doctrine has diverted the courts
from the real issues before them, and the consequence has been
to cloud important commercial expectations.
A third example is a recent spate of cases involving land-
sale contracts. Two types of cases are common. In the first
type, the debtor enters bankruptcy with a valuable option to
purchase real estate, but no remaining obligation to the Other
Party to the contract (the option price having been paid). Some
courts have denied the debtor's other creditors the benefit of
the option, because the lack of material performance remaining
on the debtor's side made the contract not executory and there-
fore nonassumable. 71
A second sub-genre of land-sale cases poses an issue of
characterization: is a contract for sale of land really a disguised
security device? Instead of focusing on this state-law question,
69, Lubrizol Enters., v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub nom
Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); see supra text accompanying
note 61.
70. E.g., Hardee's Food Sys. v. KBAR, Inc. (In re KBAIR, Inc.), 96 Bankr.
158, 159-60 (Bankr. C.D. IM. 1988) (holding that Hardee's franchise terminated
pre-bankruptcy; contract not executory and covenant enforced); In re Hawes,
73 Bankr. 584, 586 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (finding that employer could en-
force covenant not to compete against former employee because employment
contract was not executory; employment relationship ended when employee
ceased performing duties); In re Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 839, 843 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1987) (alternative ground) (holding that franchise agreement was not an
executory contract and debtor franchisees were not entitled to reject covenant
not to compete contained in agreement where, franchise agreement was near
expiration, debtor had breached it, debtor had reaped all the benefits under
the agreement, franchisor had met its obligations, and only remaining obliga-
tion was debtor's not to compete); Carstens Health Indus. v. Cooper (In re
Cooper), 47 Bankr. 842, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that where credi-
tor-employer had no performance obligations, employment contract was not
executory and debtor-employee's non-competition requirement could not be
rejected); Immugen, Inc. v. Sapse (In- re Sapse), 31 Bankr. 914, 915 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding contract for sale of business nonexecutory, covenant
not to compete enforceable, and jurisdiction to prohibit debtor conduct that
would diminish the value of stock belonging to the estate); see also Central
Control Alarm Corp. v. Black (In re Central Watch), 22 Bankr. 561, 565
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982) (finding executory employment contract containing
noncompete covenant still enforceable against former officer after debtor-cor-
poration's Chapter 11 plan was confirmed).
71. See infra notes 370-73.
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a number of courts have resolved the cases in terms of the
bankruptcy doctrine of "executoriness." The result is an al-
most random assortment of right and wrong outcomes.72 More
seriously, in the long run, the confusion engendered by the "ex-
ecutoriness" concept produced an important opinion by a lead-
ing jurist that seems to put many real estate sellers at risk of a
fundamental post-hoc change in the bargain they made, a result
that threatens an important and legitimate type of real estate
transaction.73
A number of scholars are concerned about these
problems.74 While this article was in draft, a first-rate article
appeared identifying many of the problems that I address and
suggesting some of the same distinctions I think would be help-
ful.75 The reader familiar with Michael Andrew's article will
be better prepared to understand this one and may already be
disposed to abandon the dark glass of "executoriness" through
which we have too long seen bankruptcy contract problems.
On the other hand, I fear that parts of his analysis invite us to
develop a new metaphysics of executory contracts to replace
the old, rather than penetrating entirely through the problem
to a straightforward understanding of bankruptcy contracts as
governed by the same principles and rules as the rest of bank-
ruptcy law. To that end, I propose to reexamine the role of
contracts in bankruptcy from the ground up. After doing that,
and discussing some of the leading cases from a new perspec-
tive, I will note how the Andrew analysis, excellent as it is, may
create some new and unnecessary obscurities.
II. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Professor Gilmore taught us:
It is a fairly reliable rule of thumb that, when courts with some
regularity begin to assign patently absurd reasons for their decisions,
the decisions themselves are sound and the underlying rule of law has
fallen out of touch with reality.76
72. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership),
882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989) (collecting conflicting Seventh Circuit cases).
73. See infra notes 387-94.
74. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMmIS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 105-21
(1986); E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 509-20; Byers & Tuggey,
Oil and Gas Leases and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Ap-
proach, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 337, 337-54 (1989) [hereinafter Byers & Tuggey].
75. Andrew, supra note 15.
76. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 20.1
(1965).
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Whenever an area of law has become conceptually and doc-
trinally confused, it is always helpful to return to first princi-
ples. I concede that law reviews these days are too full of
desert-island theorizing - stick-figure actors isolated from re-
ality and provided only a banana and a demand curve.77 None-
theless, a return to simple basics is an essential prerequisite
before we turn to the reality of exemplary cases.
The executoriness requirement is a limitation on assump-
tion or rejection that is not found in the Code. Section 36578
constrains assumption in three ways. It forbids assumption
when assignment is not permitted by applicable nonbankruptcy
law.7 9 If a contract is assumable, it requires the curing of most
defaults, as well as provision of assurances about future per-
formance.8 0 Those are the only limitations imposed by the
Code. The executoriness requirement has been poured into the
word "executory" in section 365(a) by a century of caselaw.81
It is obvious that a contract must be executory to be as-
sumed or rejected, if the term is used in its ordinary sense to
mean merely that aspects of the contract were not fully per-
formed or satisfied on Bankruptcy Day. But if executoriness
had such a simple meaning, the requirement would be trivial.
The trustee need not, and could not, assume or reject a contract
fully performed a year before bankruptcy - nor would anyone
dream of doing so. Speaking of a "nonexecutory" contract in
that sense is like discussing a sunset after dark.8 2
The courts intend a more complex meaning in the term
"executory." They hold many contracts to be nonexecutory,
and therefore not subject to either assumption or rejection,
even though the contracts were not fully performed or satisfied
prior to bankruptcy. Yet they have never articulated an intelli-
gible distinction between unperformed contracts that are exec-
utory and those that are nonexecutory.
This section presents a functional analysis of the proper
treatment of bankruptcy contracts without reference to the
77. See generally Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Laws, Models, and Real
People: Choice of Chapter in Personal Bankruptcy, 13 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
661, 673 (1988) (suggesting that theories of legal change are often based on the
abstract models of armchair theorists who fail to determine the strengths and
limitations of such models).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
79. Id. § 365(c)(1).
80. Id. §§ 365(b), 365(f).
81. See supra note 24.
82. We ignore, for the moment, the effect of the avoiding powers. See in-
fra Section IV. E.
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caselaw requirement of "executoriness." I argue that general
principles of bankruptcy explain why bankruptcy contracts are
sometimes treated differently than contracts outside of bank-
ruptcy. The treatment of contracts in bankruptcy is merely a
subset of those general bankruptcy principles. Looking only to
these general principles, it is possible to demonstrate all the ba-
sic propositions that govern a proper understanding of bank-
ruptcy contract law.
This discussion observes the following convention: "right"
will mean the debtor's right, and "obligation" will mean the
debtor's obligation, unless the context reveals a different inten-
tion. This convention is necessary because all contractual
rights are obligations and conversely, so it is important to re-
member which is which, from which perspective, at any point
in the analysis. The double-sided, asymmetrical nature of exec-
utory contract analysis in bankruptcy is the principal reason it
is so difficult and confusing, a point that will become evident as
we proceed.
Section A begins by examining the factors that make the
trustee's treatment of pre-bankruptcy contracts a unique prob-
lem.8 3 The trustee's routine duties are to maximize the value
of the property the estate has inherited from the pre-petition
debtor and to minirmnie the pre-petition claims against the es-
tate. Contracts are unique because they consist of both prop-
erty and claims, the debtor's rights under a contract and the
debtor's obligations. Furthermore, the rights and obligations
often are interdependent, with enjoyment of a particular right
dependent upon performance of a particular obligation. As a
result, the trustee's determination of the most profitable course
for the estate is much more complicated than for other types of
property and claims.8
Section A then discusses the basic proposition that the
trustee inherits from the pre-bankruptcy debtor a contract cre-
ated by nonbankruptcy law.8 5 The statutory option to "assume
or reject" means exactly what the Code says it means: the op-
tion to'perform or breach the contract,86 the same option every
contract party has under nonbankruptcy law. It follows that
the trustee is prima facie in the same position as any nonban-
kruptcy contract party, except when specific bankruptcy princi-
83. See infra text accompanying notes 94-102.
84. Id
85. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
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ples and rules require a different result. The section uses a
simple sales contract to illustrate the trustee's financial calcula-
tions in deciding whether to assume or reject under nonban-
kruptcy law.8 7
The last part of Section A introduces the principle that
generates all of the exceptions to the general proposition that
the trustee is in the same position as any other contract party.
That principle is equality of distribution.8 8 Equality among un-
secured creditors means that the Other Party to a bankruptcy
contract, like all other unsecured creditors, is not entitled to
full performance or payment of its claims against the debtor.
Instead, it ordinarily must be content with a tiny fraction of
those claims, proverbially ten cents on the dollar.8 9 The first
concrete consequence of the equality principle is that the
trustee can breach (reject) a contract profitably far more often
than can other contract parties because the trustee pays only a
fraction of contract damages rather than the full amount of the
Other Party's breach loss.9 From that simple proposition flows
most of the economic "magic" associated with bankruptcy con-
tract doctrine.
Section B explores the second consequence of the equality
principle, the fact that the Other Party ordinarily cannot get
specific performance of a contractual covenant, even if state
law would grant that relief.91 The reason is that specific per-
formance is full, 100% performance and therefore would violate
the equality principle by giving the Other Party far more from
the estate than is given to the other unsecured creditors.
Section C identifies the principal exception to the denial of
specific performance against the estate. The most important
and pervasive exception to the equality principle throughout
87. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
88. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. Other principles may
be important in particular cases, but the equality principle is the key point.
Cases that implicate other special incidents of bankruptcy, like acceleration of
debts, often are entangled with procedural questions under § 365. See, e.g., In
re Unishops, Inc., 543 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (finding that
contract of guarantee not executory and therefore not assumed). I look for-
ward to discussing them in another paper.
89. See Herbert & Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The
Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During
1984-87, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988); see also T. SULLIVAN, E.
WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIvE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND
CONSUMER CREDrr IN AMERICA 203-05 (1989) (analyzing amounts individual
debtors could pay from asset sales).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 128-32.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
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bankruptcy law is the enforcement of state-law interests in spe-
cific assets of the estate, what may loosely be called a "property
right" and what I call an "Interest in the Thing Itself" (ITI).92
The most common example of a creditor who enjoys the dra-
matically unequal advantages given by such rights is the holder
of a security interest. The "specific asset" or ITI exception to
the equality principle applies to an ITI created by a bankruptcy
contract, as it does elsewhere in bankruptcy, allowing an Other
Party with such an interest to compel its enforcement. To that
extent, the Other Party can obtain specific performance against
the estate.93 The Other Party thus cannot get specific perform-
ance of contractual covenants that are merely general, un-
secured claims against the debtor, but can get specific
performance of a "property right" or ITI.
Section D then goes step by step through a simple sales
contract, with the Debtor as Buyer and the Debtor as Seller.
Among other things, this example illustrates the asymmetrical
effect of the bankruptcy remedies rules.
Secticn E addresses the exception to the exception, the
constraints upon the Other Party's power to enforce a contrac-
tually created ITI. Because enforcement of ITIs is such a large
exception to the equality principle, that principle necessarily
limits enforcement of ITIs under various circumstances. Those
limitations are found in the avoiding powers, rather than in any
bankruptcy-contract principle, but they often operate in the
context of a supposed ITI created by a bankruptcy contract.
Applying those powers in the usual way, the trustee may avoid
an ITI created by a contract. If so, then the remainder of the
analysis of the contract follows the principles already discussed
where the Other Party has only general, unsecured claims
against the estate.
Section F completes the functional analysis of bankruptcy
contracts by explaining the role of the discharge. Just as the
equality principle controls the treatment of the Other Party's
rights against the estate, the fresh-start principle ordinarily
eliminates or greatly restricts the Other Party's rights against a
post-bankruptcy debtor, whether an individual or a newly reor-
ganized corporation. This section concludes by explaining how
the Other Party is protected from unfair tactics by other bank-
ruptcy principles, notably the cramdown rules.
Finally, Section G addresses the semantic confusion engen-
92. See infra text accompanying notes 138-43.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
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dered by the phrase "assume or reject," establishing the distinc-
tion between performing or breaching, as opposed to deciding
to perform or breach.
A. THE BAsIcs
1. What Makes Contracts Unique in Bankruptcy?
Contracts present unique problems in bankruptcy. The
reason is that every contract consists of both rights, which be-
come property of the estate under section 541,94 and obligations,
which become claims under section 502.95 Furthermore, these
rights and obligations often are interdependent, so that realiza-
tion of a right is dependent upon performance of an obligation.
These characteristics of a contract make the trustee's calcula-
tion of benefit and cost to the estate far more complicated than
for other property and other claims. Realizing on a drill press,
say, is straight-forward: if it will bring more than the cost of
sale, sell it. Otherwise, abandon it. Realizing on a contract
right can be more complicated, because the right is often depen-
dent on an obligation, so that the estate must perform the obli-
gation in order to be entitled to realize on the right.9 6 The
estate's performance thus becomes part of the "cost of sale" of
the contract right and the expense of performing the obligation
may exceed the proceeds of realization on the right. This inter-
dependence can be identified by the material breach test, which
is one reason it is so helpful.
Consider the example of a pre-petition contract with only
two remaining elements: the estate's right to the payment of
$500, and its obligation to pick onions growing on real property
belonging to the estate and deliver the onions to the Other
Party.97 The debtor's pre-petition contractual right becomes
part of the estate under section 541.98 Absent a procedural bob-
ble by the Other Party, its obligation attaches to the estate
94. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). But see In re Taylor, 103 Bankr. 511, 515-16
(D.N.J. 1989) (holding that personal services contract not property of the es-
tate but rejectable).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988); see T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 106.
96. See T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 106. For the important point that
the debtor in possession under Chapter 11 might have to consider ongoing eco-
nomic relationships in determining whether to accept or reject, see Epling,
Preconfirmation or Preclosing Payment of Pre-petition Claims in Bankruptcy,
94 CoM. L.J. 187, 193-94 (1989).
97. See infra Section II. D. 2. (discussing the case of the Debtor as Seller,
Uncompleted Contract).
98. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
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under section 502.99
Confronted with these contractual rights and obligations,
what should a trustee in bankruptcy do in light of the provi-
sions of the Code and the policies underlying them? In general,
the trustee is required to realize maximum value from property
of the estate. The trustee, or the debtor in possession (DIP),1' °
also is required to minimi e claims when appropriate; for exam-
ple, by objecting to those that are invalid or overblown. It must
do the same for contractual rights and obligations. It does these
things on behalf of a group of persons, the unsecured creditors,
who are not parties to the contract in question.10 1 These per-
sons have no moral or legal obligation to the Other Party and
generally cannot be blamed for any pre-petition misconduct or
imprudence of the debtor.
In our example, the trustee has inherited one contract
right (the right to receive $500) and one contract obligation (the
obligation to pick and deliver the onions). Its duty is to realize
the value of the right to payment, if it can do so at a cost of less
than $500. It also has the duty to minimize the obligation, if
possible, by buying the onions more cheaply elsewhere or by
breaching and paying damages, if that would cost less than per-
formance. The process of dealing with the contract right is in
principle no different from selling off a piece of the debtor's
equipment, if the cost of sale is less than the proceeds to be ob-
tained. Treatment of the contract obligation is the same as try-
ing to mitigate damages on a claim, as, for example, a pre-
petition tort claim, if the mitigation would increase the net dis-
99. I& § 502. This discussion assumes an unsecured transaction, the most
common contract situation. Some of the effects of security interests are dis-
cussed infra notes 380-86 and accompanying text.
100. I will refer to the Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession, 11 U.S.C. § 1107
(1988), as the "DIP." Most of the discussion in this first section will be in the
context of a Chapter 7 liquidation, but once the basic principles are established
we will find some of the most interesting problems in the Chapter 11 context.
In Chapters 7 and 13, the trustee is a she or he, but in Chapter 11 the DIP is
usually an "it," that is, a corporation or other artificial entity. I will use "it"
for trustee and DIP throughout.
101. The trustee also may act on behalf of the debtor and other parties
with an interest in the estate, especially in rehabilitation cases. See generally
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 777 n.3 (1987) (arguing
that bankruptcy is an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and
to distribute the consequences among several different actors). As among
creditors, the beneficiaries of the trustee's efforts often will be the unsecured
creditors with priorities, rather than general unsecured creditors. See Herbert
& Pacitti, supra. note 89, at 313-15. But these refinements may be ignored for
present purposes.
[Vol. 74:227
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 249
tribution to other unsecured creditors 0 2
2. Nonbankruptcy Law
In the process of maximizing the benefit of the contractual
rights the trustee has inherited, and minimizing the burdens of
the contractual obligations, the trustee must begin with the
central fact that these rights and obligations are completely de-
fined by nonbankruptcy law, usually state contract law.103 The
contract rights are not even tangible property. They are utterly
constructs of a state legal regime that requires us to perform
many of our promises much of the time. The rights and obliga-
tions by definition were created before bankruptcy law began
to operate as to this debtor. In general, therefore, these rights
and obligations - and the benefits and burdens they bring to
the estate - in all respects are governed by state contract
law.104 One corollary is of special importance in some cases:
state law determines what bundle of contractual rights and ob-
ligations are to be considered together as a single contract (sin-
gle contract or contract). 0 5
102. The trustee might decide to pay the medical bills of an indigent tort
victim, for example, if the result would be to lessen the estate's liability. But
see Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir.
1988) (reversing order to pay for Dalkon Shield claimants' treatment before
confirming debtor's plan of reorganization).
103. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, reference to "state
law," means applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether state, federal, or foreign.
104. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1979) (holding that the
Bankruptcy Act generally follows state law in determining property rights in
the estate's assets). This general proposition, however, does not imply that
bankruptcy policies should be narrowly understood, so that state law results
should almost never be changed in bankruptcy. See Nimmer, Negotiated
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contri-
butions, 36 EMoRY L.J. 1009, passim (1987); Warren, supra note 101, passim.
But see Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Di-
verse Ownership Interests, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 97, 100 (1984).
105. Because state contract law often makes the rights and obligations con-
tained in a single contract dependent upon each other, the grouping of rights
and obligations into separate contracts is often important in understanding
them. No bankruptcy principle changes the state-law grouping rules. Thus,
the trustee must deal with pre-petition contractual rights and obligations in
those bundles called single contracts, as they are defined by state law or other
nonbankruptcy law. E.g., In re Cutters, Inc., 104 Bankr. 886, 889 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1989) (finding contract for sale of business severable; covenant not to
compete part of nonexecutory segment); In re Gardinier, Inc., 50 Bankr. 491,
493-94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (holding broker's right to commission severable
from land-sale contract and not executory), rev'd, 831 F.2d 974, (11th Cir.
1987), cert denied sub nonm Byrd v. Gardinier, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 140 (1988); see
Westbrook, supra note 61, at 623-24 & nn.112-16 (discussing cases holding that
nonbankruptcy law makes arbitration clauses severable contracts, permitting
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This is an appropriate place to emphasize that section 365,
and any supposed special rules governing "executory" con-
tracts, have nothing to do with the entry of pre-bankruptcy
contracts into the estate. One thing that always confuses stu-
dents about executory contracts is that section 365(a) (granting
the "power" to assume or reject) starts with the contract al-
ready in the estate. As already noted, it comes in under sec-
tions 541 (rights) and 502 (obligations). 1°6 Indeed, section 541
contains the key provision that ensures that contractual rights
become property of the estate despite efforts to restrict their
assignability.10 7 So the contract attaches to the estate without
any reference to section 365 and exactly as it existed at state
law at the moment of bankruptcy. 0 8
Even the trustee's "power" to assume or reject in section
365(a) is not a special rule of bankruptcy law. This option
means merely that the trustee may (must) perform or breach
any single contract.10 9 We know that is what it means because
the Code itself says just that. 0 Yet state law gives this option
to every party to every contract. Posner or Holmes would say
this principle is unequivocal;"' others might limit it on moral
grounds. Putting to one side the moral question, to which we
will return," 2 state contract law permits a party to choose be-
tween performing or breaching and paying damages, at least
when an award of damages can fairly and sensibly compensate
their assumption or rejection separate from main contract). This proposition
is related to the rule that the trustee must assume a contract as a whole, cum
onere. Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946); Country-
man (pt. 2), supra note 7, at 535; 2 COLIER 15th, supra note 17, % 365.01; see
infra note 272.
106. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988).
108. See generally Butner, 440 U.S. at 57 (holding that state law determines
the property rights in the bankruptcy estate's assets).
109. E.g., Societe Nationale Algerienne pour la Recherche, la Production, le
Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v.
Distrigas Corp., 80 Bankr. 606, 609 (D. Mass. 1987). But see Andrew, supra
note 15, at 883-84. Assumption and rejection are just slightly different from
performance or breach, a point discussed in Section II. G.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
111. R. POSNER, ECONOMC ANALYSIS OF LAW 106 (3d ed. 1986); 0. HOLMES,
THE CommoN LAw 301 (1923); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 462 (1897). But see Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARv. L. REV. 687 (1990). Although Laycock is utterly persuasive that specific
relief is routinely available where necessary, he also finds that it is nonethe-
less rarely granted. See infra note 172.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
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the Other Party." 3 The debtor had that option and so does the
trustee.11
4
Thus a trustee must look to state contract law in the first
instance to evaluate the contractual rights and obligations con-
nected to the estate. The contractual rights are property of the
estate and, as with any property, the trustee will realize on
them or abandon them. The trustee will abandon property if
the costs of realizing upon it exceed its value, so that it has no
net value (Net Value).
In our pending example, suppose the debtor-seller had de-
livered the onions before bankruptcy, leaving nothing but the
estate's inherited right to payment of $500 by the Other Party.
Unless the cost of suit exceeded $500, the trustee would simply
enforce the right and get the money." 5 By the same token, if
the Other Party buyer had paid the $500 before bankruptcy but
the onions had not been delivered (the estate inherited an obli-
gation, but no remaining right), the trustee would have the sim-
ple choice of performing the obligation, picking and delivering
the onions, or paying damages for nonperformance, like any
other party to a contract. The trustee will pick the cheaper al-
ternative. We will discuss in a moment the unique impact of
bankruptcy law in this situation,116 but to this point the
trustee's job is just simple contract law and elementary busi-
ness judgment.
The trustee's analysis is unchanged when the estate con-
tains both a right and an obligation from a single contract, as
long as the two are independent. In our example, if the $500
right to payment arose from some earlier performance under
the original contract and is enforceable under contract law re-
gardless of whether the trustee delivers the onions, then the
trustee's decision-making process is the same.
113. We postpone the specific performance problem for now. See infra
Section I. B.
114. See T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 108. Given Dean Jackson's central
premise, that bankruptcy law rarely should change state law results (a view I
do not share), it is congenial for him to find that bankruptcy contracts should
be considered as primarily governed by state law. Id He also sees, correctly,
that the executory status of a contract does not matter for rejection. Id at 109.
Dean Jackson has some real insights into the executory contract problem, but
his preoccupation with his central premise causes him to devote much of the
rest of his discussion to criticizing § 365 for permitting deviation from state law
rules, rather than pursuing the executory contract problem.
115. Throughout this introductory discussion, I ignore for clarity's sake the
effect of the avoiding powers on bankruptcy contracts. See infra Section II. E.
116. See infra Section II. A. 3.
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The trustee's analysis often is more complicated, because
state contract law might make the right and the obligation in-
terdependent. In the example we are using, state law may well
say that the right to receipt of the $500 depends upon perform-
ance of the obligation to deliver the onions.1i 7 In that case, the
trustee, like any other contract party, must net the benefit of
the $500 payment against the cost of picking and delivering the
onions and then compare that Net Value against the cost of
paying damages for nondelivery.118 Again, the process is the
same as netting the cost of sale of a piece of equipment against
the likely sale price. The trustee's duty to creditors will be to
choose the most profitable alternative, thus maximizing the es-
tate. The difference is merely that state contract law makes
the right depend on the obligation and therefore makes the cal-
culation more complicated.
3. The Limitation of Remedies In Bankruptcy
Now we introduce the special effect of bankruptcy princi-
ples for the first time. Whether a contract's rights and obliga-
tions are independent or dependent, the trustee's calculations
of benefit and cost will differ greatly from the ordinary con-
tract party because of remedies rules unique to bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy law most often changes state law rules to alter
remedies, and the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy is no
exception.1 1 9
The principle that modifies the trustee's position, making it
much more favorable than that of the pre-petition debtor, is
equality of distribution. That principle requires that all credi-
tors be treated equally, subject to a number of important excep-
tions. It apparently is the most universal of all insolvency
principles throughout the world.1 0
From the equality principle comes the rule of pro rata dis-
tribution to pre-petition unsecured creditors. The pro rata rule
requires that unsecured creditors share proportionately in dis-
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(2) (1979).
118. See T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 107-09. Dean Jackson discusses the
idea of net value, but does not distinguish between interdependent and in-
dependent contract rights.
119. My colleague, Professor Douglas Laycock, is fond of asserting that
bankruptcy law is a mere subset of remedies law. D. LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES xxxii (1985). I interpret this aphorism as a frustrated re-
action to what the tide of bankruptcy does to the sand castle of remedies.
120. See 1 J. DALHUISEN, supra note 28, pt. II, § 1.06[1].
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tributions,' 2 1 with the result that almost never are they paid in
full. Their claims are calculated in full under state law, 2 2 as
we have just discussed, 23 but their actual relief, the payment of
the claims, can be thought of as being in little tiny Bankruptcy
Dollars, which may be worth only ten cents in U.S. dollars.124
In sharp contrast, if the trustee assumes a contract, then it is
converted into an estate obligation, a post-petition obligation,
and the Other Party becomes entitled to full performance or
payment as an administration claim.2s Because administration
claims are paid first in any distribution,2 6 they are usually paid
in full, 100 cent U.S. dollars.
The resulting change in the trustee's Net Value calculation
produces much of the "magic" of executory contract doctrine in
bankruptcy. When the trustee calculates the cost of breaching
an obligation, it figures the breach claim in full U.S. dollars
under state law, but it must calculate real, net costs in light of
paying that claim in Bankruptcy Dollars, that is, paying only a
percentage of the claim as calculated under nonbankruptcy law
in real U.S. dollars. Conversely, when the trustee calculates
the cost of performance, it must figure that cost in 100 cent U.S.
dollars, because it must pay for performance as an administra-
tion claim. Finally, any amounts to be paid to the trustee by
the Other Party also will be in full U.S. dollars12" Because
bankruptcy is another world, it is appropriate to adapt the in-
ternational convention from this point forward, referring to 100
cent dollars as "U.S. $" and the distribution cost of the claim in
bankruptcy as "B.D. $".
These rules change the calculation dramatically. In the on-
ion contract example, let us assume the cost of picking and de-
livering the onions to the Other Party is U.S. $550. Let us
further assume that the price of onions in the marketplace is
the same, U.S. $550. Therefore the transaction represents a
U.S. $50 loss, because only U.S. $500 will be paid. The breach-
claim expense under contract law also should be U.S. $50. Be-
cause I am a law professor, I can assume those pleasant fanta-
121. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
122. I& § 502.
123. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
124. See Herbert & Pacitti, supra note 89, at 313-14.
125. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507 (1988).
126. Id- § 507(a)(1).
127. An exception is possible in the unusual case when the Other Party is
insolvent, or when its intransigence makes collection very expensive relative
to return.
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sies, a perfect market and no transaction costs, so that it will
cost the Other Party U.S. $550 to "cover," and that party will
recover U.S. $50 from the breaching party who refused to pick.
Perfect symmetry, at least in the halls of academe. The Net
Value of assumption is the financial benefit of the Other
Party's performance, less the cost of performance of the con-
tract, plus the further benefit of assumption that comes from
the fact that the estate does not have to pay the Other Party
for the breach of contract claim that would arise from
rejection. 128
For a nonbankruptcy contract party, the Net Value of per-
formance theoretically is zero in this example. Consequently, a
nonbankrupt party has no reason to perform or not to perform
on an amoral, one-shot basis. The calculation is very different
for the estate that inherits such a contract, because the breach-
claim will be paid in Bankruptcy Dollars, while the perform-
ance cost will be paid in full U.S. dollars as a cost of administra-
tion. Assuming a 10% distribution, the loss from assumption
and performance would be U.S. $50 (U.S. $500 contract price
less U.S. $550 cost of performance), while the amount saved by
eliminating the Other Party's breach claim would be only U.S.
$5 (B.D. $50 = U.S. $5), because that claim would be paid in
Bankruptcy Dollars. Thus the Net Value of assumption for the
estate, unlike the nonbankrupt contract party, is U.S. $-45.129
To state the point affirmatively, the cost of breach is U.S. $5
while the net cost of performance is U.S. $45. Breaching and
paying is cheaper than performing, even in theory, so it is clear
the estate should choose to breach-and-pay. 130 Thus, the
trustee often will breach-and-pay when any other contract
party in the same position will perform.131 The dramatic loss of
position of the Other Party flows directly from the fundamen-
128. If the reader will forgive a formula:
Net Value, Assumption = (VOP - CP) + OPC.
Net Value, Assumption = (U.S. $500 - U.S. $550) + $50 = 0, where VOP
is the value of the Other Party's performance, CP is the cost of performance
by the estate, and OPC is the saving the estate enjoys from assumption be-
cause it does not have to pay the Other Party's damage claim for breach of
contract.
129. Net Value, Assumption = (VOP - CP) + OPC.
Net Value, Assumption = (U.S. $500 - U.S. $550) + U.S. $5 = U.S.
$-45.
130. For the trustee, we have to rewrite the formula. The trustee's
formula is as follows, where B.D. stands for Bankruptcy Dollars:
Net Value, Assumption = (U.S. $VOP - U.S. $CP) + B.D. $OPC.
131. But see infra text accompanying notes 132, 278.
[Vol. 74:227
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 255
tal bankruptcy rule that all unsecured creditors are paid pro
rata and the fundamental bankruptcy fact that such payments
often are a tiny percentage of the amount owed under state
law.
The effect of paying claims in Bankruptcy Dollars is even
more clear when the breach claim exceeds the marginal loss
from performance. If the Other Party's breach claim in this ex-
ample had been $100, then a normal contract party would have
a substantial incentive to perform, because saving a $100 dam-
age claim would have more than offset the $50 loss on perform-
ance of the contract. Not so for the trustee, who saves U.S. $50
by avoiding the cost of performance, net of the benefit of the
contract price, but pays only U.S. $10 (B.D. $100) for breach.
The trustee's Net Value for assumption is still negative, U.S. $-
40, and breach-and-pay remains the best economic decision.
The Other Party's damage claim must be unusually great, or
the distribution on account of unsecured damage claims must
be unusually large, to make assumption of an unprofitable con-
tract economically sound.132
To summarize, the estate generally should assume only
profitable contracts of the debtor, because the severe un-
dercompensation of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy will
make it worthwhile to reject (breach) all unprofitable con-
tracts. The rare exceptions most often arise with unusually
large breach claims or unusually substantial dividends to un-
secured creditors.
B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Before we can work all the way through even a simple
goods contract, we must discuss two additional bankruptcy
principles, 1) bankruptcy denial of specific performance against
the estate; and 2) bankruptcy enforcement of nonbankruptcy
remedies in specific assets.
Professor Countryman, in the Minnesota Law Review arti-
cles, identified the rule that specific performance is not avail-
able against the bankruptcy trustee.133 The reason behind the
132. See infra text accompanying note 278. The usual Net Value analysis
also might change when the Other Party has a large setoff claim. Id.
133. See Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 465-66, 471; Westbrook, supra
note 61, at 619 n.94 and authorities there cited. But see Proyectos Electronicos,
S.A. v. Alper, 37 Bankr. 931, 933-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The effect of the Proyectos
decision, which ignored the Code (other than the automatic stay) and bank-
ruptcy caselaw, was to award the goods to the buyer if, and only if, the goods
were actually or constructively delivered. This is not really specific perform-
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rule is the principle of equality of distribution. Specific per-
formance is in effect 100% "payment;" that is, performance in
full. Giving that remedy to one pre-petition unsecured creditor,
the Other Party, would seriously violate the equality principle
as to all other unsecured creditors, leaving them with a far
smaller distribution. 1' This proposition, denial of specific per-
formance against the trustee, is crucial to analyzing some of the
most important types of bankruptcy contract cases. It is not an
important part of the concept of executoriness, however, even
though Professor Countryman identified it for us. For the
same reasons, the equitable remedy of rescission should not be
available against the trustee,1 35 although rescission damages
may be.
The Other Party is not often prejudiced by this treatment,
even if the reason for granting specific relief under state law is
that damages are hard to calculate. 136 The reason is that bank-
ruptcy law provides a special remedy for the Other Party
whose damages are hard to ascertain. Section 502(c) gives the
bankruptcy court very broad power to "estimate" claims, with-
out the constraints of state law doctrines about speculative
damages. 137 Thus, the bankruptcy court probably could give a
ance. Specific performance would be ordering the debtor to deliver when legal
delivery was not made prior to bankruptcy.
134. Westbrook, supra note 61, at 619 n.94; see E. WARREN & J. WEST-
BROOK, supra note 23, at 518.
135. See Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods., Ltd. v. Elgara Electronics
Corp. (In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods., Ltd.), 83 Bankr. 241, 246
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Executive Technology Data Sys., 79 Bankr. 276,
282 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); see also Andrew, supra note 15, at 921 n.268. A
special Congressional exception makes reclamation available to a limited ex-
tent. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988); see infra note 173. Traditionally, an exception
to equality of distribution permits rescission against the trustee because of the
debtor's fraud or bad-faith misrepresentation. 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 70.41 (14th ed. 1978) [hereinafter COLLIER 14th]. Such an ex-
ception to the equality principle is hard to justify and inconsistent with mod-
ern bankruptcy trends. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (1988) (subordinating claims for
securities fraud).
136. Modern remedies scholarship demonstrates that specific relief is
sometimes granted because it is the best remedy, even where damages can be
calculated. See Laycock, supra note 111, manuscript at 20-21. In that circum-
stance, giving the Other Party only a monetary claim in bankruptcy is even
less prejudicial.
137. Because of the need to settle bankruptcy claims promptly and finally,
bankruptcy courts are given special powers of estimation not available to state
courts. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988). Although the estimation power is of much
greater importance under the Code because of the new, broad definition of
"claim," 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988), the courts are just beginning to explore its
limits. See Weintraub & Resnick, Treatment of Contingent and Unliquidated
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fairer compensatory damage claim in this situation than could a
state court limited by constraints not applicable in bankruptcy.
Even in a case in which the bankruptcy court's estimate
might give the Other Party a damage claim that is undercom-
pensatory, denial of specific relief is the fairest result. Because
bankruptcy almost always yields very low recoveries for all
creditors, the Other Party's understated claim probably will re-
sult in a distribution closer to equality with the other creditors
than would granting specific performance. That is, 100% per-
formance for the Other Party will be more unequal than pro
rata payment of an understated claim.
C. AN INTEREST IN THE THING ITSELF
In general, bankruptcy law enforces what may loosely be
called "property rights" existing under nonbankruptcy law.
More precisely, bankruptcy will enforce nonbankruptcy reme-
dies on behalf of an Other Party if they are remedies entitling
the Other Party to dominion over a specific asset,1 38 unless the
Other Party's interest is subject to avoidance under the bank-
ruptcy avoiding powers.139 This "property" principle is central
to bankruptcy law because it is by far the most important ex-
ception to the principle of equality of distribution. The rule de-
rived from the property principle, payment in full to the Other
Party of the proceeds of sale of such an asset, is the most im-
Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 373, 376-79 (1983); 5 BRo-
KEN BENCH R. 25, 25 (1986) (reviewing cases). In general, the trend is to inter-
pret the estimation power broadly in the interest of providing a distribution to
creditors and a fuller discharge to debtors. See Menard-Sanford v. Mabey, (In
re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 698-700 (4th Cir.) (holding that § 502(c) esti-
mation power justifies administrative system to resolve Dalkon Shield claims),
cerL denied sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. A.H. Robins Co., 110 S. Ct. 376
(1989); Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1982); Apex
Oil Co. v. United States (In re Apex Oil Co.), 91 Bankr. 860, 864-65 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1988) (estimating Department of Energy claim against debtor to
avoid protracted administrative proceedings); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Named
Defendants (In re Baldwin-United), 48 Bankr. 901, 903-04 (Bankr. D. Ohio
1985); In re Nova Real Estate Inv. Trust, 23 Bankr. 62, 65 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1982). But cf Avellino & Bieres v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.),
744 F.2d 332, 336-37 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding right to payment for indemnity not
a claim where cause of action arose after bankruptcy petition filed), cert de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
138. See F. MACDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM 10-11 (1985). By domin-
ion, I mean, roughly, use and/or the right to alienate and/or the right to use
and/or alienate the proceeds of use or alienation. (This footnote is dedicated,
with affection but without apology, to those who despise the "and/or"
formulation.)
139. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-49 (1988).
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portant exception to the rule of pro rata payment. A common-
place example is the treatment of security interests. 140 This
rule operates as to interests created by bankruptcy contracts as
it does elsewhere in bankruptcy, resulting in a major exception
to the rule that specific performance is not granted against the
estate.
An interest in a specific asset that entitles the owner of the
interest to the asset itself, or to priority payment of the pro-
ceeds of its sale,' 4 1 is largely congruent with what is called a
property interest. I call it an "Interest in the Thing Itself"
(ITI) to emphasize that I want to avoid addressing global issues
about the definition of that ubiquitous concept, "property." We
use the concept of "property" in many ways for many purposes
and its general definition is beyond the scope of this effort.142
Calling such an interest an ITI focuses attention in the right
place for bankruptcy purposes, on the remedies available to the
Other Party, and deflects the historical and emotional freight
that accompany the word "property."'1 43 So, an ITI is an inter-
est under nonbankruptcy law that entitles its beneficiary to do-
minion over a specific asset or to priority in the proceeds of the
sale of that asset.
Nothing in this discussion purports to explain why or when
nonbankruptcy law confers upon a party the right to these rem-
edies, thus creating an ITI. I am content to leave that to
nonbankruptcy law and nonbankruptcy scholars, just as the
Code does. The only relevant point here is that bankruptcy law
enforces ITIs created under nonbankruptcy law.'"
It is curious that the Code is never very explicit about the
rights of an owner of an ITI.145 The fact that bankruptcy law
enforces the nonbankruptcy remedies available to the holder of
140. See id. §§ 506, 725.
141. Sometimes, the owner gets the proceeds less costs of sale. Id § 506(c).
142. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments
on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv.
1165, 1202-13 (1967). In that article, Professor Michelman greatly contributes
to our understanding of the concept of "property" in perhaps its broadest con-
text, expropriation. For the even more difficult problem of defining "prop-
erty" in the context of transnational expropriation, see generally H. STEINER
& D. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 487-95 (2d ed. 1976).
143. Andrew argues against distinguishing between property rights and
contract rights in bankruptcy contract analysis primarily because of his con-
cern that state-law labels should not decide cases, a concern I share. See An-
drew, supra note 15, at 924.
144. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
145. For example, the Code never explicitly states that the holder of a
valid security interest is entitled to receive all of the proceeds from sale of col-
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such an interest must be derived in major part as a negative in-
ference from the definition of "property of the estate" in sec-
tion 541 of the Code. From the fact that the Code permits
nonbankruptcy law to define the "property" interests of the
debtor at the moment of bankruptcy, 46 it follows that the in-
terests of an Other Party in such property is also defined by
nonbankruptcy law: all the world that is not the debtor's be-
longs to someone else. As to any asset in which section 541
gives the estate an interest, any other interest in that property
belongs to somebody else. A similar definition can be derived
from section 547 for preference purposes.147 The white area on
a Rorschach defines the dark area and is defined by it, and
much the same thing is at work in the Bankruptcy Code's defi-
nition of property of the estate and its inferential definition of
the property of an Other Party.148 In this negative, inferential
way, the Code defines the enforceable ITI of an Other Party.
The Code further refines the definition of the Other
Party's property by reference to the avoiding powers. The
Code denies an interest to the Other Party and gives it to the
estate if the interest would not survive transfer to a transferee
under defined circumstances, 149 or if the Other Party got the
interest under defined circumstances during a defined period
lateral until paid in full. That fact must be inferred from several provisions,
especially §§ 506, 541(a), 552(b), 724(b)(1).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). It is often said that "property of the estate"
is a bankruptcy law concept to be defined by the federal courts. E.g., Segal
v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1966); see 4 COLLIER 15th, supra note 17,
541.02(1) (stating that federal law determines what constitutes property
within the meaning of § 541). That proposition is no doubt true in the sense
that bankruptcy courts are empowered to look past nonbankruptcy labels in
determining whether an interest is property of the estate. But the existence of
a bundle of remedies in favor of a party is the consequence of preexisting
nonbankruptcy law, even if the characterization of those remedies as "prop-
erty" for bankruptcy purposes is ultimately a question of bankruptcy law. Be-
cause the bankruptcy characterization of an interest as "property" turns on
the characteristics of the remedies available to enforce that interest, nonban-
kruptcy law determines what interests are eligible to be "property" under
bankruptcy law. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982).
See T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 93-94; see also 4 COLLIER 15th, supra note 17,
% 541.02(1). Of course, Congress can decide to limit or expand the remedies
available in bankruptcy to holders of various nonbankruptcy interests, but it
generally has not exercised that power.
147. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1) (1988).
148. Cf. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
743, 748-49 (discussing Derrida's deconstruction of the concepts of identity and
difference).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
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before bankruptcy. 50 If the Other Party's claimed interest -
its bundle of remedies - survives the avoiding powers, then it
is an ITI for bankruptcy purposes.
Modern analysts want to avoid resolving important bank-
ruptcy questions by relying on the distinction between "prop-
erty rights" and "contract rights."1 51 They have an instinct that
the distinction could lead to a quagmire of abstract debate, and
that instinct is sound. Yet we cannot avoid the fundamental
fact that bankruptcy issues turn on the important distinction
between the bundle of remedies usually called "property
rights" and the bundle called "contract rights." As much as we
may resist, no other distinction will work. To paraphrase what
Churchill said of democracy, the property-contract distinction is
the worst possible, except for all the others.152
The approach suggested here avoids the pitfalls inherent in
the property-contract distinction by focusing concretely on the
specific remedies available to enforce a particular sort of
nonbankruptcy interest, so that the bankruptcy analyst can
look for the remedies that define an interest under nonban-
kruptcy law rather than for a label or an abstract concept.153
With this understanding in hand, it is accurate to say that
bankruptcy courts will enforce a nonbankruptcy ITI, a large ex-
ception to the principle of equality of distribution and the rule
of pro rata payment. That fact is crucial to understanding
bankruptcy contracts because, as we have seen, the treatment
of bankruptcy contracts is governed by the limitations on the
Other Party's remedies imposed by the equality principle and
the pro rata rule.'1  The enforcement of ITIs is the key excep-
tion to those limitations.
A functionalist looks at the concrete operation of remedies
as the key to the bankruptcy contract problem, so the special
treatment of an ITI is central to understanding the operation of
150. Id §§ 547, 548.
151. See, e.g., Andrew, supra note 15, at 924.
152. OxFoRD DICIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979) (House of Com-
mons, November 11, 1947). Part of the reason we resist relying on this distinc-
tion is that it is not justifiable as a matter of principle. See infra note 158. Yet
it is pervasive in our law, especially our debtor-creditor law. See United States
v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1982) (distinguishing Congress'
power to modify a secured creditor's property rights from its authority over
contract rights). Because it is pervasive, it is the only distinction that main-
tains the necessary symmetry between bankruptcy contract doctrine and the
avoiding powers. See infra note 363.
153., See infra note 341.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21, 133-35.
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the rule barring specific performance against the estate. When
an Other Party enjoys an ITI under nonbankruptcy law, injunc-
tive relief will vindicate its rights against a bankruptcy trustee,
but in the absence of an ITI the trustee is immune from such
relief for the reasons discussed previously. 5 5 Because the relief
sought is very similar, a functionalist must understand why it is
available in one case and not the other.
The recognition and enforcement of an ITI, as defined, pro-
vides the clarifying distinction. 5 6 For example, an order lifting
the bankruptcy stay and requiring the estate to turn over prop-
erty to a secured party for sale is enforcement of an ITI, while
an order enforcing a covenant against competition or an arbi-
tration clause is not an enforcement of an ITI, because the lat-
ter rights are general claims, not rights to specific assets.157
Injunctive enforcement of the latter would violate the equality
principle without justification, while enforcement of the former
falls squarely within the exception to that principle for a
nonbankruptcy ITI. Similarly, a right to specific performance
of a land contract may constitute an ITI for this purpose and
may be enforceable in bankruptcy notwithstanding the rule
against specific performance against the estate, a point dis-
cussed below.' 58
155. I make this assertion in the context of property and contract rights,
ignoring tort and public law rights of various kinds not under discussion here.
156. Creating three categories of relief, of which two would be enforceable
and one not enforceable, is a second possible distinction. The additional cate-
gory would arise in cases with no ITI, and it might produce enforcement of
certain nonbankruptcy specific performance rights even absent an ITI. It
would draw a line between an interest that yields a right to payment under
nonbankruptcy law and one that yields only a right to specific relief., In my
view, this last category would be empty, or nearly so. See infra note 215.
157. In some sense, the distinction is between rights in rem and in per-
sonam. The latter rights usually are enforced by negative remedies - for ex-
ample, injunctions against competition or stay of a lawsuit pending arbitration
- but not always. As with any other distinction, it is possible by heroic obfus-
cation to confuse the two types of rights, but in most cases the distinction is
clear to one who wishes to understand. For an illuminating discussion of the
logical relationship between in personam and in rem rights, see Macneil, Z-ft-
cient Breach of Contract. Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947, 963-65 (1982)
(discussing when property rights change ownership in transaction). To a sub-
stantial extent, the distinction between a general claim and an interest in spe-
cific property is congruent with the distinction between enforcing a debt
against the debtor's property and against the debtor's liberty. Since the aboli-
tion of imprisonment for debt, state law permits enforcement against liberty
only in rare circumstances, notably for domestic support orders and covenants
against competition. The former policy has been accepted by Congress in the
form of an exception to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 187-88. There is no grand principle
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One further clarification may be helpful. It is characteris-
tic of nonbankruptcy law that a party's interests mature in the
course of a transaction. Rights that consist of merely general
remedies become, at some point, ITIs. Thus it is possible to
think of the attainment of an ITI by a party to a transaction as
marking a point of finality in that transaction, a point after
which it is not reversible. Hinging the analysis on "finality" is
a mistake because it invites the same sort of abstract, concep-
tual discourse that lurks in the labels "property" and "con-
tract." But people often feel intuitively that "finality" or
"irreversibility" under nonbankruptcy law is important to
bankruptcy treatment of contracts, and thus it is useful to see
that this intuition is closely linked to the transformation of a
general claim into an ITI under nonbankruptcy law.
A final point should be made here, even though it lies
outside the main line of the argument. I am not suggesting, as
Dean Jackson does,' 59 that Congress cannot, or should not, al-
ter nonbankruptcy remedies as to an ITI. Congress clearly has
the power to do so, especially prospectively. 60 It may appropri-
ately exercise that power in any way that seems helpful to the
commercial life of the nation.' 6 ' It may decide that certain ITIs
should not be enforceable in bankruptcy, or should be limited
in enforcement, in the interest of rehabilitating a failing busi-
ness or spreading the risks of business liquidation. It has done
precisely that with respect to one ITI, a seller's limited right of
reclamation under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.' 62 Congress decided to make the reclamation right en-
forceable in bankruptcy, 63 but only to a limited extent.' 64 Con-
that commands that a buyer of onions almost never has a right to specific per-
formance, and therefore no ITI, while a buyer of real estate almost always
does have such a right. Civil law jurisdictions would often grant a buyer spe-
cific rights in the onions, as well as the land. History has given us the distinc-
tion, which may or may not be justified on grounds of policy.
159. See T. JACKSON, supra note 74, at 21-27.
160. Congress has considerable power to alter property rights prospectively
and can do so to some extent even retrospectively. See United States v. Secur-
ity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-82 (1982) (stating that Congress may retroac-
tively impair contractual obligations); see also Rogers, The Impairment of
Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Be-
tween the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973,
974, 1013-30 (1983) (arguing that fifth amendment does not significantly con-
strain bankruptcy power).
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
162. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1987).
163. 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988).
164. See infra note 173.
[Vol. 74:227
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 263
gress can appropriately impose such limitations on any
nonbankruptcy ITI. Because it generally has not done so, most
ITIs are enforceable in bankruptcy.
With these propositions on the table, it is now possible to
work all the way through the treatment of a simple contract
for the sale of goods when it enters bankruptcy. The effort will
illustrate why bankruptcy contract problems are so compli-
cated. The principal reason is the problem's lack of symmetry.
The "executoriness" doctrine presumes symmetry. A con-
tract is executory or it is not, regardless of the side on which
we find the debtor-estate. The operative bankruptcy relief
rules, however, are utterly asymmetrical, favoring the estate
(the other unsecureds) over the Other Party. Thus, we must
always examine a given type of contract from both perspectives,
debtor as "-or" and debtor as "-ee," before we understand how
that contract should be treated in bankruptcy. Each permuta-
tion of even a simple contract has two different answers, de-
pending on whether the estate is on one side of the contract or
the other. The simple onion sale contract that we used as an
example creates more than a hundred permutations.165 Lest
the reader despair, I hasten to add that the great majority of
the cases are easy ones. The cases that are not easy are rela-
tively rare, although some of them are important.
One of the most interesting parts of the analysis is the role
of the avoiding powers in bankruptcy contract cases. More
than half of the permutations in these cases result from the
avoiding powers. In the interest of clarity, I am going to discuss
each case without reference to the avoiding powers and then
address the effects of those powers and their role in the confu-
sion surrounding bankruptcy contracts.
D. STEP-BY-STEP ANALYSIS
1. Debtor As Buyer
We start with a contract in which the pre-petition debtor
was the buyer of onions for a fixed price of $100 for 100
bushels.
165. If we were to chart the permutations of bankruptcy contracts, the
chart itself would be symmetrical; that is, it would apply to both Debtor as
Buyer and Debtor as Seller, but the results would be very different, depending
on whether the Debtor was buying or selling. Whether assumption or rejec-
tion is the sensible course will routinely turn on whether the Debtor is Buyer
or Seller because of the operation of the bankruptcy rules limiting the reme-
dies of the Other Party.
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The Completed Contract. In the first instance, the seller
delivered the onions to the debtor-buyer pre-bankruptcy, and
the debtor-buyer paid in cash on delivery. 66 The traditional
approach is that no executory contract exists.167 Ignoring any
question of warranties 68 the functional view is that the estate
inherited no contractual obligation and no contractual right
under this contract, and therefore nothing need be done about
the contract as such. (The trustee will, of course, want to sell
the onions - and promptly too.)
The Half-Completed Contract - Debtor's Performance Re-
mains. Here the onions were delivered to the debtor-buyer,
but the debtor had not paid prior to bankruptcy. The current
approach says the contract is not "executory" because the
Other Party, the seller, owes no remaining material perform-
ance. 69 Thus, the debtor-buyer could not assume or reject.
The functional approach is that the estate has no remaining
contractual right from this contract, so in the great majority of
cases the estate receives no benefit from assumption, which
would have no effect in the usual case except to elevate the
Other Party's claim to a priority claim entitled to 100% pay-
ment. Absent assumption, the contractual obligation, payment
of $100 calculated under state law, is the Other Party's allowed
claim, and it is payable in tiny Bankruptcy Dollars. Assump-
tion is unthinkable and rejection (breach-and-pay) inevitable. 70
One point that seems obvious here will be less obvious in
more complicated contexts. The remedy almost never available
to the Other Party is reclaiming the onions. Although bank-
ruptcy law might block enforcement of a reclamation remedy,
it is usually not available under applicable contract law any-
way.' 7 ' This aspect of state law, which can be understood as de-
termining the "finality" of past performance at some point
during the life of a contract, is a matter of limitation of reme-
dies. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code almost never
entitles an unsecured seller to recover delivered goods because
of a subsequent failure to pay the purchase price. In almost all
cases, the seller under Article 2 has merely a claim for dam-
166. We assume a one-step transaction, with no pre-existing contract.
167. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (quoting Countryman's test
for executory contracts).
168. See infra Section III. C.
169. Id
170. But see infra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
warranties).
171. See infra note 173.
[Vol. 74:227
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 265
ages, not an entitlement to return of the goods themselves. 7 2
If state law did grant this relief, a variety of rescission, bank-
ruptcy's special relief rules might not permit this relief against
a trustee. 7 3 In sales of goods under Article 2, however, and in
many other state contract law contexts, state law standing
alone usually denies any remedy in the property itself - that
is, state law does not give the seller an ITI. It goes without say-
ing that bankruptcy gives no greater rights to the Other Party
and therefore the Other Party cannot get the onions back.
The Half-Completed Contract - Other Party's Performance
Remains. This time the debtor-buyer has paid, but the Other
Party has not delivered the onions by the time of bankruptcy.
If the Other Party refuses to deliver the trustee will be entitled
to "cover" and sue for damages in full U.S. dollars, or in the un-
usual case get specific performance - delivery of the onions -
depending on state contract law under all the circumstances
172. U.C.C. §§ 2-702 to -710 (1987); Pacific Express, Inc. v. Teknekron Infos-
witch Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986).
The seller of course, can reserve a security interest enforceable under Article
9, but it is then in the same position as any lender or other creditor in taking a
security interest. Aside from a secured position, there are only narrow and
unusual circumstances where a seller can get back the goods themselves, prin-
cipally in U.C.C. § 2-702(2). See Note, Bankruptcy and Article Two of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: The Right to Recover the Goods Upon Insolvency, 79
HARV. L. REV. 598, 609 (1966). Recent scholarship suggests that specific relief
is more readily available than was traditionally thought, but that such relief
remains relatively rare. See Laycock, supra note 111, passim. Furthermore,
specific relief ordinarily is refused under state law if the defendant is insol-
vent.
As long as specific relief is rarely granted, we can do rough justice by as-
suming that it represents a state-law property right of some importance, espe-
cially if it survives "strong-arm" attack under § 544(a). If specific relief
became routine, however, it would lose its efficacy as a talisman of state policy.
In that case, bankruptcy policy, especially the equality principle, might require
a more selective and difficult analysis to determine when state-law specific re-
lief should be treated as enforceable in bankruptcy.
173. The U.C.C. allows reclamation under certain narrow circumstances.
U.C.C. § 2-702. See Note, supra note 172, at 609. Prior to the Code, this state
law remedy was attacked in bankruptcy with some success. In re Good Deal
Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887, 887 (D.N.J. 1974). Contra Alfred M.
Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enters., Inc.), 524 F.2d 761, 765-66 (9th
Cir. 1975). In the 1978 Code, Congress granted a right of reclamation to sell-
ers, although a narrower remedy than is available under the U.C.C. 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(c) (1988); see Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. Rawson Food Serv. Inc. (In re Rawson
Food Serv., Inc.), 846 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that seller must
show debtor's control over goods to reclaim them under § 546(c)). The bank-
ruptcy attacks on § 2-702 were generally based on the power to avoid statutory
liens, now 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988).
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(difficulty of "covering," and so on).174 The contract is not ex-
ecutory under the executoriness analysis because no perform-
ance is due from the debtor. Because that conclusion means
the trustee cannot assume, we are left to wonder how the
trustee can proceed to do what obviously should be done, en-
force the delivery obligation. In practice, it appears that the
trustee nonetheless enforces, although with no theoretical
foundation in executoriness doctrine. 7 5 The functionalist says
there is only an enforceable contract right, a right not depen-
dent on any contract obligation. Therefore, the trustee almost
certainly should assume and enforce the contract against the
Other Party.
The Uncompleted Contract. Now the onions are undeliv-
ered and the debtor-buyer has not paid. Currently, the contract
is executory, and the trustee may assume or reject. Ignoring
the avoiding powers issues, this case is similar to the simple on-
ion problem discussed earlier 176 except the debtor is a buyer in
this case and thus movements in the market produce opposite
effects, because the estate is now on the other side of the trans-
action. If the market has gone up, the estate-buyer will assume
and get either the onions or the difference in price as damages.
That result is the same as outside bankruptcy. The estate has
simply taken advantage of the good bargain (as it turned out)
made by the pre-petition debtor.
If the market has gone down, however, the bankruptcy re-
lief rules change the result dramatically, as in the earlier exam-
ple.177 The nonbankrupt debtor would have been stuck with a
bad bargain. Things are very different for the trustee. With
the market down to, say, $80, the trustee will reject the con-
tract. If the estate is still in the onion business, it will buy at
the lower market price. If not, it will just forget about onions.
Either way, the trustee will face the same $20 claim from the
seller of the onions under state law. But the trustee will pay
only a small percentage of that claim, because it will pay in
Bankruptcy Dollars.17 The trustee will avoid paying the U.S.
$100 contract price to the seller and instead will pay only U.S.
$2 (B.D. $20 at 10%) for its breach. The symmetry of contract
law remedies is broken and the trustee, unlike a nonban-
174. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -717 (1987); see Note, supra note 172, at 600-01.
175. Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 458-59.
176. See supra notes 97-102, 115-17 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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kruptcy buyer, can profit from breach. By breach it avoids a
loss of U.S. $20 in exchange for a payment of U.S. $2. Of
course, the trustee loses the right to delivery of the onions, but
since the market is down, the contract price for the onions
makes the contract unprofitable. 179
Note, however, that the Other Party seller here, because it
has not delivered, ends up with the onions themselves and
therefore will often be much better off than the Other Party
seller that has delivered before bankruptcy. Absent an unusual
circumstance, the loss of most of the purchase price is a much
greater loss to the Other Party seller than the mere loss of the
benefit of the bargain. Take two Other Party sellers, one who
has delivered and one who has not. The contract price for the
onions was $100, but the market price is now $80. The undeliv-
ered seller resells at $80 and has only $20 in damages. The de-
livered seller, unable to get the onions back under either
Article 2 or bankruptcy law, 8 0 is out the full $100 - it deliv-
ered the onions and got nothing. When each gets, say, 10% of
its claim as a bankruptcy dividend, the undelivered seller loses
U.S. $18 (U.S. $20 - B.D. $20 = U.S. $18), while the delivered
seller loses U.S. $90 (U.S. $100 - B.D. $100 = U.S. $90).
So far the example is not challenging, but these simple
cases illustrate the central role of contract law in juxtaposition
with the limited, but very powerful, capacity of bankruptcy law
to change the ultimate result because of the rule of pro rata
payment.
These results might seem harsh to these Other Parties, but
only if the position of all the other unsecured creditors is ig-
nored. They too will get only 10% (or some amount less than
100%) of what they are owed. The onion seller who had not de-
livered on that date is better off than the one who did deliver,
but both get only a small percentage of their state law breach
claims, just like the telephone company, the landlord, and all
the rest. Furthermore, the difference between the treatment of
the delivered and the undelivered seller is not arbitrary. The
former delivered on credit prior to bankruptcy - deliberately
accepted a credit risk - while the latter did not accept this
179. These magic effects are increased by the trustee's procedural power to
postpone rejection after bankruptcy. It can continue to watch the market and,
by rejecting, produce a breach-claim that relates back to the date of bank-
ruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d), 365(g), § 502(g) (1988). In this Article I largely ig-
nore the important impact of various procedural rules in § 365.
180. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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risk.181
2. Debtor as Seller
Now the pre-petition debtor becomes the seller of onions.
The Completed Contract. This case works out the same as
when the debtor is the buyer. 8 2
The Half-Completed Contract - Other Party's Performance
Remains. The debtor-seller delivered the onions pre-bank-
ruptcy and the trustee merely awaits payment from the Other
Party. Ignoring warranties, the estate has no contract obliga-
tion, only an enforceable right not dependent upon further per-
formance by the debtor-seller. The trustee sues and gets
payment in full U.S. dollars. The contract is nonexecutory, be-
cause the debtor-seller has no more material performance, but
that makes no difference.
The Half-Completed Contract - Debtor's Performance Re-
mains. In this example, the Other Party buyer paid before
bankruptcy, but the debtor-seller did not deliver the onions.
The estate contains a contractual obligation, but no contractual
right arising from the same contract. The lack of a contractual
right almost certainly means no Net Value from assumption, so
assumption is usually unthinkable. 83 The Other Party buyer
has the right to "cover" and to claim a) the purchase price al-
ready paid, and b) any damages from having paid a higher mar-
ket price.L84 That claim will be calculated under state law, but
will be paid in Bankruptcy Dollars. The buyer suffers along
with all the other unsecured creditors, because of the pro rata
payment rule. 8 5 The Other Party cannot get the onions in the
usual case, because a buyer who has not received delivery is not
181. The undelivered seller accepted a credit risk only to the extent of the
benefit of its bargain under the contract.
182. See supra text accompanying note 166.
183. Sometimes the difference in damages between performance and
breach is so great that the estate can achieve Net Value in performance even
without a contractual right to earn by performance. See infra note 278 and
accompanying text.
184. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -715 (1987). As with sellers, the U.C.C. grants a rec-
lamation remedy to the Other Party buyer, but it is so narrow that it is very
rarely available, in or out of bankruptcy. Id § 2-502; see supra note 173. The
buyer retains a possibility of specific performance under unusual circum-
stances. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1987). Even when available, such a remedy would
often face an avoiding power attack. See infra text accompanying note 200.
185. In this situation, the Other Party could have an ITI if the sale con-
tract gave it a security interest in the onions, and that security interest was
properly perfected and otherwise unavoidable. See Pacific Express, Inc. v.
Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482, 1486
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ordinarily entitled to the onions themselves under nonban-
kruptcy law'8 6 and therefore has no ITI.
This instance, the buyer paying the debtor-seller in ad-
vance, is the appropriate point to introduce the large exception
to the foregoing analysis for cases where nonbankruptcy law
gives the Other Party an ITI. The commonplace example is a
simple land contract case, just like our prior example, with
land replacing onions. The Other Party buyer may well have
an ITI under state law in the form of a right to specific per-
formance by conveyance of the land. 8 7 If it does not, then it
has no specific performance right in bankruptcy. If it does,
then that equitable right will be enforceable in bankruptcy, un-
less it is avoidable under one of the avoiding powers. It is a
right functionally indistinguishable from all the other ITIs en-
forceable in bankruptcy as exceptions to the equality principle
- security interests, co-tenancies, and all the rest. It must be
enforced unless it can be avoided.
This sort of case is very controversial. Professor Country-
man stated that the buyer's rights under such a contract could
be defeated, while Andrew asserts that they are fully enforcea-
ble unless avoidable. s8 In this instance Andrew is right. Part
of the confusion surrounding this discussion arises from the
fact that such ITIs - a right to specific performance of a land
contract - frequently are avoidable under one of the avoiding
powers and therefore Professor Countryman's result is fre-
quently the right one. We have postponed the avoiding power
discussion to the next section.
The Uncompleted Contract. The onions are neither deliv-
ered nor paid for. This case was analyzed earlier in this sec-
tion.189 The trustee-seller will be free to assume or reject,
depending on the market. If the trustee rejects, the Other
Party will have only an unsecured claim for damages and will
be paid in Bankruptcy Dollars.
As with the last example, the outcome and analysis is fun-
damentally different if the Other Party has an ITI. Again sub-
stituting land for onions, the Other Party buyer likely has a
(9th Cir. 1986). This situation is rare, although I fear that it may become more
common after bankruptcy contract problems are better understood.
186. U.C.C. §§ 2-711 to -716 (1987).
187. Andrew, supra note 15, at 909 (citing Clark v. Snelling, 205 F. 240 (1st
Cir., 1913)).
188. Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 464-65; Andrew, supra note 15, at
907-11.
189. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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right to conveyance of the land, a right to specific performance
under nonbankruptcy law, even if it has not paid prior to bank-
ruptcy. In that case, the right to the land is an enforceable ITI
in bankruptcy, unless it is subject to avoidance under the avoid-
ing powers.
To summarize, the treatment of bankruptcy contracts is
not a function of special bankruptcy rules about executory con-
tracts, but rather a straightforward consequence of the bank-
ruptcy policies limiting the Other Party's remedies in a way
that realizes on good pre-petition bargains and minimizes bad
ones, all for the benefit of unsecured creditors generally.
Nonbankruptcy law often fails to give the Other Party an ITI
and therefore relegates it to the poor plight of unsecured credi-
tors generally, an entirely appropriate result and only inequita-
ble in the sense that life is unfair.
The analysis becomes complex in these cases when nonban-
kruptcy law is unclear about the Other Party's right to an ITI.
The complexity introduced by an ITI lies in determining if
state law does treat the Other Party's interest as an ITI (for ex-
ample, state law considers onions somehow unique under the
circumstances) and, if so, determining if the ITI could survive
the trustee's avoiding powers. We now turn to the role of the
avoiding powers in bankruptcy contracts.
E. IMPACT OF THE AVOIDING POWERS
A thorough re-analysis of bankruptcy contract problems is
not possible without considering the impact of the avoiding
powers. They complete the yin and yang of the equality princi-
ple and the property principle in bankruptcy contracts.19°
Although the enforcement of ITIs is an important exception to
the equality principle in bankruptcy contracts, as elsewhere in
bankruptcy, equality re-emerges as a limitation on the property
principle through the operation of the avoiding powers.
Those powers, and the policies they serve, are inextricably
interwoven with the contract issues in many of the cases. The
most notable example may be the Richmond case, as we will
see.191 Merely noting the relevance of the avoiding powers is
insufficient because their putative applicability frequently leads
to error in bankruptcy cases when the court uses "executory
contract" analysis to resolve a problem implicating the avoiding
190. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
191. See infra Section IV. B.
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powers. At the same time, this Article is not a review of the
whole of the law of the strong-arm clause,192 preferences, 193
and fraudulent conveyances. 94 I compromise by setting forth
the general impact of the avoiding powers and giving some ex-
emplary analysis.
The starting point is the proposition that in every bank-
ruptcy contract case where the debtor, as buyer or seller,
performed prior to bankruptcy, the debtor's performance (pay-
ment or delivery) may be avoidable under the strong-arm
clause 19 or as a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. 196
A common type of case is exemplified by the onion con-
tract, where the debtor as seller delivered before bankruptcy.
Under Article 2, the seller has no right to get the onions back
and neither does the estate of the debtor-seller 197 as a matter of
bankruptcy contract law. However, the estate may be able to
show that the delivery was a preference. If, for example, the
Other Party paid for the onions in advance and then the debtor
delivered them, the delivery may have been a preference and
the estate may be able to recover the onions or their value
under sections 547 and 550. The delivery was a preference if
the trustee can prove the seven elements of section 547(b), 98
192. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
193. 1&c § 547.
194. Id § 548.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
196. Cf. In re Finelli Jewelry Co., 79 Bankr. 521, 552 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987)
(releasing option rights before bankruptcy was a preference).
197. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(e), 2-709 (1987).
198. § 547. Preferences...
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee
may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an in-
sider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
Subsection (b)(5) requires a showing that the delivery made the Other
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including delivery within ninety days of bankruptcy and insol-
vency on the delivery date. 19 9 If the court holds the delivery
was a preference, the estate avoids the transfer and gets back
the onions; then it rejects and pays damages for breach of con-
tract in Bankruptcy Dollars.
The impact of the avoiding powers in contract cases is not
limited to the debtor's pre-bankruptcy performance. They may
operate with respect to the very promise thit the debtor made
in the contract, if that promise created an ITI under nonbank-
ruptcy law. As before, if we change the subject matter of the
last example from onions to real estate, the debtor's mere
promise to convey likely created an ITI, a right to specific per-
formance conveying the land. But that ITI may be avoidable.
For example, suppose the debtor's agreement to convey the
land in the pre-bankruptcy contract was in satisfaction and re-
lease of an unsecured debt previously owed to the buyer. In
that case, the transfer of the "equitable right to conveyance,"
the creation of the ITI, was a preference and is avoidable, as-
suming the other elements of section 547 are satisfied. Because
the antecedent debt can be paid much more cheaply in post-re-
jection Bankruptcy Dollars, the trustee avoids the right under
section 547, rejects the contract, and resells the land for many
full U.S. dollars.20 0 As we will see, this example is'very close to
Party better off. That is easily satisfied in the example in the text because,
absent delivery, the Other Party buyer has no onions and is just another un-
secured creditor. Finding a preference thus depends on the other six ele-
ments. I speak of seven elements in § 547(b), although there are only five
numbered elements, by counting two that are tucked within the introductory
language to § 547(b): 1) a transfer; 2) of an interest of the debtor in property.
199. For preferences, insolvency is presumed during the 90 day period. Id
§ 547(f).
200. That is, following avoidance the debt revives, the trustee rejects and
resells, and the trustee pays the debt in Bankruptcy Dollars. See infra note
212.
Bankruptcy law is remarkably silent about the process of unraveling an
avoided transaction. It does not spell out the collateral consequences that fol-
low from avoidance of a transfer, although it is clear that revival of the Other
Party's original claim must be one of them. 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (1988). In the
simple case, an unsecured creditor who was paid its $10 debt a week before
bankruptcy has no claim on Bankruptcy Day, but surely gets a $10 general
claim after the trustee avoids the transfer and obtains return of the $10.
County of Sacramento v. Hackney (In re Hackney), 93 Bankr. 213, 219 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that after preference avoidance by trustee, debt re-
arises and regains its nondischargeable status). In more complex transactions,
restoration of the status quo is a murkier proposition, beyond the scope of the
present discussion.
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the facts in Richmond.20 '
Thus either the debtor's pre-petition performance, or the
contractual promise itself, may constitute an ITI and may be
avoidable.
In some cases the analysis becomes more complex. One
fairly typical instance requires a double preference analysis be-
cause the transaction includes a sequence of two related trans-
fers - the Chinese Box problem.202 This sort of problem can
arise in a bankruptcy contract analysis as it can anywhere else
in preference law.
Take the land-sale example again, where the case presents
the following sequence of pre-petition events under the con-
tract: a) the debtor's promise in the contract created an obliga-
tion to convey that constituted a state-law ITI; b) the debtor
performed the promise prior to bankruptcy by conveying. In
that situation there are two transfers subject to possible avoid-
ance: the ITI-creating promise and the conveyance. The
voidability of the second transfer, the conveyance, will turn on
the voidability of the first transfer, the promise to convey. Let
us assume that the second transfer, the conveyance of the land,
clearly included all the elements of a preference (the advance
payment being the antecedent debt), except for the hypotheti-
cal posed by section 547(b)(5): was the Other Party better off
because of the transfer represented by the conveyance?
The answer to that question depends upon the avoidability
201. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (Richmond IV), cert de-
nied sub nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986), discussed in-
fra notes 319-68 and accompanying text. A more common attack on a land
sale contract might be under the "strong-arm" clause, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3)
(1988). If a bona fide purchaser (b.f.p.) would defeat the Other Party's spe-
cific-performance ITI (e.g., because it is unrecorded and the buyer is not in
possession), then so can the estate, and the Other Party has no ITI in bank-
ruptcy. Chbat v. Tleel (In re Tleel), 876 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
trustee as b.f.p. had priority interest in real estate where adverse claimant was
not in possession of the property and had no recorded interest). The estate re-
jects and repays the purchase price in Bankruptcy Dollars.
In the rare instance of a specific performance right in personal property,
as under U.C.C. § 2-716 (1987), the Other Party's specific-performance ITI
would not likely survive avoiding power attack. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988); see
U.C.C. §§ 2-402 & comments, 2-403 & comments (1987); see also Note, supra
note 172, at 599-603.
202. I call this the "Chinese Box" problem after those beautiful Chinese
boxes that have a smaller, identical box inside, which in turn contains an-
other; see Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy,
38 VANM. L. REv. 713, 746 & nn.180-85 (1985) (outlining the "Countryman two-
step" analysis).
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of the earlier transfer, the specifically enforceable promise to
convey. If the promise to convey would have been unavoidable
in bankruptcy, and therefore would have been enforceable,
then the Other Party is no better off because of the conveyance
before bankruptcy. If the conveyance had not been made, the
Other Party could have obtained specific enforcement of the
promise to convey in bankruptcy court, and therefore would
have gotten the land anyway. In that case, the requirements of
section 547(b)(5) would not be satisfied and the pre-bankruptcy
conveyance would not be a preference. Thus the avoidability of
the conveyance as a preference turns upon the avoidability of
the first transfer, the promise to convey.
The ITI (the right to conveyance) created by the promise
might have been subject to avoidance under any of the avoiding
powers. For example, the sales contract might have been unre-
corded and therefore subject to defeat by a bona fide purchaser
under state law. If so, the trustee could avoid it under section
544(a)(3) and the promise to convey would not have been en-
forceable in bankruptcy. In that case, the pre-bankruptcy con-
veyance made the Other Party much better off than it would
have been absent the conveyance, section 547(b)(5) is satisfied,
and the conveyance of the land is avoidable as a preference.
Once the trustee avoids the conveyance and gets the land back,
the analysis proceeds just as in any non-ITI situation. The
trustee rejects, sells the land for full value, and repays the
purchase price to the Other Party in Bankruptcy Dollars.
These preference examples are illustrative of a number of
situations in bankruptcy contract problems where the debtor's
pre-bankruptcy promise or performance may be avoidable. On
the other hand, it is worth an aside to note that often times a
putatively avoidable contractual promise or performance is
saved from avoidance. Pre-bankruptcy performance often con-
stitutes a preference under section 547(b) that is not avoidable
because it is sheltered by an exception to avoidance in section
547(c). In particular, section 547(c)(2), the ordinary course ex-
ception, often protects routine pre-bankruptcy performance.
The avoiding powers operate in bankruptcy contract situa-
tions to produce one more remarkable result. In every bank-
ruptcy contract case, regardless of the state of performance of
the contract at the time of bankruptcy, the Other Party's claim
is subject to reduction if the obligation giving rise to the claim
is avoidable as a fraudulent conveyance. 20 3 This analysis ap-
203. See, e.g., Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 661 F.2d 979, 993 (2d
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plies whether the Other Party's claim existed at the time of
bankruptcy or arises subsequently as a result of rejection,
avoidance, or some combination of the two. One result is that
the estate sometimes may be able to reclaim the debtor's per-
formance and avoid the Other Party's claim, at least in part.
Again consider our example of the onion contract with the
debtor as seller, but add that the contract price was ridiculously
low. Suppose that the onions were worth $500 when the origi-
nal contract was made, but the contract price was only $100.
Assuming the debtor's insolvency at that time, the obligation to
sell the onions at that low price is avoidable as a fraudulent
conveyance because the price was not "reasonably equivalent
value."20 4 In that case, not only will the debtor recover the on-
ions as a preference, but the Other Party will have a claim only
for the amount it actually paid prior to bankruptcy, rather than
for the full benefit of its bargain.205 Its actual recovery, of
course, will be lower still, because it is payable in Bankruptcy
Dollars.
F. DISCHARGE
Discharge is almost never the subject of discussions of ex-
ecutory contracts, 206 yet its effect in changing state contract law
results is every bit as important as the principles already dis-
cussed. One source of the lack of understanding of this point is
confusion from which even knowledgeable people sometimes
suffer, the confusion created by that modern phenomenon, the
Cir. 1981) (remanding to determine if obligation under contract void because
debtor did not receive fair consideration for its incurrence); cf. In re Moore &
White Co., 83 Bankr. 277, 283-84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa 1988) (blocking creditor's
motion for relief from stay requires debtor to make reasonable showing that
he will prevail in an action for fraudulent transfer based on "less than reason-
ably equivalent value" and insolvency).
204. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT
§ 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1984). In the service of clarity, I am ignoring alternative
tests for a fraudulent conveyance under federal and state law, including con-
structive fraud under § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii-iii) and actual intent to defraud under
§ 548(a)(1).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1988); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT §§ 5(a),
8(b), 7A U.L.A. 657, 662 (1984). If the contract price was $100, the onions were
really worth $500, Other Party buyer paid $100 in advance, and then the
debtor-seller delivered, all pre-bankruptcy, then the debtor recovers the on-
ions themselves as a preference and avoids the contractual obligation to sell
the onions for $100 as a fraudulent conveyance, because the price was too low.
The Other Party is left only with its right, assuming its good faith, to recover
the $100 it actually paid. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), (c) (1988).
206. But see Andrew, supra note 15, at 927 n.288.
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Debtor In Possession (familiarly, the "DIP").20 7 The DIP looks
and acts a lot like the pre-petition debtor, yet the Code places
the DIP in the position of a trustee.208 As a result, it is easy to
confuse the two perspectives: that of the trustee maximizing
the estate and that of the debtor (DIP) enjoying the benefits of
discharge. This confusion affects many bankruptcy analyses,
but none more so than that of bankruptcy contracts. Its effect
is found in many of the most troubling and difficult recent
cases, especially those involving covenants not to compete and
franchises and licenses.20 9
An academic assumption that discharge is only important
for natural-person debtors, not for corporations, exacerbates
the confusion.2 0 That assumption is accurate for Chapter 7,
but not for Chapter 11, where the discharge of pre-petition debt
is central to every plan of reorganization, whether the debtor is
a natural person or a legal entity like a corporation or
partnership.
Covenants against competition are good examples of the
operation of discharge in bankruptcy contract cases, as the later
discussion of Rovine will illustrate.21' Let us consider the sim-
ple example of a salesman, Harry, who has a contract of em-
ployment with the Acme Company to sell its goods on
commission. The contract contains a reasonable covenant
against competition, enforceable for a reasonable time after ter-
mination of employment, and the covenant would be enforcea-
ble by injunction under state law. Note, however, that it is not
an ITI, an interest in any of Harry's specific assets.
Harry does a good job of selling, but a bad job of handling
his personal affairs. He greets with naive enthusiasm every
credit card application and every letter advising that "We have
$2,000 waiting for YOU!" This attitude leads inexorably to a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After bankruptcy, Harry is offered a
much better job with a competitor of Acme. (To keep the ex-
ample simple, no customer lists or trade secrets are involved.)
207. See supra note 100.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
209. See infra Section IV. A.
210. D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 729 (1985); Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 n.7 (1985); see generally Sullivan, Warren & West-
brook, Folklore and Facts: A Preliminary Report from the Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 309-10 (1986) (criticizing the view that
business owners have no need for the protection of bankruptcy law).
211. See infra notes 281-318 and accompanying text.
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Assuming Harry has not defrauded anyone, he will walk away
from all his debts to Sears, the electric company, and his
brother-in-law, by virtue of the discharge.2' 2 He also will es-
cape the anti-competition obligation, so his fresh start will in-
clude his new job.213 Some observers might be distressed that
he can escape the obligation to Acme, just as Sears and the rest
may be upset about Harry dodging his obligations to them. The
key point here is that it is the discharge that costs all of them,
including Acme, the right to enforce their unsecured contract
claims, not some exotic bankruptcy rule about "executory"
contracts.
Before we leave Harry, a caveat is necessary. Not everyone
agrees that he can be discharged from this particular obligation,
the covenant against competition. Some say that Acme's nega-
tive injunctive right is not a "claim" and therefore not a dis-
chargeable "debt."214 If that were correct, the covenant would
not be discharged and Harry would be bound by it even after
bankruptcy. I believe few, if any, equitable remedies should be
excluded from the definition of "claim" and therefore from dis-
charge, but that is an argument for another day.215 The impor-
212. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727 (1988).
213. Id,
214. See, e.g., Carstens Health Indus. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 47 Bankr.
842, 845 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that equitable right not a claim and
therefore specifically enforceable). But see, e.g., Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise
Sys. v. Register (In re Register), 95 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.) (holding
that right to enforcement of noncompetition covenant is a claim and discharge-
able), aff'd, 100 Bankr. 360 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). See generally Julis, Classifying
Rights and Interests Under the Bancruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 223, 232-
46 (1981) (discussing the definition of "claim" and noting classification difficul-
ties); Andrew, supra note 15, at 921 n.268 (same).
215. Julis argues that the adoption of the "right to payment" language in
§ 101(4)(b), which narrowed the definition in earlier versions, signaled a con-
gressional intent to exclude a fairly wide range of equitable claims. Julis,
supra note 214, at 236. The language is still very broad, however, and a broad
reading seems compelled by the overall congressional policy of eliminating
"provability" of claims and including virtually all of the debtor's obligations.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 180, 309, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6140-41, 6266.
My own view is that because the Code grants such expansive power to the
bankruptcy courts to estimate claims, 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988), the damage
remedy (the "right to payment") almost always will be available in bank-
ruptcy, even when it might not have been at state law. Note that the question
here is not the irreparable injury rule, which holds that equitable remedies are
unavailable if legal remedies will adequately repair the harm. See Laycock,
supra note 111, manuscript at 2, 4 (discrediting the rule by demonstrating that
equitable remedies are routinely available when courts find legal damages in-
adequate). Rather it is a federal standard of a "right to payment." For these
reasons, I think the availability of a "right to payment" must take into account
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tant thing here is that the right to discharge is the correct place
to tussle over this issue, rather than it being the offshoot of
some special rule about bankruptcy contracts.
Meantime, back in bankruptcy court, Harry's Chapter 7
trustee will be allowing claims from these same creditors.
Acme's claim will be harder to figure than most; that difficulty
in calculation is one of the principal reasons that anti-competi-
tion covenants are enforced specifically under state law. In
bankruptcy court Acme has a much better chance to prove a
monetary loss than it has under state law, because the Code
gives the bankruptcy court special powers for estimating
claims.21 6 On the other hand, if the salesman's bankruptcy is
like most individual bankruptcy cases, the unsecured creditors
will receive little or nothing in any case.217
Acme's claim arose when the trustee rejected the debtor's
contract with Acme. Even if the contract was assumable,218 the
the greater power of the bankruptcy court to provide a reasonably adequate
estimation, especially in light of the fact that equitable relief almost always
produces more inequality among legally equal creditors than does estimation
and pro rata payment. The result might be that the statutory category defined
as an equitable claim without a "right to payment" will be an empty or nearly
empty set, to be treated as a mere congressional caveat against the unforeseen.
On the other hand, there are policy reasons for injunctions that transcend
inadequacy of legal remedy. See Laycock, supra note 111, manuscript at 79-80.
When such policies apply to the rights of a nonbankrupt party, it could be ar-
gued that they might on rare occasions override the bankruptcy policies of dis-
charge and equality of distribution. See Nimmer, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO.
L. REV. 507, 512-13 (1983). I for one do not believe that a case can be made for
enforcing contract remedies on that basis, as opposed to public policies involv-
ing, for example, the environment. Putting to one side normative views as ap-
plied to bankrupt individuals, an interpretation that would expand the
category of "unprovable" and nondischargeable equitable claims would be dev-
astating to many business reorganizations. Such an interpretation also would
have the ironic effect of leaving the Other Party with no enforceable claims
versus the assets in bankruptcy.
Some recent cases have found no right to payment when a state judgment
for specific performance was obtained before bankruptcy. In re Roxse Homes,
Inc., 74 Bankr. 810, 818 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), aff'd, 83 Bankr. 185 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 860 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1988); Rusiski v. Pribonic (In re Pribonic), 70
Bankr. 596, 601 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1987). This is a special category of cases,
which presumably rests on the well-settled general rule that a pre-bankruptcy
final judgment is controlling in bankruptcy. E.g., Chattanooga Memorial Park
v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 929
(1978); see Westbrook, supra note 61, at 639 & n.176.
216. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1988).
217. See T. SULLVAN, E. WARREN, & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 89, 201-31;
Hervert & Pacitti, supra note 89, at 316.
218. The contract may not have been assumable because it may have been
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trustee would reject it because assumption has no effect except
to elevate Acme's claim to an administrative claim. On the
other side, in most cases Acme would not want specific enforce-
ment of the anti-competition covenant against the estate. Thus,
the trustee will reject and pay an estimated breach claim in
Bankruptcy Dollars from the available assets, if any.219
The executoriness analyst confronted with this case will be
lost in a psychedelic hall of mirrors, filled with conceptual ag-
ony over the existence vel non of an executory contract. The
functionalist will long since have departed, whistling, for a
weekend at the beach.
The key point about this sort of case is that any felt ineq-
uity is solely a function of the discharge. Acme's loss is eco-
nomic and can be calculated in damages, however imprecisely.
The bankruptcy court probably can do a fair job with that cal-
culation. Acme's rights should not be completely satisfied
when Sears and the rest suffer great loss. Indeed, it would be
ironic if Acme got, in effect, full payment because its claim
could not be calculated, while those with clearly defined losses
were left in the cold.2 20
The same basic analysis applies to a Chapter 11 debtor, as
we will see in the later discussion of the Rovine case.221 To the
extent that some observers feel a risk of inequity in cases like
these, focusing on discharge also serves to illuminate the proper
approach to preventing abuse of bankruptcy in such cases, pri-
marily through objection to discharge 222 and cramdown.223
These questions are also addressed in the discussion of Rovine.
a personal services contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1988). In that case, the
trustee must breach and pay damages, because it cannot perform, unless the
obligation is not a "claim." See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
219. The damage claim will be estimated based on Harry's likely harm to
Acme in his post-discharge sales activities, but as a pre-petition claimant Acme
will only share in the available pre-petition assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1),
502(g) (1988).
220. If Harry committed fraud, of course, he would not get the discharge.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1988). Even without fraud, some might argue that
the "substantial abuse" doctrine should be used to force him to pay. Ia
§ 707(b) (1988). But if so, it should benefit all unsecured creditors, not just
Acme.
221. See infra Section IV. A.
222. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988).
223. Id § 1129(b).
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G. ASSUMPTION AND REJECTION: DECIDING TO PERFORM
OR BREACH
Before concluding the discussion of the functional ap-
proach to bankruptcy contracts, we should consider a rhetorical
problem. Although scholars and practitioners generally agree
that assumption means performance and rejection means
breach, that usage conceals a semantic hitch. This hitch con-
tributes to the confusion in discussing bankruptcy contracts.
Assumption is not performance, it is the decision to per-
form. Rejection is not breach, but the decision to breach. Per-
formance or breach follow the court's approval of the trustee's
decision.22 Thus, when the trustee asks approval of assump-
tion, it is asking for approval of performance, but assumption is
the decision, not the performance itself.
I belabor the semantic point because I think the Code re-
flects the "moral" difficulty that came up in the initial, theoret-
ical discussion of assumption and rejection.22 Whether Posner
and Holmes like it or not, promise-breaking has a moral dimen-
sion. That dimension explains, in part, various procedural con-
tract rules that put burdens on the breacher, the wrongdoer,
the person who started all this fuss and made a lawsuit
necessary.
In part, the grant in section 365 of the right of assumption
and rejection may reflect the need to give the trustee the moral
right to breach a contract. The trustee's moral position is
sound, because it is acting for the innocent unsecured creditors,
not for the deadbeat debtor.
Of course, important procedural reasons support the spot-
light on the decision to perform or breach. That decision now
requires the court's approval in all cases,226 reflecting the mod-
em appreciation that such decisions can have fateful conse-
quences for liquidation dividends, or the prospects for
reorganization. The trustee newly appointed to liquidate a
complicated estate (or sell a business as a going concern) needs
time to compute the costs and benefits of assumption or rejec-
tion of each pre-petition contract and it is important to focus its
attention on that duty. In Chapter 11, the DIP may know
about the outstanding contracts, but in the chaos characteristic
224. This point is made evident by the fact that after assumption, the
trustee may either perform the contract or assign it. Id §§ 365(b), 365(f)
(1988).
225. See supra text accompanying note 111.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
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of the opening days of a reorganization it is important that
court approval forces a focus on the merits of each outstanding
contract. This requirement for a decision (rather than a drift
into performance or breach), stiffened by the need for court ap-
proval, helps to ensure sound business conclusions. 22 We have
seen how complex the calculation of cost and benefit can be, in-
tertwining financial and contract-law analysis, so this proce-
dural focusing device, approval of the decision to perform or
breach, is very important. The court will defer to the trustee or
the DIP under the "business judgment" rule,228 but the as-
sumption or rejection decision must be supported by facts and
reasons.
229
H. SUMMARY OF THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
To summarize briefly the main points of a functional
analysis:
1. There is no special bankruptcy "power" to assume or re-
ject contracts. The trustee (or DIP) has the power to perform
or breach contracts, just like any other contract party under
state law, and it inherits that power from the pre-petition
debtor along with the debtor's pending contract rfghts and
obligations.2 0
2. There should be no requirement of a threshold finding
that a contract is "executory" as a prerequisite to performance
or breach by the trustee.2 1 The trustee must abandon or real-
ize upon each contract right in the estate and must perform or
breach each contract obligation. 2 When contract law makes
certain rights and obligations interdependent, the trustee's
right to realize upon the rights will be dependent upon per-
formance of the obligations, as for any other contract party.233
3. The only justifiable changes in contract results in bank-
ruptcy are those arising from bankruptcy's limitations on the
227. For the suggestion that the provision might be for the purpose of forc-
ing the trustee to a decision for the benefit of the Other Party, see Silverstein,
Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 31 U.
CH. L. REv. 467, 473 (1964).
228. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub nom.
Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); see 2 COLTER 15th, supra
note 17, 1 365.03.
229. Richmond, 756 F.2d at 1047-48.
230. See supra notes 103-18 and accompanying text.
231. See infra Section I.
232. See supra notes 95-118.
233. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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Other Party's remedies and from the avoiding powers.23 The
principal provisions involved are the pro rata distribution
rules,2  the corollary rule against specific performance or re-
scission against the trustee,26 the avoiding powers,237 and the
bankruptcy discharge.238
4. Any apparent inequities in the treatment of the Other
Party under the bankruptcy remedy rules fall into one of two
categories: a) inequities that are only apparent, because they
represent the Other Party's sharing of the losses of insolvency
with the other unsecured creditors; 9 and b) inequities that
may arise if the debtor benefits from imposing on the Other
Party, a question to be addressed under the principles of sec-
tions 523 (discharge) and 1129(b) (cramdown and absolute
priority).1 °
III. THE PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF EXECUTORINESS
A. A RULE WITHOUT A REASON
Now that we have worked through the basics of a func-
tional approach to the bankruptcy contract problem, the diffi-
culties and anomalies of the present executoriness analysis can
be addressed. Let me say flatly at the outset that there is noth-
ing to be said for a threshold requirement of executoriness as a
precondition to the assumption or rejection of bankruptcy con-
tracts. It is a century-old wrong turning. The material breach
test has considerable virtue, but only insofar as it greatly ame-
liorates the effects of the executoriness requirement.
The discussion just concluded makes the most fundamental
case against a threshold requirement of executoriness. It is a
requirement with no basis in the Code. If bankruptcy contract
problems can be fully understood without reference to that re-
quirement, it is surplusage and has no effect except confusion
and obfuscation. No bankruptcy policy is served by the require-
ment, and executoriness is not necessary to the operation of the
well understood basic rules about treatment of bankruptcy
contracts.
If that requirement never restrains the trustee from pro-
234. See supra notes 119-37, 190-205 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 119-32.
236. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 206-23 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
240. See infra Section IV. A. 2, 3.
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ceeding according to the Net Value calculation and maximizing
benefits to the estate, then it is irrelevant. If it sometimes pre-
vents the trustee from maximizing the estate on a Net Value
analysis, then it is pernicious, unless it serves some other over-
riding bankruptcy policy. Because there is no bankruptcy pol-
icy or notion of fairness served by the executoriness
requirement, it is irrelevant or pernicious in every case. In
Michael Andrew's lovely phrase, "the clothes have no em-
peror."241 Section 365 provides a number of important proce-
dural rules, some of which have real economic impact,2 2 but
executoriness is utterly unnecessary to the analysis of bank-
ruptcy contracts.
The executoriness requirement may well have evolved as a
simple series of semantic mistakes. It is natural lawyerly rhet-
oric to say that a contract that the trustee may assume or reject
is an "executory" contract. An easy pontification in the next
case, as the court cites learnedly the prior authority, is the
statement, "the trustee in bankruptcy may assume an execu-
tory contract." From there it is easy for judges, lawyers, and
law professors, all of whom love rules, to derive a rule, "a con-
tract must be executory to be assumed or rejected." From any
such positive statement, it is an easy misstep to the implied
negative, "a contract that is not executory may not be assumed
or rejected." 243
Once the statement of the rule has been elaborated so far,
it seems inescapable that there must be a subset of bankruptcy
contracts that are not executory. The consequence may be the
emergence of a notion that there are contracts that are some-
how "in" bankruptcy, yet in some sense not "executory."'2 "
I do not seek to demonstrate that the executoriness test
arose historically through a series of semantic missteps of the
241. Andrew, supra note 15, at 932.
242. We all understand that "procedural" rules have substantive or quasi-
substantive effects, and in that sense bankruptcy rules do change the terms of
pre-bankruptcy contracts in some respects. For example, the expiration of an
option in a pre-bankruptcy contract may be extended 60 days by filing a bank-
ruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1988); see, e.g., In re G-N Partners, 48
Bankr. 462, 468 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (allowing petition to be filed 36 min-
utes before option expired). In the service of clarity and brevity, I ignore
these procedural phenomena.
243. Cf Balkin, supra note 148, at 746-47 (1987) (discussing the relation-
ships among opposites).
244. One thinks of Cardozo's admonition that we must avoid being en-
slaved by our own formulations. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155
N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
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sort I have just described, but it seems to me that the survival
of such a purely formal doctrine must have some such explana-
tion. It may be that this formal logic has prevailed precisely be-
cause the remarkable results of assumption and rejection of
bankruptcy contracts are not understood, so a formal, manipu-
lable system has considerable appeal for judges groping toward
correct results.
Because executoriness has no basis in policy or fairness, it
is almost infinitely manipulable. That is its central fault. I am
not one of those who believes that all legal doctrine can be infi-
nitely manipulated in plausible ways. Doctrine that can be so
manipulated is almost always formalistic, unlinked to any real
basis in policy and fairness. Doctrine that is rooted in policy
and fairness is far less subject to manipulations that seem plau-
sible to the knowledgeable. The fact that a threshold require-
ment of executoriness tacitly assumes some special bankruptcy
policy that does not exist is the very reason that it is always ca-
pable of giving the right answer - or the wrong one.
The simplest and most fundamental symptom of the weak-
ness of the executoriness requirement is the notion that some
contracts cannot be rejected because they are not executory.24 5
Because rejection merely means breach-and-pay, 246 does that
statement mean that the contract must be performed? No, be-
cause the lack of executoriness means it cannot be assumed -
that is, performed - either. What are we to make of a contrac-
tual obligation that can neither be performed nor breached?
Shall we say it can only be paid? But pay is just what we do, in
or out of bankruptcy, when we breach-and-pay (in bankruptcy
terms, reject). If the concrete difference between rejection and
nonrejection is zero, the test for rejectability is without point.
Any doctrine that requires such logical and semantic nonsense
must be unsound. 4 7
245. Professor Countryman's position on this point was somewhat ambigu-
ous. See Countryman (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 451-60.
246. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 365(g), 502(g) (1988); see supra note 15 and accom-
panying text; infra notes 403-05 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., In re KMMCO, 40 Bankr. 976, 978 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding
that debtor's obligation to pay death benefits to employee's widow as long as
she did not die, remarry or cohabit with a man was a non-executory contract;
terms relating to widow were not contractual obligations but conditions subse-
quent to debtor's obligation to pay); see also Andrew, supra note 15, at 887
(noting that rejection, though unnecessary, is harmless as long as it is not ap-
plied incorrectly). For Andrew, this is the central point. See infra note 262. I
am indebted to Professor Douglas Whaley for helping me to see this point
clearly.
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The executoriness requirement serves no policy and leads
to logically absurd results. Worse still, it obscures the true is-
sues in bankruptcy contract cases, masking the state-law issues
that are usually the central difficulty, as well as other bank-
ruptcy issues.
B. TREATING STATE LAw QUESTIONS AS MATTERS OF
ExEcuTORINEss
The focus of the "executoriness" requirement is on some
supposed special rule of bankruptcy law, thus taking the court's
attention away from the core question: the parties' rights under
state contract law. The hard questions in these cases are usu-
ally there, in contract law. Once the contract law questions are
answered,24 8 the application of the bankruptcy payment rules is
often simple. The result is that the executoriness requirement
presents a mine field of opportunities for error that functional
analysis avoids.
One instance is where it is not clear whether or not an
Other Party seller should be considered as having delivered the
goods before bankruptcy. Resolving this question often is im-
portant because state law, Article 2 in the case of onion con-
tracts, makes this distinction crucial for the rights of the Other
Party seller, in and out of bankruptcy.2 9 The executoriness ap-
proach tempts a bankruptcy court to resolve this problem by
determining the executoriness of the contract, rather than sim-
ply looking to state law for the answer. The real question is
whether nonbankruptcy law gives the Other Party seller an
ITI.
A common example of this sort of problem is where the
onions were in transit on the date of bankruptcy. Article 2 pro-
vides rules that determine whether the onions are to be consid-
ered delivered, given the provisions of the contract and the
circumstances of the case.?50 The state courts apply these rules
to determine if a seller has the rights of a seller before deliv-
ery, or the much more limited rights of a seller after deliv-
248. The state law questions are sometimes quite difficult because some
circumstances that arise in bankruptcy are not likely to have arisen under
state law, and therefore there may be few precedents. What precedents there
are can be misleading if the state-law decision was made in a context different
from the circumstances presented in the bankruptcy case. In that event, the
court must try to plumb the policy basis for state law as best it can, and then
apply those state policies to the bankruptcy context. See infra note 266.
249. U.C.C. §§ 2-401(2), 2-702 to -710 (1987).
250. E.g., "FOB," "CIF," and others. See i& §§ 2-319 to -320.
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ery.251 The problem is apt to arise when the seller attempts to
stop the goods in transit or goes to court to reclaim them. The
goods are on the train or stored at the dock and the issue is
whether the Other Party seller can get them back or is stuck
with only a damage claim to be paid in Bankruptcy Dollars.
When the onions were in transit on the date of bankruptcy,
the functional analyst will look to this body of state U.C.C. law
to determine if the Other Party is a delivered seller or an unde-
livered seller.2 52 If the seller is undelivered, then the trustee
must assume the contract or forfeit any rights in the goods. If
the Other Party seller delivered, then it has very limited
rights253 and the bankruptcy payment rules will relegate it to
an unsatisfying damage claim payable in Bankruptcy Dollars.2
From a functional standpoint, that is that.255
The mystique of executoriness tempts courts to apply a
federal bankruptcy analysis of material performance due,
rather than the proper U.C.C. analysis. Oftentimes, it must be
said, this analysis obtains the right answer.256 This type of
problem illustrates the most important reason that the material
breach analysis is enormously helpful as compared to the intel-
lectual anarchy that preceded it. By focusing the court's atten-
tion on the material performance of both sides, the
executoriness test overlaps the underlying state law problem,
which is whether the Other Party seller managed to avoid de-
livering before bankruptcy - that is, whether the Other Party
has an ITI.257
Unfortunately, the test often leads to the wrong answer for
at least two reasons. One is the mistaken notion that the mere
obligation to make payment is not material performance. This
notion was not put forward in Countryman's Minnesota Law
Review articles. One can imagine the reaction of a room full of
business people on hearing that payment is not a material part
of contract performance. Nonetheless, this idea has enjoyed
251. This problem, of course, used to be decided under the rubric "passage
of title," prior to adoption of the U.C.C.
252. U.C.C. § 2-705 (1987).
253. Id. § 2-702.
254. See supra notes 172-73.
255. See In re Nevins Ammunition, Inc., 79 Bankr. 11, 17 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1987) (holding that seller not entitled to priority administrative expense treat-
ment for goods delivered pre-petition).
256. E.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership), 882
F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d 686, 692-93 (9th
Cir. 1984).
257. See, e.g., Nevins, 79 Bankr. at 17.
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considerable currency.2 58 Applied to our example, that notion
would mean that there is no material performance due on the
debtor-buyer's side (a buyer just pays) and therefore no execu-
tory contract, whether or not the Other Party delivered the
goods. The executoriness test makes the answer to the central
state law question irrelevant and almost guarantees error.25 9
The second reason for mistakes is the presence of ancillary
obligations, like warranties, that can yield the answer "execu-
tory" when the seller has delivered the onions, which usually
should make assumption out of the question. The impact of an-
cillary obligations in producing bad results under the executori-
ness analysis is discussed in the next section.
Thus, the threshold requirement of "executoriness" is not
merely unnecessary, but leads to error. As the continuing dis-
cussion will reveal, the executoriness requirement can almost
always be manipulated to produce the correct result, but the
fact that it deflects the courts from the true problems of state
contract law invites - and often produces - error. As a result,
bankruptcy contract law conflicts with state contract law with-
out any good federal policy reasons to support the difference.
C. ANCILLARY OBLIGATIONS
The presence of ancillary obligations is an important aspect
of executoriness analysis in many of the recent cases. It is fre-
quently encountered in license cases and in cases involving a
noncompete covenant. It is another instance of using "ex-
ecutoriness" analysis where state contract law is the real point,
258. E.g., Diamond Gateway Coal Co. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.) 104 Bankr. 637, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding refusal to honor liqui-
dated damages clause of contract did not constitute anticipatory breach); In re
Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc., 76 Bankr. 695, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987) (finding
insurance contracts not executory because debtors have no obligation other
than paying money); accord In re Placid Oil Co., 72 Bankr. 135, 138 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1987); cf. In re Shada Truck Leasing Co., 31 Bankr. 97, 99 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1983) (finding debtor's obligation to pay insufficient to make contract ex-
ecutory). But see, e.g., In re Walat Farms, Inc., 69 Bankr. 529, 533 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1987) (holding contract executory due to debtor's payment obligation).
This rule may have arisen from the case of Debtor as Buyer, Uncompleted
Contract, where the debtor-buyer has only an obligation to make payment of
money. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
259. A striking example of the tangle is In re Coast Trading Co., 744 F.2d
686 (9th Cir. 1984). Based on the facts stated, the court apparently got every-
thing right as to result, but its executory contract approach to the Article 2
problem left it saying that it did not matter if the debtor assumed or rejected,
because the claim would have administrative priority anyway. Id. at 693.
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but it is sufficiently important to deserve a section of its own in
this discussion.
An ancillary obligation (Ancillary) for this purpose is an
obligation that is not the central exchange of a contract. An
Ancillary may be important, its performance may be a material
part of the contract, but it is not the central obligation in a par-
ticular single contract. Generally speaking, Ancillaries are im-
portant in bankruptcy contract cases when they have the
characteristic of being on-going obligations, remaining when
the main performance is completed on one or both sides. Per-
forming Ancillaries often is contingent on future
circumstances.
Common examples of Ancillaries for our purpose are war-
ranties, covenants to defend intellectual property rights,
noncompete covenants, and arbitration clauses. There are
many others, including perpetual care of a burial plot.260
It makes sense to start with a simple example. The subject
is the onion contract again, but this time we will not ignore
warranties, as we explicitly did earlier.
1. Debtor as Buyer
In the prior analysis, one case was the Debtor as Buyer,
Half-Completed Contract - Debtor's Performance Remains.261
It was quite simple under any approach. The debtor-buyer had
received the onions, but still owed the purchase price at the
time of bankruptcy. The estate will reject because the contract
contains no remaining benefit for the debtor.26 2 The executori-
ness doctrine says "no executory contract," because the Other
Party already delivered, and yields the same result.26 3
Yet the debtor-buyer almost certainly had warranty rights.
Absent a disclaimer, virtually all contracts under Article 2 of
the U.C.C. contain warranties implied by law,2M and many have
260. Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 349
(6th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
262. In a sense, rejection is irrelevant. The trustee does not reject, but
merely pays the claim. Yet the analysis seems more coherent, if we say that
the trustee breaches, thus emphasizing the controlling place of nonbankruptcy
law in calculating the Other Party's claim as a matter of damages for breach of
contract. In this way we also ensure court control of the process. 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1988).
263. Albeit ignoring what happens to the claim. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 365(g),
502(g) (1988).
264. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318 (1987).
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express warranties. Warranties, both express and implied, are
common in nongoods contracts, as well. In our prior example,
the warranties in favor of the debtor-buyer probably were not
important enough to be worth assuming and losing U.S. $90, so
we safely ignored them.265
Now suppose some facts that are unusual, but well short of
fantasy. Suppose the government discovers a deadly onion vi-
rus, rare but virulent, that poses a real risk of unsalability and
of product liability claims. In the marketplace, 100 bushels of
onions are now worth $100 only if backed by a strong warranty
against the virus. The market will accept only a warranty
given by a producer like the Other Party seller. A company in
the position of our debtor-buyer (wholesaler, jobber, or
whatever) can resell onions only if it can assign to the next
buyer the warranty given by the Other Party seller. The mar-
ket is such that with a warranty from the Other Party the on-
ions are worth $100, but without it they are unsalable. Further
assume, as before, a 10% distribution to unsecureds.
On these facts, assumption, which is unthinkable in the
usual case, is in the best interest of the estate and the other
creditors. Assumption of the contract will cost U.S. $100, pay-
ment in full as an administration claim. But assumption will
also activate the warranty obligations of the Other Party, mak-
ing the onions salable for U.S. $100. Payment in full to the
Other Party makes the onions salable on a "break-even" basis
and also eliminates the Other Party's B.D. $100 claim by satis-
fying it, saving the estate U.S. $10 on a 10% distribution.
Breach, on the other hand, will leave a U.S. $10 (B.D. $100)
payment to the Other Party and the onions will bring nothing
in the marketplace. This case is the rare example when as-
sumption makes economic sense, when the debtor is buyer and
the onions were delivered.2 66 The profit to the estate and the
265. See supra text following note 168.
266. This analysis presumes that the warranty right inherited by the
trustee from the debtor-buyer is dependent under contract law upon perform-
ance of the payment obligation: if the trustee breaches and pays only part of
the price, the Other Party seller has a complete defense to any warranty
claims based upon the debtor-buyer's breach of contract in not making full
payment. On that basis, the foregoing analysis is correct.
If, on the other hand, the seller has a warranty obligation under state law
despite nonpayment of the purchase price - or despite only partial payment
- the trustee would not assume because the warranty obligation would be en-
forceable without 100% payment. The trustee would breach (reject) and enjoy
the warranty obligation while paying only 10% of the payment price. State
law is key because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code purports to affect the in-
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other unsecureds from assumption will come from breaking
even on the onions while eliminating one unsecured claim, and
thus leaving more for everyone else. The value added from the
increase in the value of the onions because of assumption out-
weighs the requirement of full payment and so assumption is
more profitable than breach.267
This sort of situation, involving an Ancillary, can create
great problems with the executoriness rule.268 In a given court,
the preceding case (onions delivered to the debtor-buyer, price
unpaid) may have come up again and again and may have been
treated as a classic nonexecutory contract, producing the cor-
rect economic result in the usual case. Then a case arises like
the hypothetical case just stated, where the Ancillary - the
warranty - really matters financially. All the precedent seems
to say that the contract is nonexecutory and therefore cannot
be assumed.26 9 If so, the trustee must forgo the benefit to the
estate from assumption. Instinctively finding no good reason
for the unsecured creditors to lose that benefit, the court may
use the warranty obligation to make the contract executory and
thus permit the benefit to be had.270
terdependence of the obligations in any way. Once the state contract analysis
is clear, the economic or functional analysis, giving effect to the bankruptcy
payment rules, is relatively easy.
One problem in this whole analysis is that the circumstance of bankruptcy
- rather than any bankruptcy rule that changes state contract law - often
presents questions unlikely to arise under state law. See supra note 246.
267. Another variable that can change the trustee's functional analysis is
the percentage of distribution contemplated. In the preceding case, if the dis-
tribution to unsecureds is 20%, then the profit to the estate and the other cred-
itors from assumption is U.S. $20 because of the elimination of the Other
Party's breach claim. As the percentage of distribution rises, the possibility of
a profitable assumption also rises, adding to the precedent-confusion discussed
infra notes 268-79 and accompanying text.
268. See In re Roxse Homes, Inc., 74 Bankr. 810, 815-18 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987), aff'd, 83 Bankr. 185 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 860 F.2d 1072 (1st Cir. 1988) (dis-
cussing the problem of Ancillaries); In re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 462, 465-66
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (same).
269. E.g., In re Shada Truck Leasing Co., 31 Bankr. 97, 100 (Bankr. D. Nbb.
1983) (holding failure to honor installment sales contract warranty not a mate-
rial breach, and contract not executory); In re Continental Properties, Inc., 15
Bankr. 732, 736 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981) (holding agreement was option contract,
not executory contract). But see In re Eli Witt Co., 39 Bankr. 984, 988 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1984) (holding noncompete covenant was part of an executory
contract).
270. For example, one of our finest bankruptcy judges, Judge Schwartz-
berg, may be in trouble the next time he gets an author-publisher case just a
bit different from one he recently decided. In re Stein and Day, Inc., 81
Bankr. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). There the debtor-publisher had
bought and published two of the Other Party author's books, with a "right of
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Yet in the very next "ordinary" sale of goods case, a party
may contend that the contract is executory because warranties
are present.2 71 The result in the unusual case becomes a prece-
dent for using an Ancillary, a warranty, to make such a con-
tract executory. The trustee in the next routine case now may
claim that the obligation to pay the Other Party seller can be
rejected out of existence, leaving the estate owing nothing.272
Or the Other Party in the next case may argue that its claim
should be paid in full because the warranty makes the contract
executory and it should be deemed assumed on one theory or
another.27 3 The history of the executoriness doctrine suggests
that the court again will manipulate the doctrine to find a
nonexecutory contract and thus the right result, that is, the re-
sult that permits maximization of the estate.274 In so doing,
first notice" on future books. The court held that the contract was nonex-
ecutory because the first-notice right, along with some other Ancillaries, were
not sufficiently material to make the contract executory. Id at 266.
Yet in the hypothetical next case, if the author is the hottest property in
New York, even a mere right to first notice might be worth a great deal of
money. If the first-notice right is more valuable than the cost of elevating the
back-royalty claim to administration status, the DIP should assume. But the
court might be forced to deny assumption because of the Stein precedent.
The difference between the legal standard of materiality (breach excuses
the Other Party) and the economic value of the right in a particular case leads
to the wrong business result. In the supposed next case, the right is not "ma-
terial" from a legal point of view, but it is very valuable. Assumption should
be refused in the Stein case because it would be economically stupid, not be-
cause the contract is nonexecutory. It should be permitted in the second case
because the estate (the other creditors and perhaps the debtors' stockholders)
will benefit greatly if the contract is assumed.
271. Cf. In re Sentle Trucking Corp., 93 Bankr. 551, 553 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1987) (rejecting trustee's argument that agreement to not compete with and to
advise company in Chapter 7, in return for deferred compensation, is
executory).
272. In re KMMCO, 40 Bankr. 976, 977 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (reversing bank-
ruptcy court holding that conditions placed on surviving spouse's continued re-
ceipt of death benefits make agreement executory).
273. E.g., In re Unishops, 422 F. Supp. 75, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd 543 F.2d
1017 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (stating that Other Party claimed the guaran-
tee was executory and should be deemed assumed). In addition to a deemed
assumption approach, a recent circuit court decision has blessed the remarka-
ble idea that a trustee is bound by a contract - that is, must perform a con-
tract - because it is nonexecutory. Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1989). See supra note 61.
274. In this situation, the courts often find that the Ancillary rights and ob-
ligations form a severable contract, so that they may be assumed or rejected
independently of the main, "nonexecutory" contract. See, e.g., Pacific Express,
Inc. v. Teknekron Infoswitch Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1482,
1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding maintenance agreement and software license sev-
erable from nonexecutory lease agreement, when the latter was tantamount to
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however, the courts create a mass of confusing and inconsistent
doctrine and sometimes make serious errors. These problems
would be avoided if the court decided the issues explicitly as a
matter of state contract analysis and consequent costs and ben-
efits to the estate from performance or breach.
The warranty example provides another explanation for
the fact that the executoriness doctrine is almost endlessly ma-
nipulable.275 Virtually any contract can be called executory if
the court is willing to look for Ancillaries to serve the function
of "further performance due." If the court wants a nonex-
ecutory contract, it ignores "quiet" obligations like warranties
and patent-defense covenants. If it wants an executory con-
tract, it uses these Ancillaries to give it one and permit the de-
sired result.27 6 Most contracts contain an Ancillary the courts
can use as "further material performance," but Ancillaries, be-
ing ancillary, are also easy to ignore when courts seek a nonex-
ecutory answer.
2. Debtor as Seller
Now consider the converse case, the Half Completed Con-
tract-Debtor's Performance Remains, but this time with the
Debtor as Seller. The Other Party paid for the onions, but the
debtor-seller has not delivered when bankruptcy intervenes.
Normally, the trustee using a functional approach simply dis-
misses the idea of assumption, since no contract right is gained
by assuming, and it breaches and pays in Bankruptcy Dollars.
If the market is still paying $100 for 100 bushels, the trustee re-
sells for U.S. $100, the Other Party covers at a loss of U.S. $100
(having paid twice for the onions), and the trustee pays B.D.
$100, or U.S. $10. Assumption means delivering the onions to
a sale); In re Camptown, Ltd., 96 Bankr. 352, 355 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (find-
ing property maintenance agreement (executory) severable from right to oc-
cupy and use land (nonexecutory)). On the other hand, when the "onions" are
delivered to the debtor pre-bankruptcy and the court does not want the debtor
to avoid related obligations, the contract can be declared nonseverable and the
cum onere rule used to make the debtor perform or give up the "onions." See,
e.g., In re Case, 91 Bankr. 102, 104 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (involving debtors in
possession of condominium, but seeking to reject maintenance obligations).
275. The first explanation is that it is not tied to any bankruptcy policy or
concept of fairness. See supra Section HLI. A.
276. The ultimate Ancillary may be one the court identified in a land sale
case, Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College Park), 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
The court appeared to hold that the fact that a mortgage remained on land al-
ready sold, with deed delivered, constituted remaining material performance
because the seller-lender has to release the mortgage on full payment! I at
1349 n.5.
[Vol. 74:227
1989] EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY 293
the Other Party, losing the U.S. $100 from the market sale and
gaining only the savings of U.S. $10 in breach-claim payment to
the Other Party. The Net Value of assumption is U.S. $-90 and
no rational trustee would assume.277
Once again, however, we can posit an unusual case where
the Other Party has a huge damage claim in case of breach.
The Other Party buyer needs the onions as part of a much
larger contract with an "Ultimate Buyer." Because the market
has recently gone crazy, Ultimate Buyer wants an excuse to
terminate its contract with the Other Party and nondelivery of
the onions would provide a valid legal justification. For techni-
cal reasons, the Other Party cannot cover if the debtor-seller
(estate) does not deliver. As a result, the Other Party stands to
lose a perfectly demonstrable $10,000 profit from the larger
contract. We also will suppose that the Other Party explained
all this to the debtor-seller in advance, and therefore state con-
tract law entitles the Other Party to recover those lost profits if
the debtor fails to deliver the onions. Finally, we will assume
that for promotional reasons the original contract required the
Other Party buyer to label the onions "Debtor's Crunchy
Onions."
Now the trustee's calculations change. Assumption will re-
quire delivery of the onions, losing the potential U.S. $100
profit from sale in the market, but will also avoid a claim from
the Other Party buyer of B.D. $10,000. Even in Bankruptcy
Dollars, the payment to the Other Party at 10% will cost the
estate U.S. $1,000, far more than the profit from the market
sale. On these unusual facts, the trustee will want to assume
and deliver, thus minimizing loss to the estate.278
As before, the bankruptcy court may have repeatedly
found this sort of contract nonexecutory in routine cases, be-
cause the Other Party owed no remaining performance. In this
unusual case, the court must manipulate executoriness to save
the unsecureds from a catastrophic claim by the Other Party, a
claim that might preempt all the estate's unencumbered assets.
An average lawyer for the trustee will read the precedents and
give up. A smart lawyer - or a smart bankruptcy judge, sua
sponte - will seize upon the existence of an Ancillary, the
277. For Net Value formula, see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
278. Another unusual case might arise when the Other Party still owes
substantial payment and is entitled to offset a breach claim against the further
payment due to the estate. Setoff amounts to 100% payment of a claim to the
extent of the setoff, which is why the setoff right is treated as a secured claim
in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 363(a) (1988).
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"crunchy" labeling obligation, as "material performance" still
due on the side of the Other Party buyer, call the contract ex-
ecutory, and save the unsecureds. The result will be right and
the lawyer or judge will feel quite clever - until the next rou-
tine case in this category comes along and.one of the parties
makes the same arguments. Now these arguments produce the
wrong financial result, and the court and the litigants descend
into a doctrinal quagmire.
This example is especially interesting because, unlike the
warranty in the Debtor as Buyer example,279 the Ancillary
here, the labeling requirement, is unrelated to the actual finan-
cial issue. The labeling problem is not important economically
because the trustee could care less about having the debtor's la-
bel on the onions. Yet the Ancillary lies there, sleeping, just
awaiting a kiss from a smart lawyer to turn the frog into an ex-
ecutory contract. This sort of thing makes great children's sto-
ries, but terrible law.
Even more interesting is the problem the executoriness
court will have if the labeling provision is not so helpfully bur-
ied in the provisions of this contract, or if the lawyers fail to
ferret it out. Without such an Ancillary, this is one of the few
cases where it is quite difficult to find any "material perform-
ance" due from the Other Party. A court employing the ex-
ecutoriness test might be stuck with forbidding assumption and
thus preventing the trustee from saving anything for the other
unsecureds. There is no possible justification for that result,
which also damages the Other Party.
D. EXECUTORINESS MASKING AN AVOIDING POWERS PROBLEM
Some significant cases turn on an implicit assumption that
bankruptcy law somehow gives the trustee greater contract
remedies than the debtor has pre-bankruptcy, in addition to its
limits on the remedies of the Other Party. I think courts sup-
pose a special bankruptcy contract power in some cases because
another, real bankruptcy policy and power is lurking unidenti-
fied. The notion of a special bankruptcy contract "power," cou-
pled with the "magic" of some bankruptcy contract results,
leads courts to hold that bankruptcy changes state contract
rights in substantive ways, when courts are really responding to
the other, unidentified bankruptcy principle. A striking exam-
279. See supra Section III. C. 1.
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ple is Richmond, discussed after Rovine.2 80
IV. EXEMPLARY CASES
A. RovNE
A good place to start discussing exemplary cases is In re
Rovine,2 8 1 a classic executory contract case. It is one of the
cases involving a noncompete covenant. These cases do not in-
volve an ITI, so they are perhaps the simplest type of cases that
the courts find difficult and controversial. Rovine provides a
good example of applying the principles and approaches previ-
ously discussed to a more complicated problem.
The facts in Rovine are relatively simple. The Rovine Cor-
poration was a Burger King franchisee under a typical
franchise contract (as far as the facts appear in the opinion).28 2
It presumably received all sorts of start-up help in establishing
its burger store, including complete plans for layout and proper
equipment, training of personnel, and the rest ("french fries
here, apple turnovers over there"). Burger King also promised
to keep Rovine on the cutting edge of hamburger technology
and permitted the use of its heavily advertised brand name.2 8 3
In turn, Rovine was obligated to pay royalties to Burger King
and to comply with Burger King's standards of "Burger Excel-
lence." It also agreed to a covenant not to compete with Burger
King in a stated geographical area for a stated period of years
following termination of the franchise for any reason.28 4 The
covenant appeared to be sustainable as reasonable in time and
extent under state contract law.
The burger business did not do well, so Rovine Corporation
filed in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.28 5 Given its financial results to
date, it decided that the status of Burger King franchisee was
more expensive than it was worth. Furthermore, we can as-
sume that it already got many of the benefits of a franchisee in
the pre-opening training and guidance provided by Burger
King, benefits that were to be amortized by payment of royal-
ties to Burger King over many years. The fact that a franchisee
280. See infra Section IV. B.
281. Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 5 Bankr. 402
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn.) (Rovine I), later proceeding, 6 Bankr. 661 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1980) (Rovine II).
282. Rovine II, 6 Bankr. at 665.
283. I&
284. Id.
285. Rovine 1, 5 Bankr. at 403.
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gets benefits early in the franchise and pays for them later is
no doubt one important reason Burger King included that cove-
nant against competition. It prevents the franchisee from get-
ting the benefits and then dumping the franchise to avoid
paying the related future royalties.
In any event, Rovine decided to go it alone, to purvey its
hamburgers under its own name, foregoing Burger King's re-
search and development, but also avoiding the royalty obliga-
tion. Thus, in its role as DIP-trustee it rejected the Burger
King contract, including the covenant not to compete, and
stated an intent to sell its burgers at the same old stand under
its own name.286  Burger King understandably objected. It
made its objection under the rubric of executoriness, contend-
ing that the franchise contract was not executory and therefore
was not subject to rejection. Because the contract could not be
rejected, Burger King contended, the covenant against competi-
tion could not be rejected and should be enforced.2s7
The court took the argument on these terms, as many
precedents suggested it should, and concluded that the contract
was executory. 2s8 Much material performance obviously was
due from Rovine, including royalty payments and maintenance
of Burger Excellence, so the problem was to find material per-
formance due from Burger King in order to satisfy the material
breach test for executoriness. That task was not easy because
Burger King already had done most of the valuable things it
promised. Nonetheless, the court found some Ancillaries that
did the job. It held that Burger King's obligation to consult and
to provide Rovine with the latest Burger Breakthroughs made
the contract executory.2 9 Therefore, the court allowed Rovine
to reject the contract and avoid the effect of the noncompete
covenant.29o
The result seems entirely correct, at least within the four
286. Id
287. In the first Rovine opinion, the parties focused the court's attention on
the covenant alone, not the whole franchise contract. Id In the second
round, Burger King also contended that it had no "claim" for violation of its
competition covenant because it had no right to payment under 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(4) (1988). Ravine II, 6 Bankr. at 663. In effect, Burger King asserted
that its rights were enforceable only by injunction, and therefore it could not
be compensated by payment of damages. See supra notes 214-15 and accompa-
nying text.
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corners of bankruptcy contract policy.29 ' It was painful for
Burger King, no doubt, and in a sense unfair. But pain and un-
fairness are the lot of unsecured creditors in bankruptcy and
Burger King, as the Other Party, was suffering along with eve-
ryone else.
1. The Executoriness Analysis
Although the result in Ravine was almost certainly correct
as to the release of the noncompete covenant, the inquiry that
led to the result seems curiously off the point. The extent of
Burger King's additional obligations should not determine the
debtor's right to reject. Should Burger King's counsel now ad-
vise the company to eliminate all post-opening services to new
franchisees? Should a court confronting such a revised contract
conclude that Burger King's reduction of its consideration enti-
tles it to enforce the noncompete covenant? The further per-
formance due from the Other Party and that party's right to
enforce residual covenants are not logically connected. Any
connection may cut the other way: a party that agrees to con-
tinue performing as part of an ongoing relationship should have
a greater right to insist on performance of the debtor's
promises. The rejectability of the competition covenant should
not turn on Burger King's continuing obligation to keep the
debtor informed of the latest developments in quarter-
pounders.2 92
The Burger King obligations were Ancillaries, unrelated to
the underlying economics of the case, yet they had to be found
"material" under state contract law if the contract was to be
held executory and rejectable. Because it would be easy to find
them nonmaterial under contract law, this analysis could pro-
duce the wrong result in two different ways. Binding state-law
precedent holding similar obligations to be nonmaterial might
force a bankruptcy court to find the contract nonexecutory and
nonrejectable, even in a case where the court realized that re-
jection was the right economic answer. The second sort of mis-
take can arise where there is no state-court precedent, so that
the bankruptcy court can plausibly find the Ancillaries mate-
rial or nonmaterial. 93 In this situation, the court's attention is
291. The larger question of fairness in this case is discussed infra Section
IV. A. 3.
292. See In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224, 227 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (criti-
cizing Countryman's definition of executoriness).
293. See supra Section III. C.
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focused on the wrong issue, the central legal point can be
manipulated in either direction, and there is every likelihood
the court will get the wrong answer. In both situations, the
risk of error comes from the fact that the materiality of the
Ancillaries is merely incidental.
Burger King's "consultation" obligation seems extremely
tenuous and hard to enforce. I sincerely doubt that Rovine
could terminate the contract because Burger King "hardly ever
calls anymore." The future-technology promise was fairly
vague and of speculative value as well. I am skeptical that fail-
ure to communicate promptly the latest secret sauce would en-
title Rovine to terminate the contract. But the real point is
that a court could come out either way, without committing an
obvious mistake.
Because these Ancillaries could be considered nonmaterial,
a state court decision might have squarely held, on very similar
facts, that breach of any of these Ancillaries did not justify ter-
mination by Rovine. If the bankruptcy court takes the law seri-
ously (as courts fairly often do), it must hold the contract
nonexecutory and defeat the maximizing of the estate. That re-
sult would be wrong, in practice and in principle.294
294. A more subtle Ancillary in Rovine is the ongoing right to use the Bur-
ger King name. The court did not give much attention to this issue in the "ex-
ecutoriness" analysis, but it seems the most valuable of the remaining benefits
of the franchise contract. On the other hand, it is a curiously passive and neg-
ative sort of continuing material performance for an "executoriness" analysis.
Burger King must not seek an injunction against Rovine (or the estate) for us-
ing the Burger King name absent a breach of the franchise contract. As long
as the contract is not breached by Rovine, Burger King is obligated to so "per-
form." This sort of negative performance is the ultimate sleeping Ancillary, to
be ignored or invoked as manipulation requires. This kind of Ancillary may
be very important in some of the license cases. A negative Ancillary of this
sort can make virtually all such contracts "executory," if that is the desired
result. See In re Fryar, 99 Bankr. 747, 748 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (holding
that under farm subsidy contracts, debtor's performance included "preventing
erosion"); see also Epling, Contractual Cure in Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 71, 73 (1987); Byers & Tuggey, supra note 74, at 353 n.73.
This sort of negative Ancillary - not enjoining use of the Burger King
name - provides the clearest example of yet another reason that the materi-
ality test is so manipulable. Materiality in the material breach test turns on
excusing a party from performance. If other relief is available, short of excus-
ing performance and terminating the contract, it will often be granted. By
finding that less drastic relief is available, the court can hold an Ancillary non-
material. Where Burger King wrongfully sued to block use of its name, a state
court might just dismiss Burger King's suit and order damages for Rovine,
rather than terminating Rovine's long-term franchise obligations. On that ba-
sis, a bankruptcy court could find the obligation nonmaterial, because its
breach would not excuse Rovine from further performance.
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Even in the absence of state court precedent, a bankruptcy
court could intuitively feel that rejection - leaving Burger
King with nothing to show for its substantial investment except
McEgg on its face - is inequitable, especially if it appeared the
debtor company would make a lot of money down the road at
Burger King's expense. That judge easily could find the Ancil-
laries nonmaterial, the contract nonexecutory, and the cove-
nant against competition fully enforceable, all under existing
doctrine. The judge might even be right about the equities, but
the result is patently wrong. The right way to understand the
equities will be addressed shortly,295 but only after we look at
the contract issue using a functional approach.
2. A Functional Analysis
To understand the functional analysis of Rovine, consider a
hypothetical Rovine case, one in which the debtor is a natural
person.296 We already have considered a noncompete case in-
volving a natural person, the case of Harry, the free-spending
salesman.297 Now assume that Mr. Rovine, a natural person,
was the Burger King franchisee. To start at the very beginning
conceptually, also assume that he filed for Chapter 7 liquida-
tion. By so doing, we create two perspectives, that of the
trustee and that of Mr. Rovine.
Mr. Rovine's situation is just like Harry's. He will be dis-
charged of the covenant and will emerge from bankruptcy free
of it, just as he is free of his debt to VISA and his tort liability
to Ms. Jones for an auto accident he caused. Absent a sustaina-
ble claim of fraud by Burger King, or some other basis for ob-
jecting to discharge, Mr. Rovine will walk away from his
obligations in Chapter 7 like any other Chapter 7 debtor. The
noncompete covenant is no different from his promise to pay a
promissory note five years from now, and to pay interest in the
meantime.298 Both creditors get stiffed and are relegated to
their claims against the estate. It is just that simple. If Mr.
Rovine wants to open a new burger palace right down the
295. See infra Section IV. A. 3.
296. This approach would be utterly unnecessary to a court in applying
functional analysis, but it will help this discussion to go step by step.
297. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text. The analysis here is
similar to Harry's case, but because the franchise situation is more complicated
than the employment case, the analysis will go a bit further.
298. This conclusion assumes the covenant is a dischargeable claim. See
supra notes 214-15.
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street, even with assets purchased299 from his old store, he is
entitled to do that as part of his "fresh start."
From the perspective of the Rovine trustee in Chapter 7,
the estate inherited a group of contractual rights, including the
Ancillaries, and a group of contractual obligations, including
the royalty payments. The first financial alternative is liquida-
tion of the business and sale of its assets piecemeal. In that
case, the remaining franchise contract rights, divorced from a
going concern, are worth virtually nothing and the trustee will
abandon them. Therefore, it will not even consider assumption
of the franchise contract. As to the obligations of the contract,
it will breach and pay in Bankruptcy Dollars. One of those ob-
ligations is the covenant against competition. Burger King is
entitled to include damages for its breach, but because the es-
tate is going out of business, no damage is inflicted by the es-
tate. To this point, the analysis is just like the earlier
hypothetical involving the salesman.30 0
The reader may be impatient at this point, feeling that I
am just stating the obvious, but nothing in Rovine speaks to the
discharge and its effect, although it was key to the actual case.
Furthermore, several other courts have gotten this point
wrong.30 1 Yet the fact that the debtor can walk away from the
covenant not to compete, despite having very valuable knowl-
edge and training given to him by Burger King under the con-
tract, is directly the result of the bankruptcy discharge and
nothing else.
Now let us return to the trustee's point of view on a differ-
ent financial assumption, the sale of the business as a going
concern. The trustee found a buyer, Ms. Smith. A functionalist
trustee will ask Ms. Smith whether she wants to buy the busi-
299. Purchased with nonestate property, of course - perhaps money just
borrowed from his brother-in-law.
300. See supra notes 211-15, 219 and accompanying text.
301. E.g., In re Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 839, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (alter-
native ground) (holding franchisee's noncompetition covenant not executory
when franchisor has no remaining obligations); In re Hawes, 73 Bankr. 584,
586 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987) (lifting stay to allow employer to pursue enforce-
ment of noncompetition covenant as a matter of state law); Immugen, Inc. v.
Sapse (In re Sapse), 31 Bankr. 914, 915 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding non-
competition covenant given in exchange for royalties and a stock option fully
executed and specifically enforceable). One case did discuss the discharge is-
sue, but held that the covenant was not dischargeable because it was not a
"claim." Carstens Health Indus. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 47 Bankr. 842, 845
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985). The court apparently believed that if specific per-
formance is a remedy, the obligation can never be a claim, which is simply
wrong. See supra notes 214-15.
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ness with or without the franchise contract rights and obliga-
tions. She might plausibly decide she just wants the business.
After all, Rovine did not do so well with the contract and most
of the benefits promised by Burger King were already per-
formed.30 2 In that case, the trustee will breach and pay the
contract obligations and abandon the contract rights, while sell-
ing the hamburger shop and ongoing business to Ms. Smith.
If Ms. Smith wants the assets without the contract, can
Burger King enforce the noncompete covenant? The answer is
that Burger King has no ITI, no "property" interest in those as-
sets. It cannot get specific performance against the estate for
the reasons discussed earlier.3 03 It cannot get specific perform-
ance against Ms. Smith, because she never agreed not to com-
pete. It cannot get specific performance against the assets
(whatever that might mean),30 4 because it failed to get an inter-
est - for example, a security interest - in those assets.
If Ms. Smith instead wants the franchise rights and obliga-
tions as well as the physical business, the trustee will assume
the contract and assign it to her.30 5 Ms. Smith will get the con-
tract with all of its burdens and benefits, including the noncom-
pete covenant. For a functionalist, that is the end of the
matter.
For a court bogged down in execuioriness, however, the
problem may be tougher. The reason is that the doctrine as-
sumes symmetry, so the same finding is necessary regardless of
the economic impact of the bankruptcy remedy rules, even
though they are asymmetrical in effect.30 6 The court will be
safe, as usual, if it finds the contract executory, because the
finding leaves the trustee free to do what is best for the estate,
performance or breach, depending on the one that will attract
Ms. Smith's best offer. Often, however, faced with cases like
302. Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 6 Bankr. 661,
665 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (Rovine II).
303. See supra Section H. B.
304. Must the property be destroyed and the shop padlocked? Surely not.
Must all of it be given to Burger King? If so, Burger King gets all the assets of
the estate, making this unsecured Other Party in effect secured. Bankruptcy
policy almost never permits a mere equitable remedy to make an unsecured
party secured, so that cannot be the result either. E.g., In re Norquist, 43
Bankr. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984).
305. As a condition of assumption and assignment, Ms. Smith will have to
provide "adequate assurance of future performance." 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(B)
(1988). The estate will be relieved of further liability, id- § 365(k), but the op-
eration of that section is outside the scope of the present discussion.
306. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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the first case - where it is better financially to get rid of the
contract - the court finds no executory contract. This seems
the easy solution. No harm is done because, as we have seen, to
say a contract cannot be rejected makes no difference, as long
as confusion can be avoided.307 The trustee still pays the
breach claim and that is that.
Yet the court that solved the first case by finding no execu-
tory contract is in trouble when along comes the second case,
identical on executoriness analysis, but where the right finan-
cial answer is assumption and assignment. Either frantic ma-
nipulation of doctrine ensues, or the court denies the trustee
the opportunity to maximize the estate.
To this point, the result in this example is perfectly consis-
tent with existing bankruptcy policy. The estate gets the bene-
fit of performance or rejection of the Burger King contract,
whichever is best, and Burger King's damage claim will be paid
in the same proportions as the other unsecured creditors. Mr.
Rovine in Chapter 7 is able to wriggle out of his noncompete
promise, but that results, we now see, from the discharge pol-
icy. A reader who is troubled by that result may question the
"fresh start" policy, but has no reason to challenge the treat-
ment of bankruptcy contracts, as such.
3. The Shift in Equities in Chapter 11
If functional analysis makes sense in the liquidation con-
text, and the results seem fair within the framework of the
principles of equality of distribution and discharge, the situa-
tion changes when we put Mr. Rovine, the natural person and
Burger King franchisee, into a Chapter 11. He now is both
debtor and trustee, which is the effect of the Chapter 11 rule
making him the DIP, the controller of the business as a fiduci-
ary for the creditors.308 The DIP concept conflates debtor and
trustee and the consequence is a real risk of inequity, the very
inequity that many people feel lurking in the Rovine case, but
mistakenly attribute to a problem with bankruptcy contract
analysis.
Mr. Rovine, as trustee, makes the same economic analysis
as the trustee in liquidation, except that the business is to go on
rather than being sold to Ms. Smith. Thus the trustee-DIP is in
Ms. Smith's economic position and faced with the same ques-
307. See supra notes 247, 262 and accompanying text.
308. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988).
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tion about the future value of the Burger King franchise con-
tract. Very plausibly, Mr. Rovine will decide that the business
is better off without the franchise contract and will provide for
Burger King's breach-damage claim in his plan of reorganiza-
tion. If the plan is confirmed, then he will be discharged from
his debts in Chapter 11, including the covenant not to compete.
Here, the risk of inequity in Rovine appears. Mr. Rovine may
make a lot of money based on the training and guidance he got
from Burger King, while Burger King gets paid some percent-
age of its damages and is barred by the Chapter 11 discharge
from getting the usual injunction against competition in viola-
tion of the covenant. That result does not seem fair. And it
may not be.
The inequity, however, lies not in the treatment of the con-
tract, but in the step that we have just skipped: confirmation of
the plan. The bankruptcy rules we have discussed are based on
the general proposition that one forfeits assets in exchange for
a discharge or, if one wishes to keep assets, one promises to pay
an amount agreeable to a majority of creditors.309 Bankruptcy
does not permit a debtor to keep assets and stiff creditors over
the objection of a majority of them. The cramdown rules,
under section 1129(b), preserve and protect these central princi-
ples; these rules should prevent the apparent or potential ineq-
uity in Rovine.310
Given the existence of section 502(c), which permits the
bankruptcy court to estimate damages without the constraints
of strict proof, Burger King may emerge in Mr. Rovine's Chap-
ter 11 as the largest creditor, or at least as one possessing more
than one-third of the claims in amount. If so, its negative vote
will doom the plan,311 unless Mr. Rovine can invoke cramdown
under section 1129(b).3'2 As against unsecured creditors, the
absolute priority rule will require that Rovine retain no value,
no ownership in the business, as a condition of cramming down
the plan against an adverse unsecured class. 3 13 In effect, the
309. I& § 1129(a)(8). Chapter 13 substitutes the requirement that the
debtor apply all disposable income to claims, id& § 1325(b)(1)(B), with the fur-
ther protection of the "good faith" test developed in the cases. E.g., In re
Greer, 60 Bankr. 547, 549 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing factors involved
in determining whether or not debtor's proposal is in good faith).
310. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1988).
311. 1& §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(10).
312. rd- § 1129(b).
313. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 108 S. Ct. 963, 967-68 (1988).
Creditor approval is not required in Chapter 13 and the Chapter 13 discharge
is so broad that fewer statutory constraints prevent abuse. Nonetheless, once a
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business will become the property of the unsecured creditors,
including Burger King. This principle is sometimes difficult to
apply, but in theory Rovine cannot keep ownership of the as-
sets and still discharge Burger King without its consent. In
principle, the apparent inequity in Rovine should be blocked at
the confirmation stage.
If Burger King is owed less than one-third of the un-
secured debt of the business and the other creditors believe the
plan is in their best interests, Rovine can keep the business and
discharge Burger King without its consent.3 14 In that case, Bur-
ger King is indeed stuck, but only if the great mass of un-
secured creditors think they will be better off as a result. The
alternative, full performance of the covenant to Burger King
and loss of virtually everything by the other unsecured credi-
tors because of the failure of the reorganization, is far more
unfair.315
The only remaining transformation required to turn our
hypothetical case back into the actual Rovine case is to make
Mr. Rovine into Rovine Corporation once more. The Chapter
11 analysis is exactly the same, except for two points. One is
that the discharge is absolute; even a fraud claim by Burger
King will be discharged for a Chapter 11 corporation.316 Sec-
ondly, it is the shareholders who must get the creditors' agree-
court focuses on discharge and plan approval in potentially abusive bankruptcy
contract cases in Chapter 13, it is easy to apply existing concepts to prevent
abuse. See infra note 398.
314. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c), 1129(a)(10) (1988). That is unlikely to happen un-
less the damage to Burger King from Rovine's competition (expectation dam-
age) is small and Burger King's expenditures at the start-up stage (reliance
damages) also were small.
315. In this Chapter 11 context, the problem may seem different to Burger
King because even if it will get paid more by going along with the Plan, it may
want to block Rovine lest its other franchisees follow suit. This is the same
sort of extraneous consideration that may have been important to the interna-
tional union in U.S. Truck. In re U.S. Truck, 47 Bankr. 932, 940 (E.D. Mich.
1985), aff'd sub. nor. Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v.
U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding Teamsters' objection
to plan probably based on desire to use its claim for bargaining purposes in
later contract negotiations). As the U.S. Truck court held, bankruptcy policy is
directed to concrete results as against concrete rights to payment from a par-
ticular debtor, and it should not be controlled by these sorts of secondary cred-
itor concerns. Id at 939. If franchisors are being savaged by bankruptcy,
Congress might want to enact a special rule protecting them, but that would
be a legislative judgment that franchise protection is more important than
bankruptcy policy in that industry. Within the four corners of bankruptcy pol-
icy, the effects beyond the particular case cannot override the rights of other
unsecured creditors.
316. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (1988).
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ment or forfeit their interests.31 7 Otherwise, the analysis is the
same.
The rejection of a contract often comes before the court, as
it did in Rovine, at a time well in advance of confirmation and
the application of the cramdown rules. At that stage in the pro-
ceeding, the conflation of trustee and debtor seems to create an
unaddressed inequity. A court feeling that concern is tempted
to manipulate executoriness to keep the debtor from appar-
ently wriggling out of a valid promise. Yet rejection of the con-
tract and discharge of the covenant not to compete may be
crucial to a higher return for unsecured creditors generally.
Any other result may be happy for Burger King, but disastrous
for all the other, equally innocent unsecured creditors (maybe
more innocent, because Burger King may have had more influ-
ence over the success or failure of the franchise).
Rovine, one of the most debated executory contract cases
decided under the Code, illustrates the operation of the equal-
ity-of-treatment and discharge principles against Burger King's
state law rights, as well as revealing the importance of the
Chapter 11 requirements for confirmation in protecting against
abuse of these bankruptcy principles.318 Properly understood,
none of the policy and fairness factors in Rovine has anything
to do with the remaining performance Burger King might owe
under the contract on the date of bankruptcy. Yet the exist-
ence of unperformed obligations is central to a finding of ex-
ecutoriness. The threshold requirement of executoriness is
irrelevant to the analysis, to policy, and to fairness.
B. RICHMOND
In re Richmond 319 is one of the cases used earlier as an ex-
ample of the difficulties that the material breach test has en-
countered in the license cases.320 The bankrupt inventor 321 in
317. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
318. Many judges find noncompete covenants nonrejectable because they
feel that the debtor is using rejection for its own benefit. In re Noco, Inc., 76
Bankr. 839 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987), for example, held alternatively that the
case should be dismissed as an abuse of the bankruptcy process. Id. at 845; see
infra note 397.
319. In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. E.D. Va.)
(Richmond I) (merits), stay denied, 36 Bankr. 270 (Bankr. E.D. Va.) (Rich-
mond II), rev'd, 38 Bankr. 341 (E.D. Va 1984) (Richmond III), rev'd sub nom.
Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (Richmond IV), cert denied sub
nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
320. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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Richmond granted a nonexclusive technology license to
Lubrizol, the Other Party, prior to bankruptcy. The license
contract was signed about a year before bankruptcy, but
Lubrizol promised not to use the technology until May, 1983,
just over three months prior to the inventor's bankruptcy.322
Following bankruptcy, the inventor sought to reject the
contract and enter into a more profitable arrangement free of
Lubrizol's rights. Although the Lubrizol license was nonexclu-
sive, the inventor claimed that the existence of the contract
would make it impossible to strike the most profitable deal
with another licensee.3 23 The district court held that Lubrizol
could not be deprived of its license, because the contract repre-
sented a sale of rights, like a sale of real estate.3 24 Therefore,
the contract was not executory and could not be rejected.
The Fourth Circuit reversed.325 It analogized the contract
to a real estate lease and allowed the inventor to reject it. The
effect of the Fourth Circuit decision was to cancel the li-
cense.3 26 As too often happens in judicial consideration of
bankruptcy contracts, the court sought a "thing," a contract ex-
ecutory for all purposes and for both parties, rather than look-
ing at the relief available to the bankrupt party under state and
then bankruptcy law.
As previously noted, the result in Richmond threatens
commercial chaos, despite subsequent congressional action.3 27
In principle, after Richmond any patent or trademark licensor
could go into Chapter 11 and invalidate a license perfectly valid
under contract law. So serious were the implications for pat-
ents and copyrights that Congress amended the Code to deal
321. The debtor was a company, but I will call it the "inventor" for clarity's
sake.
322. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045.
323. Id. at 1047.
324. Richmond III, 38 Bankr. at 343.
325. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1048.
326. Accord In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 Bankr. 683, 687 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1986) (discussing executoriness of software license); see also Fenix Cattle
Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat), 625 F.2d 290, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
the exclusivity provision of the software license contract executory and reject-
able). But see In re Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 839, 843 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987)
(prohibiting rejection of the franchise agreement because only debtor had obli-
gations remaining). Other cases have found licenses and similar contracts to
be executory, but have refused rejection on the grounds that the debtor was
abusing the bankruptcy process for its own benefit. See cases cited infra note
397.
327. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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with this particular problem.328 Yet the amendment does not
solve the problem even for all intellectual property cases be-
cause trademarks are not covered by the new amendment.
More generally, the Richmond approach remains available for
application in many other types of contract cases. Thus, the re-
cent amendment emphasizes the seriousness of the Richmond
problem, while by no means defusing it.
The Richmond analysis is so dangerous because it provides
no requirement of insolvency, limitation of time (within one
year, for example), or any other limit, except the mirage limit
of executoriness. It also leads to the obvious anomaly that the
Other Party loses if it has extracted promises of future per-
formance from the debtor, but might win if it has driven a
worse bargain, with the debtor promising no future perform-
ance.32 9 An executoriness analyst stands naked on this bleak,
unbounded plain, with all the contract laws struck down, wait-
ing for the Devil to arrive.33°
1. The Executoriness Analysis
The court found the Richmond contract executory because
the debtor-inventor had certain contingent, continuing obliga-
tions. The Richmond inventor's obligations were minimal.
They included notifying the distributor of other uses -of the
technology and protecting the distributor against infringement
claims.331 If the distributor had not bargained for these rights,
the court might have held the contract nonexecutory and the
distributor would not have lost its license. The distributor's re-
ward for bargaining for these benefits was to see its license
taken away.332 Surely that analysis is off the point - if not
backward.3 33 No policy, in contract law or bankruptcy, sup-
ports that distinction, and one wonders if the results in the
courts will really rest upon it in the long run.
Richmond reveals a second, and more profound, anomaly
328. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(n) (West Supp. 1989)).
329. See generally E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 518-19
(providing a detailed problem on this issue).
330. "And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
- where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?" R. BOLT, A MAN
FOR ALL SEASONS 38 (1962).
331. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045.
332. In desperation, the licensee waived those future obligations in the dis-
trict court. Richmond III, 38 Bankr. 341, 343 n.2.
333. See generally E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 518-19
(providing a detailed problem on this issue).
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in the material breach analysis. In that case, it seems highly
likely that state law would say that the license contract was fi-
nal from the perspective of the inventor. In other words, state
law would not permit the inventor to terminate the license,
even if the inventor paid damages for breaching the contract.334
If the Other Party, the distributor, breached the contract, con-
tract law might leave the inventor a damages remedy, rather
than permitting revocation of the license. Far more certainly,
contract doctrine would not permit the breacher to benefit
from its own breach by revoking the license. Why should the
inventor be able to revoke the license in bankruptcy by rejec-
tion? No bankruptcy rule or policy requires that reversal of
state law.
The executoriness analysis would have led the Richmond
court into just as much intellectual disarray if the court had
found the contract nonexecutory. The inventor did have some
outstanding obligations under the contract.335 If the contract
were nonexecutory and therefore not subject to rejection,
would the bankrupt inventor have to perform? It might seem
so, as a conceptual matter, because rejection is breach. If the
debtor cannot breach, then the only logical alternative is per-
formance. In that case, the licensee would obtain full perform-
ance, or payment in U.S. Dollars, while all the other unsecured
creditors got some small percentage. The effect would be co-
erced assumption, which neither the Code nor any bankruptcy
policy justifies. 336 On the other hand, if the contract is neither
assumed nor rejected, then the outstanding obligations are not
accounted for at all; they are neither breached nor performed.
Do they just disappear? If these obligations simply are con-
verted into monetary claims, then the effect is exactly the same
as rejection: the outstanding contractual obligations become
monetary claims based on breach of contract. If so, why do we
say nonexecutory contracts are exempt from rejection?
2. A Functional Analysis
The functional analyst would find the problem in Rich-
mond subject to a coherent, ordered, and clear resolution. The
334. See Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat), 625 F.2d 290 (9th
Cir. 1980); see also 4 A. DELLER, D.T.T.R'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 410, at 646
(1965) (stating that "[t]he unilateral action of one party to a license agreement
cannot revoke the agreement"); cf. U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (1987).
335. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045.
336. See supra note 61.
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debtor-licensor is in the position of a seller in the functional
universe. It transferred a nonexclusive patent license to the
Other Party buyer (licensee). It is likely that patent-contract
law would not permit the debtor-seller to revoke or rescind the
license, even if the Other Party breached,337 just as Article 2
would not grant return of the onions.338 Beyond doubt, neither
patent-contract law nor Article 2 would permit rescission by
the breaching party against a performing Other Party.339 Ab-
sent some special bankruptcy rule granting greater rights to
bankruptcy estates, the trustee (or DIP) is equally powerless to
revoke the license, especially against a nonbreaching licensee.
Under patent-contract law, a breach by the debtor-seller leaves
the license in place and the royalties due, with the Other Party
Lubrizol entitled to set-off any damages for breach of the ancil-
lary provisions concerning lawsuit defense and the like. °0 In
short, nonbankrupty law would say that Lubrizol had an ITI
in the license. For the functionalist, there only remains the
calculus of cost and benefit from assuming the contract obliga-
tions to defend suits and so on, versus the benefits of avoiding a
set-off claim for breach of those obligations.9 1
3. The Pseudo Avoiding Power
The courts often use executory contract analysis as a type
of avoiding power because it serves as a surrogate for one of the
337. 6 E. LipSCOmB, LipscoMB's WALKER ON PATENTS § 20:35 (3d ed. 1987).
338. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2) to -(3) (1987).
339. Id.; cf. id § 2-106(4) (1987).
340. See 6 E. LIPscOmB, supra note 337, § 20:55 (stating that licensor's non-
performance of independent covenant may result in liability for damages).
341. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. This is a good spot to
re-emphasize that the ITI distinction will not usually be difficult to apply. In
Lubrizol, for example, we need not be concerned about getting lost in the dis-
tinction between a property right and a "mere license." Lubrizol as licensee
had the right to enjoy the use of the patent rights, i.e. to produce and sell
goods that would violate the patent but for the license. If state law said that
the inventor-licensor could revoke the license and get a court order to block
further sales by Lubrizol, leaving Lubrizol with only a damage claim, then
Lubrizol would have only a general claim and no ITI enforceable in bank-
ruptcy. On the other hand, in the real world state law says that Lubrizol has
more than a claim for damages. It has the right to continue sales, defeating
any judicial action to block it, and the right to get a court order to prevent any
licensor interference with its sales. Therefore, it has an objectively defined
state-law right in the patent, an ITI, and that right is enforceable in bank-
ruptcy. There will be marginal cases, as there must always be at the margins
of any legal distinction, but the great majority of cases will be easy ones. We
need only determine what remedy state law grants for enforcement of a right,
damages versus specific rights in specific property.
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statutory avoiding powers. A court uses this surrogate when it
perceives equities of the sort traditionally associated with the
avoiding powers, but cannot see how to use the powers pro-
vided by the statute. Richmond is a good example.
In Richmond, a relatively one-sided contract gave the
Other Party considerable benefits at the expense of the
debtor's opportunities to relicense its technology, a move which
would greatly benefit its other creditors and itself. Revocation
of that license would put the debtor's creditors on a more equal
footing and help to rehabilitate the business.3 2 These tradi-
tional bankruptcy goals are, and should be, very important to a
court sitting in bankruptcy. The rhetoric of the Fourth Circuit
panel demonstrates that its decision was motivated by these
goals. The rhetoric was that associated with the equality of
treatment principle and its primary mechanism of enforcement,
the avoiding powers.343 Because the court was unable to iden-
tify a method for achieving those goals by using the statutory
avoiding powers, it sought the intuitively correct result by using
executory contract analysis.
The Richmond court was wrong to enforce the equality of
treatment principle through the executory contract device. The
avoiding powers, including the preference 34 and fraudulent
conveyance 345 provisions, are the method the Code provides for
enforcing that principle, not some implied and unbounded con-
tract "power." If the grant of the license was not avoidable
under those provisions, then the equality of treatment principle
did not apply. This conclusion is supported by the standard
propositions that the particular should control over the general,
and the explicit over the implied. If the Code squarely and spe-
cifically sets forth a basis for explaining and vindicating a felt
equity, then that basis should prevail over a claim of an implied
contract "power."
A contract approach is unbounded, while an avoiding
power analysis is subject to all the constraints and exceptions
imposed by wise policy and compromise. For example, a con-
tract approach to the delivered onion problem could go back an
unlimited time before bankruptcy. To avoid spoilage, we can
change from onions to widgets, delivered three years before
342. Richmond I, 34 Bankr. at 526; Richmond II, 36 Bankr. at 273.
343. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1048 (noting that companies like Lubrizol
"share the general hazards created by [§ 365] for all business entities dealing
with potential bankrupts").
344. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988).
345. Id. § 548; see supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy, and the Other Party to pay three years after deliv-
ery. The debtor has warranty obligations sufficient to make the
contract executory. Shall we set it aside and reclaim the wid-
gets in a rising market? Surely not. The damage to commer-
cial expectations (and the effect on the blood pressure of
business people and their lawyers) would be too great. Prefer-
ence law defines 90 days as the relevant time and that makes
rough-justice good sense.346 When the delivery was within 90
days, the felt-equities arising from a "trivial difference in tim-
ing" among creditors is addressed. Further, countervailing eq-
uities and commercial policies, like "ordinary course of
business," are considered via the preference exceptions.347 The
bounded analysis should control over the unbounded one.
We already have seen that bankruptcy contract cases can
implicate the avoiding powers, especially the preference
power.348 The equities that concerned the court in Richmond
could have been properly analyzed, and competing policies
given the weight accorded by the Code, by viewing the problem
as a possible preference or fraudulent conveyance. The prefer-
ence or fraudulent conveyance issues are not obvious in Rich-
mond, but they are hidden in its facts and in the court's
rhetoric.
a. Preference Analysis
Although the contract in Richmond was signed more than
a year before bankruptcy, Lubrizol promised not to use the
technology until May 1, 1983, just two weeks more than ninety
days before bankruptcy.3 4 9 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court
tells us that Lubrizol had not in fact used the technology - or
paid any royalties - by the time the bankruptcy petition was
filed.350 On that basis, deferring the use of the technology
could be construed as delaying the "transfer" to May 1, 1983,
the first date on which the contract permitted Lubrizol to use
the license. If May 1, 1983 was found to be the date of the
346. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1988). The period is extended to one year for
insiders. Id § 547(b)(4)(B).
347. Id § 547(c)(2).
348. See supra Section II. F.
349. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045. The facts are scattered through all
four Richmond opinions and show some inconsistencies. For example, the dis-
trict court opinion suggests that Lubrizol was barred from using the license
until July, 1983, which would have been within 90 days of the August 16, 1983,
bankruptcy. See Richmond III, 38 Bankr. at 342.
350. Richmond I, 34 Bankr. at 526.
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transfer of the license under section 547, and if the debtor Rich-
mond had filed bankruptcy within 90 days of that date, then
the transfer could have been voidable for the benefit of the
other creditors if the other section 547 elements were pres-
ent,351 including insolvency on May 1.352 The antecedent debt
element 5 3 would have been easy, because the Richmond li-
cense was granted largely, if not entirely, in satisfaction of an-
tecedent debt owed to Lubrizol by the debtor at the time the
original contract was signed.3M
On the actual facts in Richmond, assuming a May 1 trans-
fer of the license, the debtor filed two weeks too late to avoid
the license as a preference. If the court found that fact painful,
a proper analysis would force the court to realize that some-
times trivial differences in timing do matter. The preference
provisions push back the bright line 90 days before the bank-
ruptcy, but we have to stop somewhere. Under the old Bank-
ruptcy Act, the license transfer would have been within the
four month period then provided for preferences and would
have perhaps been avoidable.35 5 Congress, however, reduced
the preference period in conjunction with a host of policy
changes amid political compromises among various elements in
the commercial community. 356 The result is that large and im-
portant pre-bankruptcy transfers cannot be avoided, but those
are the lines that Congress drew.
b. The No-Transfer, UndeliveredSeller Analysis
A second analysis was available to the Richmond court to
avoid the transfer of the license, depending on the facts in the
record. The court could have found the transfer of the license
to have taken place even later than May 1, 1983, because it is
possible the contract could have been construed to say that the
transfer was not effective until Lubrizol actually began to use
351. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
352. Id. § 547(b)(3).
353. Id. § 547(b)(2).
354. Richmond III, 38 Bankr. at 342 n.1. This fact is an unusual circum-
stance. In a more common transaction, a two-level analysis might be neces-
sary. See supra note 200. We discussed this very example earlier, in the
section examining the impact of the avoiding powers on bankruptcy contract
analysis. See supra text accompanying note 199.
355. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (codified as
amended as The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-15132 (1988).
356. Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38
VAND. L. REv. 713, 726 (1985).
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the license. It appears from the opinions that Lubrizol may not
have been liable for royalties until it began to use the pro-
cess. 357 A royalty-deferral clause, under all the facts and cir-
cumstances, might suggest that the parties intended no actual
transfer of the license until Lubrizol started to use the technol-
ogy. Given these facts, the court might hold that the license
was not transferred prior to bankruptcy. In that case, bank-
ruptcy contract law permits the debtor-seller to breach-and-
pay, keeping the license, because it is in the position of an un-
delivered seller, as discussed earlier.358
I am not suggesting that the Richmond court should have
manipulated doctrine to find for the debtor come hell or high
water. Perhaps on a proper record no one could plausibly claim
that the transfer took place any time except when the contract
was first signed, in which case the transfer was long prior to
bankruptcy and was not a preference and therefore the license
transfer should stand.359
c. Fraudulent Conveyance Analysis
The rights of the Other Party in Richmond also might have
been vulnerable to a fraudulent conveyance attack. Lubrizol
did not use the technology360 and might not ever use it, thus
producing no revenue for the debtor-seller.36' The commit-
ment of Lubrizol under the contract may have been so tenuous
that its promises could properly be characterized as "less than
reasonably equivalent value" for even a nonexclusive license.
If so, and if the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer
of the license, then the transfer could be avoided as a fraudu-
lent conveyance. 362
357. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045. The bankruptcy court found no evi-
dence that any royalty had been paid or would be paid in the future. Rich-
mond I, 34 Bankr. at 526. Again in the context of royalties, the court also
implied that Lubrizol might not be able to prove damages because it had not
exercised its rights under the contract. Richmond 11, 36 Bankr. at 272. The
district court implied, ambiguously, that Lubrizol was not liable for any royal-
ties until it chose to use the license. Richmond III, 38 Bankr. at 342.
358. This conclusion assumes that the contract did not create an ITI under
nonbankruptcy law that might face avoiding power attack, so the court would
not have to go through that analysis as well. See supra Section II. E.
359. This conclusion is subject to the fraudulent conveyance analysis that
follows.
360. Richmond IV, 756 F.2d at 1045.
361. The bankruptcy court noted that "Lubrizol did not demonstrate that
any royalty payments had been made or would be forthcoming in the future."
Richmond I, 34 Bankr. at 521.
362. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988). The question of "reasonably equivalent
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If the Richmond court was concerned with equities such as
the need to apply the equality principle, then it should have
looked for an avoidable preference 363 or fraudulent conveyance.
If not, it should have let the transaction stand, while leaving
the DIP free to assume or reject the remaining bundle of
Ancillaries.
The preference and fraudulent conveyance analysis ex-
plains the results in cases like Richmond that seem to grant the
bankruptcy estate greater contract rights than exist under state
law. Because the results in those cases cannot be explained by
the bankruptcy rules that I have identified as central to the
"magic" of bankruptcy contract results,36 these decisions must
be understood in terms of other principles or some special con-
tract "power." I believe that they can be understood by the
specific, bounded provisions of the avoiding powers, and there-
fore it is unnecessary, and harmful, to conjure up some special
contract power not given the trustee or DIP by the Code.
The fact that avoiding power problems are often hidden in
a bankruptcy contract case does much to explain why rejection
of executory contracts appears to the courts much like an in-
dependent avoiding power. In some bankruptcy casebooks the
executory contract section is within a section devoted to avoid-
value" as applied to antecedent debt is exquisitely complicated and far beyond
the present discussion.
363. See Epling, supra note 96, at 195. The impact of the avoiding powers
re-enforces the proposition that the ITI (property-contract) distinction is es-
sential in understanding the enforceability of the Other Party's rights under a
bankruptcy contract. Only that distinction provides symmetry with the avoid-
ing powers, because only the debtor's grant of an interest in a specific asset is
subject to avoidance. For example, in Lubrizol the license was granted in sat-
isfaction of antecedent debt. Richard III, 38 Bankr. 342 n.1. If it had been
granted within 90 days of bankruptcy, the transfer would have been avoidable
as a preference, if the grant created an ITI, because creation of an ITI is a
transfer of property. If the license was not a transfer of an ITI in property, it
could not be subject to preference avoidance. This example demonstrates that
the distinction between a transfer of a property interest and creation of a gen-
eral claim is the crucial one for bankruptcy contracts, because it is central to
all of bankruptcy law. If the license in Lubrizol was not the creation of a
property interest but would nonetheless be enforceable in bankruptcy, then it
would represent the ideal vehicle for a nonavoidable preference. If so, then a
grant of a security interest in the debtor's equipment within 90 days before
bankruptcy would be avoidable, but the creation of the rights represented by
the license would be immune from avoidance. That result makes no sense.
The whole system is coherent only if there is continuity between those rights
that are enforceable in bankruptcy and those that are avoidable. The only dis-
tinction that provides that symmetry is the distinction between rights in spe-
cific assets versus general claims.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 119-32.
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ing powers. That is true of the casebook I co-authored, 365
notwithstanding that the logic of functional analysis would
place the section 365 discussion in the estate administration sec-
tion, just as the section itself is placed in the administration
chapter of the Code. Other casebooks put the executory con-
tract materials between administration and avoidance, reflect-
ing its ambiguous position.366 Thus, it is not surprising that the
courts often assume that there is a special bankruptcy contract
"power."r
C. OTHER IMPORTANT RECENT CASES
Functional analysis of bankruptcy contracts is at bottom a
simple concept: The estate has the same rights and obligations
as other contract parties under nonbankruptcy law, subject to
the special bankruptcy limitations on remedies and the avoid-
ing powers. Nonetheless, this discussion demonstrates that it is
not always simple to apply. It sometimes requires hard work
on difficult state law contract questions, and occasionally raises
hard bankruptcy remedy and avoiding power questions as well.
Its advantages, the payoff for the analytical work involved, are:
a) it makes the easy cases, the great majority, really easy; b)
properly applied, it is highly likely to yield the right answer;
and c) it is much harder to apply improperly, in contrast to the
constant temptations to err presented by the "executoriness"
requirement.
As we saw, the executoriness approach often is manipu-
lated as an easy way out of a hard bankruptcy contract prob-
lem.36 7 We also noted that today's easy way out becomes
tomorrow's nightmare, when a precedent seems to require a re-
365. E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, supra note 23, at 492-521.
366. E.g., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 210, at 451-520; D. EPSTEIN, J.
LANDERS, & S. NICKLEs, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS
879-98 (3d ed. 1987); S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS'
REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 629-41 (4th ed. 1987); J. WHITE, BANK-
RUPTCY AND CREDITORS RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 164-220 (1985). From
a pedagogical point of view, the functionalist should put the executory contract
materials after the preference and fraudulent conveyance materials because,
as the preceding discussion demonstrated, it is not possible to understand fully
the treatment of bankruptcy contracts until the students understand these
avoiding powers. It is, of course, crucial in every field to keep in mind the stu-
dents' need to learn "A" before tackling "B" in ordering teaching materials,
although some casebook authors seem to prefer instead an organization that
fits the theoretical framework most satisfactory to someone already expert in
the field.
367. See supra Section III.
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sult that feels intuitively wrong in the next case that comes
along.368 In the long run, the effort required by the functional
approach is less painful than the frustration that produced the
cry of anguish from the Sixth Circuit panel in Jolly.3 69
Nonetheless, the challenge of working through the
problems presented by each category of contemporary case is
sufficiently great that I wonder whether stopping at this point
will leave the reader unsatisfied, because this or that category
of troublesome case is left unanalyzed.
The answer must be that this article is too long already, a
point that the patient reader may justly regard as understate-
ment. Therefore, I will touch just briefly on some other bank-
ruptcy contract problems as further examples of the way a
functional analysis opens up the issues in bankruptcy contract
cases.
1. Land-Sale Option Contracts
One type of troublesome problem that yields simply and
quickly to a functional approach is the real estate option case.
Typically, the debtor-buyer prior to bankruptcy held a naked
option to buy, with no obligation to purchase that constitutes
material performance due from the debtor. The cases have
split as to whether the contract is executory and hence assuma-
ble.37 0 One recent case was notably sensible and analytical in
permitting assumption.37 1 The debtor in that case purchased an
option to buy land and then sold that option to a third party for
a potential two million dollar profit. The court explicitly noted
that Ancillaries would permit finding an executory contract,
(although it did not so label them), but the court preferred to
rest its decision on the straightforward fact that the estate
would benefit from assumption.372 The analysis was purely
368. Id.
369. Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 350
(6th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978).
370. In re G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. 462, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
Contra Travelodge Int'l v. Continental Properties (In re Continental Proper-
ties, Inc.), 15 Bankr. 732, 736 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1981).
371. G-N Partners, 48 Bankr. at 465-66.
372. Id at 466. Another real estate problem generating recent litigation is
the oil and gas lease. See Byers & Tuggey, supra note 74, at 337. The courts
have divided as to its status as an executory contract or unexpired lease under
§ 365, but have generally gotten the right result: a debtor-lessor (a seller in
our lexicon) should never be able to reject effectively, while a debtor lessee
would virtually never want to reject. Id. at 337-54. A recent article suggests
the right results, but is forced to review all the metaphysical wrenchings re-
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functional. The contract right (the option to buy) was valuable
and could be realized without paying any price for assumption
because the price had already been paid. To hold the contract
nonexecutory and deny the estate the benefit of the option be-
cause of the lack of a debtor obligation would be a dysfunc-
tional and aberrant result.373
A functionalist sees only a contract right for the estate and
no contract obligation to the Other Party seller. The estate ob-
viously should realize on the right by assuming and performing,
or assuming and assigning.
2. Land-Sale Contracts as Mortgages
Functional analysis would benefit another, more complex
category of recent cases involving treatment of certain pre-peti-
tion transactions as either contracts to sell or as secured trans-
actions. In the classic instance, a real estate contract or a sale
of goods with the Debtor as Buyer could reasonably be viewed
as either an executory contract of sale or as a security device
dressed up in contract clothes. The most typical case involves
the sale of land.3 7 4 The court frames the issue in terms of
quired by the "executoriness" requirement and the occasional case that
equates rejection with rescission. Id. at 346-52. For the functionalist, the key
point for a debtor lessor is that state law would never permit rescission or its
equivalent by virtue of the lessor's breach. The problem with lessees has been
primarily the "deemed rejection" rule under § 365(d). Because a debtor lessee
would never want to reject, any deemed rejection by a lessee must be in-
advertant. The deemed rejection rule permits the Other Party to use the exec-
utory contract rule against the estate and the other creditors which does not
make much sense. A functionalist would suggest that § 365(d) be modified to
prevent such results, perhaps blocking deemed rejection where a) it could not
possibly be in the estate's interest to reject; and b) the Other Party has failed
to seek an assumption-rejection decision by notice to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. There are some interesting problems at the margins of oil and gas
leases - for example, with convenants to develop and farm-out agreements -
but most of these cases are easy ones from a functional standpoint.
373. Another simple category of recent cases involves retrospective insur-
ance premiums. The courts nearly always get these cases right, finding the
contracts nonexecutory and leaving the insurer with its monetary claim for
premiums. E.g., In re Wisconsin Barge Line, 76 Bankr. 695, 698 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987); In re Placid Oil Co., 72 Bankr. 135, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
Functionally, there is no benefit to assumption, the coverage period having
passed, and the premiums are pre-petition unsecured debts without any need
to speak of rejection. The only advantage of a functional approach here is that
it is simpler and clearer.
374. Executory: Speck v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Speck), 798 F.2d 279, 280
(8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding contract for deed between seller and
debtor-buyer to be executory; debtors obligated to buy); In re Waldron, 65
Bankr. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (finding land sale contract between
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whether the transaction is a contract to sell, in which case the
trustee-DIP must assume the contract or forfeit the land, or is
really the functional equivalent of a form of mortgage or deed
of trust. The latter characterization means that the estate can
keep the land while paying the Other Party seller only the
value of the land, which is assumed to be something less than
the amount still due on the purchase price.3 75 These cases
often are addressed as problems of executoriness.3 76
In fact, these cases are merely another example of the need
to properly characterize the transaction under state law in or-
der to know the remedy state law gives the Other Party
seller.3 77 Then the relevant bankruptcy rules can be applied.
The lure of executoriness diverts too many courts from the ob-
viously helpful line of cases distinguishing leases from secured
seller and debtor-buyer executory under state law); In re McCallen, 49 Bankr.
948, 952 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (finding land sale contract between seller and
debtor-buyer was executory); Shaw v. Dawson (In re Shaw), 48 Bankr. 857,
861-62 (D.N.M. 1985) (holding real estate contract in which debtors were buy-
ers executory under state law); see also Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College
Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding it question of fact
whether land sale contracts between bankrupt land development corporation
and purchasers were executory contracts); Benevides v. Alexander (In re Al-
exander), 670 F.2d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding deposit sales agreement on
debtor-seller's home to be executory); McCannon v. Marston, 679 F.2d 13, 18
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding agreement for purchase and sale of apartment to be ex-
ecutory where buyer had not paid purchase price and debtor-seller had not
transferred title); In re W&L Assocs., 71 Bankr. 962, 966 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987) (finding contract for sale of realty to be executory despite debtor-seller's
pre-petition breach); In re Aslan, 65 Bankr. 826, 828 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)
(contract for sale of debtor-seller's real property was executory).
Not Executory: Eugene Squire Motel v. Thurmond (In re Thurmond), 46
Bankr. 723, 724 (D. Or. 1985) (holding land sales contract between seller and
debtor-buyer was a lien rather than an executory contract); All-American Life
& Casualty Co. v. Adolphsen (In re Adolphsen), 38 Bankr. 780, 781 (D. Minn.
1983) (holding contract for deed between seller and debtor-buyer was a financ-
ing agreement for sale which had already occurred and not an executory con-
tract); In re Flores, 32 Bankr. 455, 460 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983) (construing
contract for deed where debtor is buyer as a lien and not an executory con-
tract); In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (classifying contract
for deed between seller and debtor-buyer as a lien rather than an executory
contract).
375. E.g., Mitchell v. Streets (In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership), 882
F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Kratz, 96 Bankr. 127, 129 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988). Two recent opinions permitted rejection of contracts where the debtor
was seller and the contract price was lower than the value of the property.
W&L Assocs., 71 Bankr. at 968; Aslan, 65 Bankr. at 831.
376. E.g., Streets, 882 F.2d at 234; Kratz, 96 Bankr. at 129-30; W&L Assocs.,
71 Bankr. at 966; Aslan, 65 Bankr. at 828.
377. See, e.g., Streets, 882 F.2d at 235; Kratz, 96 Bankr. at 129; W&L Assocs.,
71 Bankr. at 964-66; Aslan, 65 Bankr. at 831.
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transactions. These cases involve the same problem and the
courts, in their "substance over form" analysis, essentially have
been proceeding in a functional way by searching for the eco-
nomic function of the agreement.3 7 8 The inquiry is, of course,
under state law.3 79
We can begin with a secured sale-of-goods case, dredging
up the onion contract once more. We are back to Article 2
treatment of the delivered and undelivered seller, although this
time the delivered seller has a purchase money security inter-
est in the onions. The undelivered seller is still superior in po-
sition under state law, because it has the right to the onions
themselves.38 0 The secured delivered seller has only the Arti-
cle 9 right of a secured party to realize the value of the onions
by sale, up to the amount of the purchase price plus damages.38 1
The difference under state law between a right to the thing it-
self and the right to the value of the security interest can be
important. It will matter, for example, in the rare case when
the resale of the onions brings more than the purchase price,
because the secured delivered seller will have to give the sur-
plus back to the debtor.38 2
That state law difference also matters in bankruptcy where
the bankruptcy-ascribed value of collateral can be different
than the amount still owed to the seller. To elaborate requires
several excursions38 3 that would violate my promise to the tir-
ing reader. For now, I simply assert, with the support of many
cases, that in bankruptcy the price still owed for the goods can
be different than their bankruptcy-ascribed value.3 84
As a result of this potential difference in value, a delivered
secured seller may be forced to accept less than the amount
378. See, e.g., Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.), 804 F.2d 193,
201 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding transaction structured as a sale-leaseback not a
lease within the meaning of § 365); Blue Barn Assocs. v. Picnic 'N Chicken (In
re Picnic 'N Chicken), 58 Bankr. 523, 527 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding
"lease" to be disguised financing arrangement, and therefore not a lease
within § 365).
379. In re Speck, 798 F.2d 279, 280 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
380. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(a), (d), (f), 2-706 (1987).
381. Id. § 9-504.
382. Id- § 9-504(2).
383. We would have to consider bad bargains (purchase price greater than
value) not bad enough to be avoidable as fraudulent conveyances, as well as
cases where the market had plunged after the contract was made. We also
would have to explore going-concern value as contrasted with liquidation
value, and possibly the difference between going-concern value and firm-spe-
cific value.
384. E.g., In re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1986).
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owed in exchange for the estate's keeping the collateral, be-
cause state law and bankruptcy law give the delivered seller
the right to recover only the value of the collateral, not the col-
lateral itself. Because the undelivered seller has a right to the
collateral itself, it keeps the collateral unless the estate as-
sumes and pays in full. Thus, where the collateral is valued at
$100 in bankruptcy and the remaining purchase price is $150,
the debtor who got delivery before bankruptcy has to pay only
$100, plus interest, to the Other Party secured seller in order to
keep the collateral in a Chapter 11 proceeding.3 5 Against an
undelivered seller, the debtor has to pay $150 to get the goods
because it has to assume the contract.
The same analysis applies in real estate cases, although
with different terminology. Thus, the court should determine
whether state law treats the seller as the equivalent of a deliv-
ered or undelivered seller. In a land case, we ask whether state
law entitles the seller in case of default to the land itself, or
only its value as realized at a foreclosure. In the latter case, the
seller is a delivered secured seller and the estate may keep the
land by paying its value, rather than assuming the contract and
paying in full. The details of this analysis would take consider-
ably more space, but this discussion covers the key points.38 6
The most well-known case in this genre is In re Booth.38 7
Booth goes beyond an executoriness analysis and asserts that
the bankruptcy court can treat a sales contract as either an ex-
ecutory contract or as a secured transaction, whichever is better
for the debtor.388 Although the court gives a nod to protection
of the Other Party, the overall thrust is improvement of the
debtor's chances for rehabilitation. 389
Judge Mabey's sensitive opinion in Booth reveals two tell-
ing points. The first is that judges are led to the Booth ap-
proach, at least in part, because the executoriness analysis
suggests a separate bankruptcy-contract policy that permits or
even requires the bankruptcy courts to reshape contract law.
390
385. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
386. Cf. In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224, 225-28 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984) (ap-
plying "functional" analysis to debtor's rejection of a partnership agreement).
387. 19 Bankr. 53, 59-61 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); see also Laurence, At Home
With the Bankruptcy Code: Residential Leases, Installment Real Estate Con-
tracts and Home Mortgages, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 125, 129-36 (1987); Weintraub
& Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts: What Is An Executory Contract? A
Challenge to the Countryman Test, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 273, 274-78 (1983).
388. Booth, 19 Bankr. at 59-61.
389. Id
390. Id. at 55-57.
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Because this policy does not exist, the reshaping must go on
without statutory support and without bounds or limits.3 91 If
instead the courts focus on the general bankruptcy policies that
affect treatment of Other Parties to bankruptcy contracts, then
the impositions on those parties will be bounded and relatively
predictable. 392
The second point is that the real policy question has noth-
ing to do with executoriness. 393 Perhaps there should be a spe-
cial bankruptcy policy about land-sale contracts, especially in
rehabilitation proceedings. If so, perhaps Congress should
adopt it and in the process give it bounds and limits. In the
land-sale cases, state law generally offers buyers and sellers a
"two-deal option." They can choose to structure a land sale as a
contract or as a security device, although the states vary widely
in drawing the line between the two.3 94 Generally, state law
gives the buyer in a contract situation fewer rights than a buyer
who "owns" the property subject to a lien, the same overall re-
sult as in bankruptcy.
Congress might decide that bankruptcy should convert con-
tract deals into security deals to enhance rehabilitation or to
prevent over-reaching. But if it does so, then sophisticated sell-
ers may not make sales on a contract basis, because of the
bankruptcy risk. If over-reaching was the principal concern,
Congress might decide to decree the conversion for consumer
buyers, but not for commercial buyers. It might go further in
drawing distinctions, and permit conversion only when the
buyer is a consumer and the seller is not a consumer. Congress
also might decide it is better to do nothing, "letting fifty flow-
ers bloom" in the several states, depending on local credit avail-
ability and regional traditions. In an ideal world, Congress
might even spend a little money to hire experts - practitioners
or academics - to find out what is really going on in this mar-
ket around the country, before changing the law based on anec-
dote or lobbying power. Given the many factors to consider in
this area, caselaw development, with no statutory guidance,
may not be the best approach. In any case, courts should un-
391. Cf. United Sav. Ass'n. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1402-05 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
that courts allowing interest payments to undersecured creditors confront
many issues for which no statutory guidance exists), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
392. See Booth, 19 Bankr. at 59-61.
393. See i& at 56.
394. See G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw §§ 3.26 to
.32 (2d ed. 1985).
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derstand that no special bankruptcy-contract "power" exists
and that executoriness has nothing to do with the case.
3. "Qui bono?" Cases
A great many of the difficult bankruptcy contract cases of
recent years implicate, and even turn upon, the question "qui
bono?" The licensee in Richmond and the franchisee in Rovine
seemed to use bankruptcy more for the benefit of themselves
than their creditors,395 although the courts did not address
those questions. Of course, the bankruptcy laws are very much
designed to benefit debtors, as well as creditors, so benefit to a
debtor hardly makes a bankruptcy filing illegitimate.3 9 6 The
question, as always, is the balance that the system maintains
between debtors and creditors. More profoundly, benefits to as-
sist debtors in trouble are very different from benefits that en-
able debtors to ignore their promises with no justification.
The issues raised by this concern are far too large for this
paper, but in a whole category of bankruptcy contract cases the
courts perceived just these sorts of problems and confronted
them explicitly. These cases might be called the "qui bono"
cases, because the courts plainly were concerned that debtors
might be using the system to benefit themselves by escaping
state law obligations illegitimately.3 97 I do not want to analyze
these cases here, so suffice it to say that they can normally be
395. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (Richmond IV), cert.
denied sub nom. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986); Burger
King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In re Rovine Corp.), 5 Bankr. 402, 404 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn.) (Rovine I), later proceeding, 6 Bankr. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1980) (Rovine H).
396. See Warren, supra note 101, at 777 n.3.
397. E.g., Chinichian v. Campolongo (In re Chinichian), 784 F.2d 1440, 1444-
46 (9th Cir. 1986); Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941
(11th Cir.), cert dismissed sub nom. Waldron v. Shell Oil Co. 478 U.S. 1038
(1986); In re Noco, Inc., 76 Bankr. 839, 844-45 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re
Southern Cal. Sound Sys., 69 Bankr. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987); In re
Carrere, 64 Bankr. 156, 160 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). As one court put it,
"Here, the debtor is attempting to use its rejection power to create a business
rather than preserve one." Southern Cal. Sound, 69 Bankr. at 898. But see In
re Alexander, 670 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982) (permitting debtor-seller who
filed under Chapter 13 on trial date of buyer-creditor's action for specific per-
formance to reject executory contract because Chapter 13 rejection may bene-
fit debtor as well as creditors); In re W&L Assocs., 71 Bankr. 962, 967-68
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (filing under Chapter 11 to avoid an executory contract
is not an abuse of the bankruptcy process); see also In re Taylor, 103 Bankr.
511, 517 & n.5 (D.N.J. 1989) (permitting singer to reject personal services con-
tract because necessary for fresh start).
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resolved by applying the usual rehabilitation checks and bal-
ances, as in the analysis of Rovine.3 9 s If we find the results in-
adequate to prevent abuse, then corrective steps should focus
upon those provisions, rather than section 365 and the treat-
ment of bankruptcy contracts.
V. THE EXCLUSIONARY APPROACH
The reader who has studied Michael Andrew's recent arti-
cle 399 will see that he and I agree on many issues concerning
the nature of the present bankruptcy contract dilemma. We
also agree about several of the key distinctions in fashioning a
better analysis. Yet we disagree in some important respects,
conceptually and practically.
The central conceptual disagreement is that Andrew would
treat rejected contracts as never becoming property of the es-
tate,4° ° and would create special rules to account for the effects
of nonassumption by granting the Other Party a claim against
398. See supra Section IV. A. 3. For example, Carrere concerned a Chapter
13 proceeding where a soap opera actress was trying to escape her current tele-
vision network contract in order to accept a better one. Carrere, 64 Bankr. at
157. The analysis in this case should start with the potential benefit to her
other creditors. If her disposable income, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (1988), under
the current contract would not permit 100% payment to her other creditors
and the new contract would pay them much more, rejection is for the other
creditors' benefit. If the creditors would be paid 100% by applying all her dis-
posable income under the current contract, the rule barring specific perform-
ance against the estate should not apply because specific performance would
give the network the same full performance obtained by all the other credi-
tors. Therefore, if the actress rejects the network contract, a negative injunc-
tion of the usual sort should be available.
The better analysis may be that the bankruptcy court should estimate the
damages to the network, using its uniquely broad powers to do so, 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(c) (1988), and require 100% payment of that amount to the network in
case of rejection. One measure of damages would be her increase in salary
under the new contract. Such a rule would surely deter, if not eliminate, uses
of bankruptcy to reject contracts in illegitimate ways.
399. Andrew, supra note 15, passim.
400. In a thoughtful and helpful letter commenting on a draft of this Arti-
cle, Andrew indicates that the concept of exclusion of the contract from the
estate until assumption merely reflects the historical development of the doc-
trine rather than being important to his theoretical understanding. Letter
from Andrew to Westbrook (June 6, 1989) (copy on file with the author).
With deference, I am unable to understand important parts of his analysis
without the exclusionary idea. For example, the "ride-through" doctrine, see
infra note 426, seems to be important to his analysis, but he feels it is a "spuri-
ous historical artifact." Letter from Andrew, supra, at n.3. I can only con-
clude that we are somehow talking past each other. For now, I am stuck with
my understanding of his article, as explained in the text.
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the estate "as if" the debtor breached the contract.401 This "ex-
clusionary" approach substitutes a new metaphysics of bank-
ruptcy contracts for the old one.
At the core of my suggested analysis is a much simpler
idea: the estate inherits the debtor's pre-bankruptcy contracts
and is in exactly the same position as any other contract party
under nonbankruptcy law, with just two exceptions: a) after
rejection (breach), the remedies of the Other Party are limited
by the general bankruptcy rules constraining the remedies of
unsecured creditors; and b) ITIs of the Other Party may be sub-
ject to avoidance under the bankruptcy avoiding powers. Un-
like an exclusionary rule, which requires a new set of special
rules and concepts to understand the proper treatment of an
obligation that hovers somehow outside of bankruptcy, the
functional approach permits a simple, two-step analysis. What
are the rights and obligations of the estate under nonban-
kruptcy law in case of breach? How are the Other Party's rem-
edies under nonbankruptcy law limited by bankruptcy
remedies rules and by the avoiding powers? Unless there are
compelling reasons to develop special rules for nonassumed
contracts, Ockham's rule prefers the simpler analysis within
the existing framework of concept and doctrine.402
The exclusionary analysis requires us to ignore the lan-
guage and the structure of the Code. Andrew devotes consider-
able attention to the idea that rejection of a contract is not
breach,403 but the Code says "the rejection of an executory con-
tract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach. '40 4
If, as I argue, treatment of rejection as breach leads to straight-
forward and intuitively correct results, why read this language
out of the Code? To adopt the exclusionary concept forces us to
read section 365(a) as saying "the trustee may... assume or not
assume" executory contracts. 405 All this twisting and bending
401. Andrew, supra note 15, at 877-78. In his letter, Andrew emphasizes
that my view that the estate's breach gives rise to the claim of the Other Party
is central to our disagreement. Letter from Andrew, supra note 400, at 2. His
view rests on the historical development of the doctrine, as well as his under-
standing of the intention of the drafters of the Code. I certainly agree that the
measure of damages for breach (rejection) often refers to the effect of the
debtor's discharge of the obligation giving rise to the claim, see supra note 219,
but only when coupled with nonassumption by the estate.
402. W. OCKHAM, QUODLMBETA SEPTEM (1320).
403. Andrew, supra note 15, at 877-78.
404. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1988).
405. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 848-49. Section 502 would be tacitly
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of the language of the Code should be avoided unless some
overriding problem of concept and policy compels it.
Even more fundamental are the problems the exclusionary
analysis creates under section 541 (Property of the Estate). The
estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property.' '4° 6 Contract rights undoubtedly are property, as il-
lustrated by the fact that billions of dollars in financing are se-
cured by such rights (for example, accounts receivable).
Indeed, expectancies much less concrete and certain are rou-
tinely included in the "property of the estate. '40 7 Yet the ex-
clusionary analysis requires us to exclude "unassumed"
contracts in section 541. It also requires discovery of a provi-
sion in section 541 that admits a bundle of contract rights to the
estate after assumption. Section 541(a) is carefully drafted to
include in the estate interests in property acquired after bank-
ruptcy by use of the avoiding powers.40 8 It even provides for
post-petition acquisition of proceeds and profits40 9 and be-
quests.410 It has no provision for adding to the property of the
estate those contracts that the exclusionary approach permits
in the door only after assumption. The exclusionary concept
has no foundation in the Code. Worse still, it forces us to evade
and distort the whole structure of section 541, creating mani-
fold possibilities for confusion and error.
The difference between the exclusionary and the func-
tional approach is not merely conceptual. Conceptual differ-
ences nearly always have concrete and practical consequences,
whether or not we think of them when we first form the con-
cepts. Some of the operational differences between an exclu-
sionary and a functional treatment of bankruptcy concepts are
evident from the Andrew article.
Andrew is particularly concerned with the locus of an ex-
cluded contract, which he says remains in the original
debtor.4 11 He says, correctly, that if the original debtor
amended to read: "A claim arising from the nonassumption ... of an execu-
tory contract."
406. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
407. E.g., In re Dennison, 84 Bankr. 846, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (in-
cluding NFL disability insurance coverage in estate); Professional Sales Corp.
v. United States (In re Professional Sales Corp.), 48 Bankr. 651, 660 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill.) (including pollution permit in estate), vacated on other grounds, 56
Bankr. 753 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
408. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (1988).
409. I& § 541(a)(6).
410. Id. § 541(a)(5)(A).
411. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 879. Because of the confusion engen-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
breaches or fails to perform the contract, the discharge relieves
that debtor of the resulting liability.412 The exclusionary ap-
proach, however, leaves open the opportunity for the original
debtor to attempt to proceed with the contract after the bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. That consequence of excluding unas-
sumed contracts would create many problems.
The most important difficulty in permitting an original
debtor to claim the right to enforce a pre-bankruptcy contract
post-petition is that it is unfair to the Other Party, as well as a
trap for the unwary. In effect, it creates an assumption-rejec-
tion right in the original debtor, requiring the Other Party to
continue with a contract after the debtor has been stripped of
all of its assets. It establishes a new twilight world of perform-
ance and breach with no statutory time limits on assumption or
rejection and no court control. None of the protection the Code
provides to the Other Party as against the estate413 protects the
Other Party in this darkling outer world, with the ironic result
that the Other Party is protected in its dealing with the entity
with all the assets, the estate, but not with the destitute origi-
nal debtor.414 After a period of time under this legal regime,
well counseled Other Parties would re-insert bankruptcy or
ipso facto clauses in their contracts, and these clauses presuma-
bly would be good against the original debtor. From that time,
the rule would be merely a trap for the unwary and under-
lawyered Other Party.
The whole notion that rejection merely creates a claim "as
if" the debtor had breached, an idea central to the exclusionary
analysis,415 apparently rests on the premise that bankruptcy
might not accelerate contract claims.416 Although that subject
is too large for extensive treatment here, the better part of the
little authority we have suggests that bankruptcy does acceler-
ate all claims, at least in the sense that every pre-petition obli-
gation of the original debtor must be accounted for in the
bankruptcy case.417 The extraordinarily broad definition of
dered by the terms "debtor" and "debtor in possession," I use the phrase "orig-
inal debtor" to emphasize that I am talking about the person or entity that
filed for bankruptcy, or against whom bankruptcy was filed. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1988) (involuntary cases).
412. Andrew, supra note 15, at 877-78.
413. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1988).
414. Would performance by the original debtor (or its offer to perform) bar
the "as if" breach claim contemplated by the exclusionary rule?
415. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 878.
416. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 882.
417. See, e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700
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claim in section 101,418 and the policies served by that sweeping
definition, compel this result.419 That conclusion is re-enforced
by the power given to the debtor in rehabilitation cases to
maintain pre-bankruptcy contracts and financing agreements, a
power unnecessary if they continue unaffected by bankruptcy
in the absence of contractual default.420 Once again, the func-
tional approach fits neatly within the existing structure and the
detailed provisions of the Code, while the exclusionary concept
requires us to invent whole new provisions and procedures.
For example, Andrew feels compelled to develop a new defini-
tion of executory contract that threatens, in my view, to undo
much of the good done by his analysis.4 1
One of the points on which the exclusionary notion princi-
F.2d 1053, 1054-57 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding only lump-sum method of redemp-
tion available to a Chapter 7 debtor, not installment-payment method); In re
Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 Bankr. 293, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stat-
ing that "[b]ankruptcy operates as the acceleration of the principal amount of
all claims against the debtor"). Indeed, the acceleration rule sometimes may
change results in bankruptcy contract cases because it changes the nature and
timing of relief to the Other Party. See supra note 88. Some recent cases
seem inconsistent with this view. They are the so-called "lien-stripping" cases
involving § 506(d). See, e.g., Folendore v. United States S.B.A. (In re
Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1539-40 (11th Cir. 1989) (voiding lien on real estate
even where claim not disallowed; key is fresh start); FHA v. Garnett, 99
Bankr. 757, 757-58 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (voiding second, third, and fourth mortgage
on real property to the extent they were unsecured). I think they are explica-
ble as consumer protection cases whose principles should not be extended to
other contracts, if they are accepted at all. See, e.g., Larson v. Alliance Bank
(In re Larson), 99 Bankr. 1, 3-5 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989) (refusing lien-strip on
non-exempt apartment building, collecting cases).
418. [C]laim means -
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unma-
tured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988).
419. See supra note 215.
420. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1988) (maintaining payments); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1122(a), 1124(2), 1129(a)(8)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (deeming claims
unimpaired).
421. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 893 & n.174. For example, when the
debtor holds a valuable land option on Bankruptcy Day, but owes no further
performance, the Andrew definition would make the contract nonexecutory
and therefore, presumably, nonassumable, for no good reason that I can see
and to the prejudice of the estate and the unsecured creditors. See supra note
373 and accompanying text.
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pally rests is the set of "ride-through" cases,42 in which con-
tracts "ride-through" bankruptcy if they are neither assumed
nor rejected, rather like a stowaway sneaking around the immi-
gration shed and jumping back into the boat. The only "ride-
through" provision in the Code preserves the rights of lien-
holders under certain circumstances of inaction. 423  No
equivalent provision exists for unsecured Other Parties. Yet it
is said that they may sleep on their rights, pray for a mistake
by the trustee, and grab hold of their part of the estate assets as
the assets emerge from bankruptcy.4 It would be painful in-
deed if the Code required such a result, but happily it does
not.42
422. Cases decided under the Bankruptcy Act: see, e.g., Federal's, Inc. v.
Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577, 579-81 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Alfar Dairy, Inc.
(Palm Beach County Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Alfar Dairy, Inc.), 458 F.2d
1258, 1261 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); In re Greenpoint Metal-
lic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1940); Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise
Shoe Stores, Inc., 111 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 311 U.S. 454 (1940);
Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d
799, 802-05 (4th Cir. 1936); In re Computerized Steel Fabricators, Inc., 40
Bankr. 344, 348 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States Metal Prods. Co. v.
United States, 302 F. Supp. 1263, 1268-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); In re Grayson-Robin-
son Stores, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code: see, e.g., International Union,
UAW v. Miles Mach. Co., 34 Bankr. 683, 686-87 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Central Con-
trol Alarm Corp. v. Black (In re Central Watch), 22 Bankr. 561, 565 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1982); see also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 546 n.12
(1984) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that "in the unlikely
event that the contract is neither accepted nor rejected, it will 'ride through'
the bankruptcy proceeding and be binding on the debtor even after a discharge
is granted.... The nondebtor party's claim will therefore survive the bank-
ruptcy proceeding"). See aso Andrew, supra note 15, at 879 n.142 (citing above
cases and discussing "ride-through" rule).
423. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
424. Andrew, supra note 15, at 879 & n.142. Analogous to the claim that
the rights of Other Parties may ride-through bankruptcy, is the assertion that
an undersecured creditor can claim post-petition interest, even though both
rights are given only to fully secured creditors under §§ 506(b), 506(d). The
Supreme Court rejected the latter position as obviously inconsistent with the
statute. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 36
(1988).
425. Most of the cases Andrew cites as "ride-through" cases were decided
under the old Bankruptcy Act. Generally they rest on the fact that a contract
claim was not "provable" without rejection, so its holder did not get a bank-
ruptcy distribution but did avoid discharge of its claim. E.g., Federal's, 555 F.2d
at 581 (holding that default on unexpired lease of real property did not give
rise to a provable claim and contract remained executory); Mohonk, 111 F.2d
at 290 (holding that landlord does not become creditor with provable claim un-
til tenant rejects lease). Andrew suggests that the changes wrought by the
Code do not affect these cases. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 880 n.142. In
fact, the abolishment of the requirement of "provability" and the dramatic ex-
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The effect of a "ride-through" as described by Andrew4 6 is
exactly the same as if the contract had been assumed by the es-
tate. The estate must perform the contract or pay 100% U.S.
dollars for breach. The same result is achieved by a doctrine of
implied assumption. If that result is ever desirable and fair, im-
plied assumption is the preferable analysis,4 7 because assump-
tion is closely regulated by the Code and its effects are defined
pansion of the concept of "claim" eliminate the concern for the Other Party
who might not have a claim assertable in bankruptcy unless an ignored con-
tract rode through. See supra note 215; infra note 430 and accompanying text.
The new Code concept of finality in restructuring a debtor's affairs, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101(4), 1141(d) (1988), is inconsistent with the ride-through idea. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 50, at 180, 309, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIM. NEWS at
6140-41, 6266.
Other cases that Andrew cites really are "bar" cases, where the Other
Party tries to get its claim recognized after plan confirmation. Some suc-
ceeded, at least to some extent, and some did not. Compare Mohonk, 111 F.2d
at 290 (barring claim) with Afar Dairy, 458 F.2d at 1260 (allowing school
board's milk contract claim as setoff against post-petition milk deliveries). See
also Greenpoint, 113 F.2d at 884 (finding "ride-through" permitted payment of
a rejection claim at 20%). None of these cases clearly stands for the ride-
through proposition, despite Collier's adoption of their dicta. 8 COLLIER 14th,
supra note 135, 3.15[10] & n.37 (citing Greenpoint); 2 COLLIER 15th, supra
note 17, % 365.03[2]; 5 id. % 1123.021[b]. Of the Code cases Andrew cites, one
adopts the old Act cases with no analysis under the Code whatsoever. Interna-
tional Union, UAW, 34 Bankr. at 687. The other case, Central Watch, 22
Bankr. at 565, relies completely on In re Shoppers Paradise, Inc., 8 Bankr. 271
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980), discussed infra note 427.
426. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 879.
427. See Shoppers Paradise, 8 Bankr. at 278-79. Judge Schwartzberg's opin-
ion clearly suggests that the contract was assumed by implication from the
parties' conduct. Id. at 279. The opinion quotes the cases cited by Andrew for
the "ride-through" principle, but it obviously is based on an idea of implied as-
sumption. The case focuses on the status of a bankruptcy contract prior to as-
sumption or rejection, a difficult and important point not addressed here. See,
e.g., Skeen v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (In re Feyline Presents, Inc.), 81
Bankr. 623, 626 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (stating that "an executory contract
under Chapter 11 is... enforceable against the nondebtor party prior to the
debtor's assumption or rejection of the contract"). The equities protected in
most such cases could be satisfied under the Code by a "use and benefit" anal-
ysis, rather than the straight-jacket of implied assumption. See, e.g., Broadcast
Corp. v. Broadfoot, 54 Bankr. 606, 610-11 (N.D. Ga.) (use versus benefit in com-
pensation for television transmission facility pending assumption or rejection;
discusses principal "use and benefit" authorities), later proceeding sub nom.
Broadcast Corp. v. Subscription Television, 177 Ga. App. 199, 338 S.E.2d 775
(1985), aff'd sub nom. In re Subscription Television, 789 F.2d 1530 (lth Cir.
1986). In both Shoppers Paradise and Central Watch, the nonbankrupt party
tried to use executoriness to wriggle out of its obligations, and that "reverse
twist" procedural posture may help explain the results. See Westbrook, supra
note 61, at 620 n.100 (discussing Tobin v. Plein, 301 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1962) (ad-
dressing nonbankrupt party's argument that court should use trustee's "avoid-
ing" powers against the trustee)).
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in the Code and the caselaw, while "ride-through" takes us to
an extra-Code no-man's-land.
Assumption is supposed to be approved by the court.2 8 In
a Chapter 11 case, it is often part of the plan approved by the
creditors.429 Implied assumption, or any result with the same
effect, like "ride-through," violates these statutory commands
and offends the policies that these commands enforce. It
defeats court control over preferential treatment of a pre-peti-
tion claim, creates a special, hidden class of preferred creditors,
and may materially mislead creditors voting on a plan. It ought
not to be permitted except on a clear showing that the equities
are substantially in favor of assumption, considering not merely
the debtor's conduct and interest, but the other creditors as
well.430 If a contract is to "ride-through" bankruptcy, it should
be on the basis of that sort of strict scrutiny and not by an ex-
tra-statutory conceptual twist.
The principal reason that the exclusionary analysis is so in-
consistent with the statutory scheme is that modern bank-
ruptcy law rests upon the fundamental policy of "once and for
all," resolving all of the debtor's pre-petition affairs in one pro-
ceeding.43- Under the Act, concepts like "provability" caused
many types of claims to be denied distribution, on the one
hand, and to survive to taint the fresh start, on the other. The
Code, in its broad definition of claim and otherwise, was
designed to make bankruptcy a true financial watershed, for
natural persons and for reorganizing corporations. The enor-
mous social and financial problems in cases like Kane v. Johns-
Manville Corp.432 and Grady v. A.H. Robbins Co.433 never could
have been resolved, and no plan acceptable to financiers and
markets could have been confirmed, without this all-embracing,
now-and-forever approach. The exclusionary concept runs
against this tide of modern bankruptcy law and thus is thor-
oughly inconsistent with concepts and rules throughout the
428. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
429. See Epling, supra note 96, at 192-93.
430. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 880 n.143 (discussing difficulties
presented by ride-through rule).
431. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 180, 309, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6140-41, 6266.
432. 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988) (dealing with claims against major
manufacturer of asbestos products).
433. 839 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.) (addressing claims against manufacturer of
Dalkon Shield), cert dismissed sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins Co., 109 S. Ct.
201 (1988).
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Code.434
One key reason that Andrew and I are so far apart in con-
cept, despite agreement on a number of the crucial issues in the
treatment of bankruptcy contracts, is that we have different
434. The new intellectual property amendment is consistent with the anal-
ysis presented here and therefore inconsistent with the Andrew approach. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 365(n) (West Supp. 1989). The amendment is modeled on
§ 365(h)(1), which protects the Other Party as lessee or vendee of real prop-
erty if the estate rejects. See S. REP. No. 505, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, re-
printed in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 3200, 3202-03 [hereinafter
SENATE AMENDMENT REPORT]. Like those provisions, the new § 365(n) gives
the Other Party an option to accept rejection and proceed on the basis of
breach under nonbankruptcy law, or to retain its pre-bankruptcy interest in
the property.
Section 365(n) differs from the earlier provisions with regard to damages
for rejection. Although all three require the Other Party to continue contrac-
tual payments, it appears that § 365(n) provides the Other Party with a differ-
ent form of relief for damages caused by the rejection. Sections 365(h)(2) and
365(i)(2)(A) permit the Other Party to set off its damages from rejection
against the payments due, balancing this offset right by imposing a forfeiture
of the Other Party's right to assert a damage claim beyond the offset. See 2
COLLIER 15th, supra note 17, % 365.09 to -.10. Section 365(n) gives the Other
Party relief that is the reverse of that given by §§ 365(h) and (i). Under
§ 365(n), the Other Party may make a claim for rejection damages under
§ 502(g), but may not offset that claim against the estate's entitlement to royal-
ties. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 10, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 5796; 2 COLLIER 15th, supra note 19, S 65.13.
The results commanded by all three provisions are close to what would
emerge from functional analysis in their absence, assuming that non-
bankruptcy law gave the Other Party an ITI. On that assumption, the princi-
pal difference is that a functional analysis is better for the Other Party
because it permits both setoff and a rejection-damage claim. With this excep-
tion, the new amendment is symmetrical with functional analysis, assuming an
unavoidable nonbankruptcy ITI, because the new provision is not intended to
make any change in the estate's avoiding powers. See SENATE REPORT, supra
note 50, at 11, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5797. Therefore,
under a functional regime the new amendment, along with the other two pro-
visions, are unnecessary to the extent they track the proper result under
nonbankruptcy law.
On the other hand, these three sections may give the Other Party greater
rights than it has under nonbankruptcy law in cases where nonbankruptcy law
does not give the Other Party an ITI. To the extent that they do give greater
rights to an Other Party, these sections represent congressional mistakes, un-
less Congress intended to make special policy judgments that such interests
should receive greater protection in bankruptcy than under nonbankruptcy
law. Because the legislative history contains no hint of such policy conclu-
sions, see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 50, at 349-50, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6305-06; SENATE REPORT, supra note 50, at 60, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5846; SENATE AMENDMENT REPORT, supra, passim,
these sorts of provisions create the risk that Congress is changing state law en-
titlements in bankruptcy without recognizing that it is doing so and without a
good reason.
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views of the statutes' development and of the role of Professor
Countryman's analysis in that development. Although An-
drew's discussion of the history of bankruptcy contracts is in-
teresting and illuminating, I disagree that the nineteenth
century "title" view of bankruptcy contracts is close to the cor-
rect approach,435 and that the material breach test is a wrong
turning.43 6 I have stated my contrary view that the caselaw
before Countryman was a conceptual morass and that the statu-
tory moves in the correct direction were a triumph of practical
intuition over conceptual confusion.437 Professor Countryman's
material breach test was a vital step forward in the proper un-
derstanding of bankruptcy contracts. That is why so many ex-
perienced judges adopted it. By standing on his shoulders, we
can see past the conceptual problems that bedeviled those nine-
teenth century courts to a solution that reunites the treatment
of contracts in bankruptcy with the treatment of all other
kinds of property and claims.
VI. PRECEDENT
Even the reader who feels attracted by a functional analy-
sis of bankruptcy contracts may feel that this whole, long, for-
est-destroying discussion is rather pointy headed, given the firm
establishment of executoriness in the precedents and in the
Code itself.438 The judicial reader who likes this analysis may
be especially frustrated, seeing no point in learning to solve
these problems in a way forbidden by the law. There are at
least two approaches to an answer.
One is that the judge could become a "closet functionalist."
Locking the door to chambers, the judge could functionally an-
alyze bankruptcy contracts and then emerge to announce a re-
sult in terms of executoriness, leaving precedent safely
undisturbed. Because executoriness is almost infinitely manip-
ulable, this approach would almost always work. If the judge is
concerned about the need for intellectual assistance from the
lawyers in a system that presupposes an adversarial framing of
the issues and development of a record, the judge could invite
the lawyers into chambers for functional analysis among con-
senting adults. Or a cryptography could be developed, with the
435. See Andrew, supra note 15, at 850.
436. See generally id. at 874 & n.122, 875 & n.129.
437. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
438. See Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341, 344 & n.12 (1980).
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lawyers presenting the functional analysis of a case hidden in
the statement of facts (the facts being the key to functional-
ism), while translating the desired result into executoriness
terms in the memorandum of points and authorities.
All this would be quite practical. A number of cases al-
ready come close to doing just that.439 Cases, like Richmond,
that suggest an executory contract "power," 0 can be solved
without questioning the executoriness approach by showing
that they are really avoidance power cases, and by finding that
certain aspects of performance are final under state law. The
court could hold that the trustee cannot use rejection to rescind
and "get the onions back," even if the contract is executory.
Nearly all the remaining contract cases can be solved, as we
saw, by finding the contract executory, so that the trustee can
assume or reject, whichever maximizes the estate. The exist-
ence of Ancillaries, especially passive, negative ones, like not
enjoining the Other Party from doing something, makes it easy
to find a contract executory, and therefore to permit the
trustee to do the best thing.44 1 Thus, a hidden substratum of
functionalism might work well in practice, although at the cost
of that candor so dear to Professor Llewellyn" 2 and those of us
who admire him.
The alternative is to abolish the requirement of executori-
ness as a threshold requirement for performance or breach.
This direct approach might seem to fly in the face of the Code,
which authorizes the assumption or rejection of executory con-
tracts, especially since the legislative history refers to the mate-
rial breach test. 43 Yet the legislative history does not adopt
the material breach test, but only says that the test is a good
example of the general understanding of the phrase executory
contract.44 A number of opinions suggest that Congress delib-
439. E.g., In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984)
(discussing functional nature of an executory contract in bankruptcy); In re
Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. 780, 781 (D. Minn. 1983) (stating that it is "inappropriate
to apply a generalized rule such as in Countryman to all situations").
440. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1046-47 (4th Cir. 1985) (Richmond IV),
cert. denied sub non. Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
441. See supra notes 274 and accompanying text.
442. See Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARv. L. REV. 465, 470 (1987) (discussing Llewellyn's realist theory
and his "belief that legal rules must relate to the facts and must fit the reali-
ties of the transactions they govern").
443. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
444. Id
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
erately left the definition open, and that the courts are free to
continue caselaw development.445
Given that position, the courts might decide to look at con-
tract rights and obligations one by one, as functionalism sug-
gests, bundling together those rights that arise from a "single
contract" under nonbankruptcy law to the extent that non-
bankruptcy law makes realizing some of the rights depend on
performance of some of the obligations. Courts could then in-
terpret the congressional references to the material breach
standard as exemplary. They could find a congressional intent
to permit the courts to continue common law development of a
fuller understanding of executoriness. In that case, the term
"executory" could be used in its ordinary sense: A contract is
executory when there is any right or obligation unperformed or
unsatisfied on the date of bankruptcy. A functional analysis
could proceed from there.
In fact, judicial criticism of the material breach test is in-
creasing,446 although much of that criticism is unfair. The
problem is the threshold requirement of executoriness that the
material breach test first brought under rational control. Yet
those courts uneasy with the material breach test certainly
might be inclined to look for ways to avoid the problem by
eliminating the unnecessary and confusing requirement of
executoriness.
Given the confusion in the courts, it is difficult to claim
that commercial expectations would be seriously threatened by
this redefinition of executory contracts, or by the proposed new
analysis. Instead, the commercial world would be relieved from
445. E.g., In re Norquist, 43 Bankr. 224, 225-26 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984); In
re Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. 780, 781 (D. Minn. 1983).
446. For example, one opinion suggests that the material breach test is
helpful, but should not be exclusive:
Countryman's definition is somewhat simpler and more easily applied
[than Jolly's] in that the relevant facts may simply be plugged into the
formula and a clear answer produced. Yet, Countryman himself prob-
ably did not intend such a result, for he recognized the principle re-
cited in Jolly.... Thus, it would appear that Professor Countryman
recognized that no all-purpose definition of an 'executory contract' in
bankruptcy was possible, but that the courts could establish certain
threshold elements of inquiry which could be useful.
In re Gladding Corp., 22 Bankr. 632, 634-35 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (citation
omitted); see also Norquist, 43 Bankr. at 226-27; Adolphsen, 38 Bankr. at 781;
see generally Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 387, at 274-78 (discussing the
Countryman test); West, Life After Bildisco: Section 1113 and the Duty to Bar-
gain in Good Faith, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 65, 78 nn.53-54 (1986) (discussing execu-
tory contracts in the context of collective bargaining agreements).
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guarding against unbounded threats to expectations presented
by cases like Richmond, as well as the dilution of predictability
resulting from the present eccentric results throughout the
field of bankruptcy contracts.
Finally, courts sympathetic to the functional approach
could do a bit of both, analyzing functionally but adapting to
existing doctrine, until the executoriness doctrine quietly
ceases to matter, like the veriform appendix.
However the courts proceed, a proper analysis of bank-
ruptcy contracts would enable us to avoid congressional reac-
tions like the recent intellectual property amendment.447 It is
sometimes necessary for Congress to create exceptions to bank-
ruptcy rules, because some nonbankruptcy policy may be over-
riding. It is clearly not a good idea, however, to solve our
conceptual confusion about bankruptcy contracts by burdening
the Code with endless exceptions arising from our confusion
rather than from the policies underlying bankruptcy law. Such
an approach invites unfair special treatment based on political
advantage. It invariably creates a different set of rules for cer-
tain kinds of contracts in bankruptcy, without any congres-
sional determination that different bankruptcy treatment is
appropriate as a matter of federal commercial policy.
CONCLUSION
After such an arduous journey, a closing summary is the
least I can do. The four basic propositions of this article are:
1. There should be no threshold requirement that a con-
tract be "executory" as a prerequisite to assumption or rejec-
tion (performance or breach) by the trustee. 4 8 The trustee
may, indeed must, assume or reject every pre-bankruptcy con-
tract of the debtor that is not completely performed or satisfied
on Bankruptcy Day.44 9
2. The trustee's contract rights are the same as those of the
pre-bankruptcy debtor, except that under the equality of distri-
bution principle,450 the trustee may pay for breach in tiny
Bankruptcy Dollars, which makes breach profitable for the
trustee much more often than for a nonbankruptcy party,451
and the Other Party cannot get specific performance of a
447. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1988).
448. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text; Section III. A.
449. Id-
450. See supra text accompanying note 120.
451. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
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purely contractual covenant.45 2 The trustee's financial decision
to perform or breach is made in light of the estate's right to pay
in tiny Bankruptcy Dollars and its immunity from specific
performance.
3. The major exception to the equality principle is that
bankruptcy courts enforce a state-law interest in a specific asset
of the debtor, an ITI.4 5 3 When a contractual covenant is not
purely contractual (a general claim against the debtor and its
assets), but instead creates an ITI, then the Other Party can ob-
tain enforcement - specific performance - of its ITI.4M
4. The avoiding powers limit the enforcement of state-law
ITIs created by contract. 45 5 If an ITI is avoidable, it is not en-
forceable against the trustee and the analysis proceeds as if no
state-law ITI exists.45 6
In a court that adopts a functional approach to bankruptcy
contracts, the trustee's analysis proceeds almost backwards
through the foregoing propositions in analyzing each pre-bank-
ruptcy contract that is not fully performed or satisfied before
Bankruptcy Day:
1. Does this contract create a state-law ITI?
2. If the contract gives rise to a state-law ITI, is the ITI
avoidable?
3. A) If there is no ITI, or only an avoidable one, will the
estate profit more from performance of this contract, or from
breach and payment in Bahkruptcy Dollars?
B) If the ITI is unavoidable and therefore enforceable,
will the estate profit more from performance or breach, given
that any breaches of the other covenants in the contract will be
payable only in Bankruptcy Dollars?
Following the trustee's analysis, the court must evaluate
the additional question of the equities of the case where the
benefits of the bankruptcy remedy rules appear to flow to a
DIP or debtor.457 The court should evaluate alleged abuses on
the basis of the policies underlying discharge 458 (including the
possibility of denial of discharge) and, in Chapter 11 cases, upon
452. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
455. See supra notes 190-205 and accompanying text.
456. Id.
457. See supra note 308 and accompanying text; Section IV. C. 3.
458. See supra Section II. F; supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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the policies related to cramdown.459
The study of contracts in bankruptcy illustrates that the
joys and the frustrations of bankruptcy law are intimately in-
tertwined. Its youth and complexity make it a fascinating ob-
ject of study. Yet the difficulty of some of its problems, and the
lack of a complete theoretical understanding of its functioning,
too often leads its students, especially overburdened judges, to
throw up their hands and "do equity." That recourse is usually
a serious error. To some extent, the doctrines of Dean Jackson
and some other scholars, who seek to rein bankruptcy within a
very narrow intellectual and policy compass,460 may represent
an overreaction to the chaos threatened by "doing equity." This
reaction may be strengthened by a deep suspicion of bank-
ruptcy judges,461 the judges of the fourth clause.462
Those of us who believe that American bankruptcy laws,
especially the "chapter" proceedings, 46 3 are richly complex and
do not lend themselves to simple theoretical explanations,464
must do considerable work to unravel their complexities. In
treating bankruptcy contracts, as elsewhere, the bankruptcy
bench has done a remarkable job, but it is the task of the aca-
demic community to offer theoretical help. Decisions like Rich-
mond4 65 and Booth466 leave bankruptcy law too unbounded and
too greatly unsettle the commercial world that bankruptcy
serves. Yet the narrow premises of scholars like Dean Jackson
are unpersuasive to many who believe bankruptcy law is more
than the Creditors' Dilemma.4 67 The middle ground is the pa-
459. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988); id. §§ 1322, 1325; see supra notes 309-18 and
accompanying text.
460. See Jackson, supra note 74, at 10-13.
461. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 104, at 126-28.
462. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The reference is by analogy to the phrase
coined for federal judges by my late, distinguished colleague, Bernie Ward:
"the judges of the Third Article." Wright, The Wit and Wisdom of Bernie
Ward, 61 TEX. L. REv. 13, 19 (1982). It is interesting that leading practitioners,
as well as academics like me, who have had substantial experience in bank-
ruptcy practice, have a very different view of bankruptcy judges.
463. The "chapter" proceedings are Chapters 11 and 13, the "payout" chap-
ters. 11 U.s.C. §§ 1101-74, 1301-30 (1988).
464. See Nimmer, supra note 104, at 1011; Warren, supra note 101, at 811-
14.
465. Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub noam.
Lubrizol Enters. v. Canfield, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986),. discussed supra Section IV.
B.
466. In re Booth, 19 Bankr. 53, 58 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
467. See Jackson, supra note 74, at 10 & n.9 (describing creditors' choices as
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tient work of scholarship. I will be gratified if this Article con-
tributes to that work.
a type of prisoner's dilemma when the debtor's estate is insufficient to satisfy
all claims).
